In any case isn't what is being counted is page loads, not users?
Many firms measure page views, Net Applications (which shows IE in the lead) counts unique users.
Which is more important depends on what you plan on doing with the numbers (abstract "my browser is bigger than yours comparisons" not tied to any actual useful purpose can use either equally.)
One cannot answer hypothetical questions correctly
Sure you can.
since they offer no "truth" (the "yes") from which to derive an answer.
Assuming by "truth" you mean something like "accurate statements of external reality", this is not required for a correct response to a hypothetical question.
The logic (Philosophy) professors at college hated me, because I was right. ALL hypothetical questions must be answered hypothetically.
Uh, yeah. I doubt they hated you for that, since everyone knows that. They might have disliked your failure to understand what answering hypothetically means, though.
The question in class were usually something like "If all cats are dogs and all dogs are horses, are all cats horses?", the hypothetical answer is "yes" but in reality (truth) is no.
No, the answer, period, is yes, whether this is intended as a definition blind hypothetical (so that "cat", "dog", and "horse" are just variable names, not terms with definitions outside the question) or whether its a hypothetical about "cats", "dogs", and "horses" under the usual definitions.
In the former case, the question is equivalent to: Given p -> q and q -> r, does p -> r? Implication is transitive, the answer is yes.
In the latter case, then the question is "Is the implication ((p -> q) && (q -> r)) -> (p->r) satisfied when p->q, q->r, and p->r are always false." The answer here is also yes.
This is important because people often base hypothetical questions as "fact"
This clause is incoherent. If you mean people often assume that the premise of a hypothetical question is fact, then, to the extent that that is true, its simply a failure to understand what a hypothetical question is. It has no impact on the correct manner of answering such a question.
No, nothing on that site is an example of Google encouraging anything, except demonstrations of web technologies that work in Chrome, independently of whether they are Chrome-only or not.
Google could pretty easily prevent this for its "chrome experiments" via a simple policy of requiring capability sniffing, not UA sniffing for them
Arguably so, but there is a big giant excluded middle between "preventing" and "encouraging"; absence of the former is not the same as the latter.
the way other UAs do for branded demos.
Please provide evidence that other UA's require capability sniffing for branded demos. I can't, on a very cursory examination, see any. For instance, Mozilla DemoStudio's only firm requirements appear to be providing source code under an open license, packaging in a zip file and certain file organization requirements in that file, and using client-side technologies. Supporting multiple browsers is a "should", and there is no stated requirement or recommendation regarding UA and/or capability sniffing.
If you really care I can find you examples of Google encouraging truly Chrome-only pages (as in, sniff for "Chrome" in the UA).
Its your argument that they are doing it. I don't really care one way or the other if you present evidence for it or not, though if you keep making it while presenting evidence that doesn't support it, I might keep pointing that out.
I suspect that an investigation was done which determined two things: 1) It is concretely the case that Google was doing the kind of inclusion of competitors content that is complained about in the past, and 2) It is clear that Google has stopped at least some of the complained about use
(Many, many articles on this story have pointed out that both of those are, in fact, the case with reviews on Google.)
As this is an opportunity for Google to address the concerns in advance of a potential adversarial process, Google can probably very easily address this concern by noting that they did do it, that they've stopped doing it, and making a binding commitment to to continue not doing it.
How does China relate to this exactly? I looked at the wiki page and it seems they were an American company, HQ in chicago, etc. Did they own a lot of factories or property in China, thus needing permission?
They do own factories and other operations in China (actually, I believe they own a subsidiary which is a Chinese company which owns those operations.)
Yes, if it sniffs for WebKit and only runs if it finds WebKit that makes it WebKit-only. I would think that would be fairly obvious.
Chrome is a proper subset of the set of all WebKit browsers, so something that is WebKit-only but does nothing to assure that it is running on Chrome beyond sniffing for WebKit isn't Chrome only.
Note that it sniffs for WebKit and if it doesn't find it tells the user to go download Chrome.
That doesn't make it Chrome only. It makes it a WebKit-only app that recommends Chrome to non-WebKit-users that try to access it.
The version under development allows a portable representation.
The version under development is under development, and the capacity you reference that is under development (Portable Native Client or PNaCl) was specifically addressed in GP.
ActiveX is single OS / Single architecture; Native client is trying to become cross platform.
Native client is weakly cross architecture (in that Native Client exists on both ARM and Intel, but won't run the same binaries -- Portable Native Client aims to resolve that) and more strongly cross OS (in that it is supported on every OS Chrome is available on, and will run the same binaries on every OS using the same [ARM or Intel] architecture.) "Trying to become cross platform" implies that it isn't cross OS or cross architecture now, which is misleading.
Monopolies are NOT illegal. I swear to god this is one of the most misunderstood facets of US law.
You actually aren't helping it be understood well.
The Sherman Anti-Trust law establishes one illegal act.
This is true only for astoundingly large values of "one".
This is for a Trust (a business with a monopoly on a sector of the economy) to use that Trust to gain another Trust in a second business.
A "trust" is not a business with a monopoly, but a particular form of combination of businesses (whether or not it forms a monopoly.) And the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 USC Sec. 1-7) itself (and, a fortiori, US antitrust law which includes but is not limited to the Sherman Act) makes illegal more than just leveraging an existing monopoly to monopolize another area of business. Particularly, the Sherman Act:
Makes a felony of "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nation." (15 USC Sec. 1)
Makes a felony of "[e]very contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations" (15 USC Sec. 3(a))
Makes it a felony to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" (15 USC Sec. 2)
Makes it a felony to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia, and any State or States or foreign nations" (15 USC Sec. 3(b))
You can reasonably argue that Sec. 1 and Sec. 3(a) are the same "act", and that Sec. 2 and Sec. 3(b) are the same "act", which gets you two illegal acts under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. But you can't reasonably argue that there is only one illegal act created by the Sherman Act.
Also, the Sherman Act isn't the whole of US Antitrust Law, which also includes the Clayton Act (15 USC 12-27, 29 USC 52-53) and other provisions.
The Sherman Anti-Trust act has as a penalty for abuse of a Trust in that it allows the government to forcibly break up the business into smaller pieces (or leavy a fine and restrict the business)
The Sherman Act does not actually specify (or limit) the remedies for violation, aside from the criminal fines, or even expressly make final equitable relief available (preliminary injunctions are specifically referred to in the Sherman Act.) The Clayton Act does expressly provide (and regulate) some equitable remedies available for violations of Antitrust laws (including the Sherman Act.)
If they had no expectation of dividends - not necessarily now, but sometime in the future - then they were foolish to buy in the first place. Stocks are fundamentally valuable for exactly one reason: because they entitle you to dividends.
Since dividends aren't mandatory, they aren't really an entitlement. The inherent value of a stock is a claim on a shre of the assets of the corporation in the event of dissolution. Dividends are, in effect, a manner by which a corporation effects a partial dissolution to allow stockholders to realize some value without actually completely dissolving the corporation.
In a publicly traded firm, simply selling some portion of a stock holding on the open market acheives exactly the same thing as a dividend would from the point-of-view of the stockholder, except with better control of the timing.
Was $38 the present value of estimated future earnings of FB minus a risk permium or the balanced bookie position where half the players where for and half against?
Neither. It was the value Facebook convinced its underwriters that they could find other people to buy at that price.
Just in this case, it was the company whose IPO was being handled that sold the line of hype and visions of more suckers down the line to pass the overpriced stock onto, and the underwriters who bought it, rather than the underwriters and large-scale investors selling it, and the small-fry investors buying it.
I think it shows a great sense for rational valuation if after the first day the stock stayed within 10% of its opening either way.
It only stayed within that range on the first day because of underwriter intervention, and even with continued underwriter support its trading outside of that range on Day 2. Facebook did a good jump of finding underwriters to take to the cleaners on the IPO, but that's the only success story you can credibly write about this IPO.
This result was expected based on what happened on Friday. It was reported that the underwriting investment banks were propping up Facebook's share price on Friday to keep it above the IPO price of $38, so as to help their clients avoid losing money on the first day. Now that we're past day 1, the banks have stopped buying shares at the apparently overvalued price, which makes sense -- after all, if the banks are buying at $38, then they stand to lose money when they sell at a lower price in the future.
Actually, most of the reports I've seen today indicate that, while they aren't buying at the IPO price, the IPO underwriters are still supporting the stock at its current price (~12% below the IPO price), and are discussing the possibility of it really tanking if they decide to limit their losses and stop supporting it.
I know what everyone is saying about how the $38 share price was perfectly picked as the correct valuation of the company, but (and I am not a financial expert) what does this mean to the people who bought in on Friday?
Its a zero-sum game: the more fully the company has exhausted the supply of available capital in setting its IPO price, the less room there is for people who bought in at the IPO price to make money in the short term.
What investors have to hope for is long-term growth, but if investors outside of Facebooks underwriters generally saw much potential there, the share price wouldn't have only stayed around the IPO price on the IPO day with underwriter intervention, and wouldn't be falling below that price now.
Apparently, the only people sold on Facebook being worth the price set at the IPO are the IPO underwriters.
Facebook doesn't produce anything, it doesn't sell anything, and there's no charge to use the service.
That's not entirely true: it sells advertising, and it sells transaction services to application operators (by way of selling "Facebook credits".) But it doesn't sell enough of either to be worth anything near its the valuation implied by the IPO price, even if it wasn't -- by Facebook's own admission -- facing trouble with advertising due to its userbase shifting from the desktop (where there is plenty of advertising space to sell) to mobile (where they haven't figured out how to sell ads while still providing the functionality that would keep users using.)
I can't really understand why you're saying that share price going down on IPO is a troubling signal. During normal operation, sure, but on IPO? It just means that the company didn't undervalue themselves and sell their shares at too low prices.
Share price being relatively flat at and just after an IPO just means that, sure. The IPO underwriters having to intervene to keep the price at the IPO price on the IPO day and the price dropping significantly on day 2 means that and everything that the stock dropping during normal operations would mean.
If I were a shareholder before the IPO and the per share price would had doubled, that would mean half of my potential profit and ownership lost.
Uh, no.
If the per share price doubled at the IPO, then your potential realizable profit would have doubled, not lost half.
Its better for management if share price doesn't go up, because it means that all the money they could have raised was raised. But it doesn't somehow reduce the value of pre-IPO shareholders stock if the stock price goes up after the IPO. It increases that value.
Its definitely worse for pre-IPO shareholders if the stock price goes down after the IPO, and its as much a bad sign for the corporation as a similar decline would be any other time.
Sales to Amazon customers throughout California will be deemed to take place there, so all the sales tax earmarked for local government operations will go to those two cities."
In California, there is often a local city or county percentage added to the state sales tax. The cities can do whatever they want with *their* portion of the sales tax. The state's portion goes to the state.
Actually, there is also a portion of the state sales tax which is reserved for the use of the locality from which the tax was collected. This is in part (and maybe entirely--this has been done more than once in the past) due to realignment of previously-state-operated services to the counties (which is a popular way for California to do stealth service cuts -- instead of cutting services up-front, the funds that were supporting the services (and sometimes, less funds than the state was using to support the services) are redistributed to the counties which often can't use them as efficiently (having to reproduce the administrative functions provided by the state 58 times between them.)
Yes, private enterprise creates money, so governments require private enterprise.
Outside of banks, that's generally not true; money is created by either printing/minting it (usually a government monopoly) or extending credit, and most non-bank business don't create much if any money on balance.
Private businesses, if they are successful, attract existing money, rather than creating money.
52 counties in California and each has its own way of doing business.
58, actually.
It's supposed to preserve the interests of locals and that's true
Not really, its mostly a system that allows outside actors to spur a race to the bottom by threatening to take their business elsewhere. Both local politicians (who often want to score a short-term apparent accomplishment and move on to a bigger office before things blow up) and the outside actor have an interests in overstating the benefits to be expected from the deal and understating long-term costs and risks. Actual locals -- even entrenched, privileged locals -- aren't the real beneficiaries of the system.
Slashdot Mirror
Many firms measure page views, Net Applications (which shows IE in the lead) counts unique users.
Which is more important depends on what you plan on doing with the numbers (abstract "my browser is bigger than yours comparisons" not tied to any actual useful purpose can use either equally.)
Sure you can.
Assuming by "truth" you mean something like "accurate statements of external reality", this is not required for a correct response to a hypothetical question.
Uh, yeah. I doubt they hated you for that, since everyone knows that. They might have disliked your failure to understand what answering hypothetically means, though.
No, the answer, period, is yes, whether this is intended as a definition blind hypothetical (so that "cat", "dog", and "horse" are just variable names, not terms with definitions outside the question) or whether its a hypothetical about "cats", "dogs", and "horses" under the usual definitions.
In the former case, the question is equivalent to:
Given p -> q and q -> r, does p -> r? Implication is transitive, the answer is yes.
In the latter case, then the question is "Is the implication ((p -> q) && (q -> r)) -> (p->r) satisfied when p->q, q->r, and p->r are always false." The answer here is also yes.
This clause is incoherent. If you mean people often assume that the premise of a hypothetical question is fact, then, to the extent that that is true, its simply a failure to understand what a hypothetical question is. It has no impact on the correct manner of answering such a question.
No, nothing on that site is an example of Google encouraging anything, except demonstrations of web technologies that work in Chrome, independently of whether they are Chrome-only or not.
Arguably so, but there is a big giant excluded middle between "preventing" and "encouraging"; absence of the former is not the same as the latter.
Please provide evidence that other UA's require capability sniffing for branded demos. I can't, on a very cursory examination, see any. For instance, Mozilla DemoStudio's only firm requirements appear to be providing source code under an open license, packaging in a zip file and certain file organization requirements in that file, and using client-side technologies. Supporting multiple browsers is a "should", and there is no stated requirement or recommendation regarding UA and/or capability sniffing.
Its your argument that they are doing it. I don't really care one way or the other if you present evidence for it or not, though if you keep making it while presenting evidence that doesn't support it, I might keep pointing that out.
Isn't Motorola Mobility the biggest maker of Cable TV boxes?
Not unless Ireland conquered the State of Delaware when I wasn't looking.
I suspect that an investigation was done which determined two things:
1) It is concretely the case that Google was doing the kind of inclusion of competitors content that is complained about in the past, and
2) It is clear that Google has stopped at least some of the complained about use
(Many, many articles on this story have pointed out that both of those are, in fact, the case with reviews on Google.)
As this is an opportunity for Google to address the concerns in advance of a potential adversarial process, Google can probably very easily address this concern by noting that they did do it, that they've stopped doing it, and making a binding commitment to to continue not doing it.
They do own factories and other operations in China (actually, I believe they own a subsidiary which is a Chinese company which owns those operations.)
Yes, if it sniffs for WebKit and only runs if it finds WebKit that makes it WebKit-only. I would think that would be fairly obvious.
Chrome is a proper subset of the set of all WebKit browsers, so something that is WebKit-only but does nothing to assure that it is running on Chrome beyond sniffing for WebKit isn't Chrome only.
That doesn't make it Chrome only. It makes it a WebKit-only app that recommends Chrome to non-WebKit-users that try to access it.
No, its current information.
The version under development is under development, and the capacity you reference that is under development (Portable Native Client or PNaCl) was specifically addressed in GP.
Sniffing for WebKit doesn't make it Chrome-only.
Native client is weakly cross architecture (in that Native Client exists on both ARM and Intel, but won't run the same binaries -- Portable Native Client aims to resolve that) and more strongly cross OS (in that it is supported on every OS Chrome is available on, and will run the same binaries on every OS using the same [ARM or Intel] architecture.) "Trying to become cross platform" implies that it isn't cross OS or cross architecture now, which is misleading.
You actually aren't helping it be understood well.
This is true only for astoundingly large values of "one".
A "trust" is not a business with a monopoly, but a particular form of combination of businesses (whether or not it forms a monopoly.) And the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (15 USC Sec. 1-7) itself (and, a fortiori, US antitrust law which includes but is not limited to the Sherman Act) makes illegal more than just leveraging an existing monopoly to monopolize another area of business. Particularly, the Sherman Act:
You can reasonably argue that Sec. 1 and Sec. 3(a) are the same "act", and that Sec. 2 and Sec. 3(b) are the same "act", which gets you two illegal acts under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. But you can't reasonably argue that there is only one illegal act created by the Sherman Act.
Also, the Sherman Act isn't the whole of US Antitrust Law, which also includes the Clayton Act (15 USC 12-27, 29 USC 52-53) and other provisions.
The Sherman Act does not actually specify (or limit) the remedies for violation, aside from the criminal fines, or even expressly make final equitable relief available (preliminary injunctions are specifically referred to in the Sherman Act.) The Clayton Act does expressly provide (and regulate) some equitable remedies available for violations of Antitrust laws (including the Sherman Act.)
I think you misunderstood who "they" and "other people" refer to in the GP.
Since dividends aren't mandatory, they aren't really an entitlement. The inherent value of a stock is a claim on a shre of the assets of the corporation in the event of dissolution. Dividends are, in effect, a manner by which a corporation effects a partial dissolution to allow stockholders to realize some value without actually completely dissolving the corporation.
In a publicly traded firm, simply selling some portion of a stock holding on the open market acheives exactly the same thing as a dividend would from the point-of-view of the stockholder, except with better control of the timing.
Neither. It was the value Facebook convinced its underwriters that they could find other people to buy at that price.
Which turns out to have been optimistic.
Sure it did.
Just in this case, it was the company whose IPO was being handled that sold the line of hype and visions of more suckers down the line to pass the overpriced stock onto, and the underwriters who bought it, rather than the underwriters and large-scale investors selling it, and the small-fry investors buying it.
It only stayed within that range on the first day because of underwriter intervention, and even with continued underwriter support its trading outside of that range on Day 2. Facebook did a good jump of finding underwriters to take to the cleaners on the IPO, but that's the only success story you can credibly write about this IPO.
Actually, most of the reports I've seen today indicate that, while they aren't buying at the IPO price, the IPO underwriters are still supporting the stock at its current price (~12% below the IPO price), and are discussing the possibility of it really tanking if they decide to limit their losses and stop supporting it.
Its a zero-sum game: the more fully the company has exhausted the supply of available capital in setting its IPO price, the less room there is for people who bought in at the IPO price to make money in the short term.
What investors have to hope for is long-term growth, but if investors outside of Facebooks underwriters generally saw much potential there, the share price wouldn't have only stayed around the IPO price on the IPO day with underwriter intervention, and wouldn't be falling below that price now.
Apparently, the only people sold on Facebook being worth the price set at the IPO are the IPO underwriters.
That's not entirely true: it sells advertising, and it sells transaction services to application operators (by way of selling "Facebook credits".) But it doesn't sell enough of either to be worth anything near its the valuation implied by the IPO price, even if it wasn't -- by Facebook's own admission -- facing trouble with advertising due to its userbase shifting from the desktop (where there is plenty of advertising space to sell) to mobile (where they haven't figured out how to sell ads while still providing the functionality that would keep users using.)
Share price being relatively flat at and just after an IPO just means that, sure. The IPO underwriters having to intervene to keep the price at the IPO price on the IPO day and the price dropping significantly on day 2 means that and everything that the stock dropping during normal operations would mean.
Actually, there is also a portion of the state sales tax which is reserved for the use of the locality from which the tax was collected. This is in part (and maybe entirely--this has been done more than once in the past) due to realignment of previously-state-operated services to the counties (which is a popular way for California to do stealth service cuts -- instead of cutting services up-front, the funds that were supporting the services (and sometimes, less funds than the state was using to support the services) are redistributed to the counties which often can't use them as efficiently (having to reproduce the administrative functions provided by the state 58 times between them.)
Outside of banks, that's generally not true; money is created by either printing/minting it (usually a government monopoly) or extending credit, and most non-bank business don't create much if any money on balance.
Private businesses, if they are successful, attract existing money, rather than creating money.
58, actually.
Not really, its mostly a system that allows outside actors to spur a race to the bottom by threatening to take their business elsewhere. Both local politicians (who often want to score a short-term apparent accomplishment and move on to a bigger office before things blow up) and the outside actor have an interests in overstating the benefits to be expected from the deal and understating long-term costs and risks. Actual locals -- even entrenched, privileged locals -- aren't the real beneficiaries of the system.