Don't forget that Dell is a near-monopoly in its own way. I wonder what percentage of Microsoft's OS business comes from Dell sales? If it's significant (and it doesn't have to be that large of a percentage to be economically significant), Microsoft might not want to do something like what you've described.
But any given document will only be as secure as the least-secure workstation which has access to it. If the user of that workstation browses to a compromised site, and, oh I don't know, his browser loads an image with malicious code embedded in it that Windows blithely executes, then oops! you've got a backdoor into your network with at least the privileges of the user who "installed" it, including any privileges he has on the file server. Doesn't really matter how secure the file server is at that point, or what OS it's using for that matter.
I have had friends fired at jobs on the spot (as in the mgr calling for security and having two guards escort the person out, then calling for a "forensics" expert to go through the person's comp to find anything to have him arrested for) because they pointed to management that the place had wide-open wireless, or wireless with brain-dead security settings.
Really? Friends? As in, this has happened to more than one person that you know well?
How did these people go about "pointing to management"?
Slashdot Mirror
Don't forget that Dell is a near-monopoly in its own way. I wonder what percentage of Microsoft's OS business comes from Dell sales? If it's significant (and it doesn't have to be that large of a percentage to be economically significant), Microsoft might not want to do something like what you've described.
promptly available on request from anyone in the general public
Sure, but it's not promptly available for anyone in the general public to change.
But any given document will only be as secure as the least-secure workstation which has access to it. If the user of that workstation browses to a compromised site, and, oh I don't know, his browser loads an image with malicious code embedded in it that Windows blithely executes, then oops! you've got a backdoor into your network with at least the privileges of the user who "installed" it, including any privileges he has on the file server. Doesn't really matter how secure the file server is at that point, or what OS it's using for that matter.
I have had friends fired at jobs on the spot (as in the mgr calling for security and having two guards escort the person out, then calling for a "forensics" expert to go through the person's comp to find anything to have him arrested for) because they pointed to management that the place had wide-open wireless, or wireless with brain-dead security settings.
Really? Friends? As in, this has happened to more than one person that you know well? How did these people go about "pointing to management"?