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randomwalker writes "There was an extremely interesting presentation at the Blackhat Windows Security Conference in January by Dr Curtis Kret entitled Nobody's Anonymous. In his presentation he showed how information about spammers can be determined. In addition he showed that some spam is being used as a covert communication channel. This presentation demonstrates how to apply data forensics to spam in order to identify the sender of specific spam messages. Some senders can be identified by name, while others can be distinguished by attributes such as preferences, nationality, religion, and even left-handedness. Four spam categories are provided that classify spam by function, including List Makers, Scams, and Covert Communication channels. The examples provided include full-disclosure case studies: a phishing gang that targets bank customers with malware and impersonations, and an IRC group that uses spam as a covert communication channel."

randomwalker writes "There was an extremely interesting presentation at the Blackhat Windows Security Conference in January by Dr Curtis Kret entitled Nobody's Anonymous. In his presentation he showed how information about spammers can be determined. In addition he showed that some spam is being used as a covert communication channel. This presentation demonstrates how to apply data forensics to spam in order to identify the sender of specific spam messages. Some senders can be identified by name, while others can be distinguished by attributes such as preferences, nationality, religion, and even left-handedness. Four spam categories are provided that classify spam by function, including List Makers, Scams, and Covert Communication channels. The examples provided include full-disclosure case studies: a phishing gang that targets bank customers with malware and impersonations, and an IRC group that uses spam as a covert communication channel."

randomwalker writes "There was an extremely interesting presentation at the Blackhat Windows Security Conference in January by Dr Curtis Kret entitled Nobody's Anonymous. In his presentation he showed how information about spammers can be determined. In addition he showed that some spam is being used as a covert communication channel. This presentation demonstrates how to apply data forensics to spam in order to identify the sender of specific spam messages. Some senders can be identified by name, while others can be distinguished by attributes such as preferences, nationality, religion, and even left-handedness. Four spam categories are provided that classify spam by function, including List Makers, Scams, and Covert Communication channels. The examples provided include full-disclosure case studies: a phishing gang that targets bank customers with malware and impersonations, and an IRC group that uses spam as a covert communication channel."

Rathumos writes "The network security world has been waiting patiently for a definitive study of internet worms and defenses against them. Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms by Dr. Jose Nazario has arrived to fill that space with a clear and concise analysis of the current state of worm defense." Read on for the rest of Rathumos' review. Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms author Jose Nazario pages 322 publisher Artech House rating 10 reviewer Duncan Lowne ISBN 1580535372 summary This book provides a solid approach toward detection and mitigation of worm-based attacks.

Publishing a book on a subject as dynamic as internet worms can never result in a complete volume. The near-weekly outbreaks of modified versions of old worms and completely new designs is enough to frustrate the efforts of even the most prolific anti-virus software developers, let alone those who try to provide an overview of their study.

Nevertheless, Nazario accomplishes a clear and concise summary of the state of worms today. Seeded by a paper ('The Future of Internet Worms', Nazario, Anderson, Connelly, Wash) written in 2001, Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms encourages the reader to focus on the directions worm development might take in the future, with a specific view toward anticipation of, and prepartion for, future attacks.

The book begins with a discussion of the departure worms take from traditional computer virii. An outline of the benefits for the black-hat toward a worm-based attack, as well as a brief analysis of the threat model posed by worms, provide ample reason for the computer security professional to take the study of internet worms very seriously.

Beyond this introduction, the book is laid out in four major sections. The first introduces to the reader some background information crucial to the study of worms. The author discusses the history and taxonomy of past worm outbreaks, from their sci-fi origins (think John Brunner's Shockwave Rider) through modern-day outbreaks. A thorough analysis of various worms' traffic patterns is presented, with data broken down by infection rates, number of infected hosts, and number of sources probing specific subnets. Finally, the construction and lifecycle of worms are presented, with particular attention paid to the interaction between the worms' propagation techniques and the progression of their lifecycles.

The second section of the book (ch. 6 - 8) studies the trends exhibited by past worm outbreaks. Beginning with an examination of the processes and mechanisms of infection, it progresses on to a survey of the network topologies generated by a worm's distribution. Specific infection patterns are examined, along with case studies of worm outbreaks that have exhibited such patterns. Further, this section examines the common characteristics of vulnerable targets, from older UNIX and VMS mainframes through desktop systems onward to infrastructure equipment and embedded systems. A discussion of the payload transmission methods that have made recent worm attacks so devastatingly effective, and an explaination of why liberal use of a clue-hammer on users is not by itself enough to control and prevent further outbreaks, complement chapter nine's analysis and speculation of the future of internet worms.

Section three (ch. 9 - 11) focuses on worm detection strategies, and is more distinctly aimed at the already-overworked network security professional. Effective methods of detecting scans and analyzing a worm's scan engine are presented with a focus on timely and efficient protection from further infection. Monitoring techniques for quickly recognizing, analyzing and responding to worm outbreaks leads into a detailed description of well-placed honeypots and dark network monitors ("black holes"). Discussion of the (so-far) most effective method of worm detection, signature analysis, completes the section, and covers host-based and logfile signatures, along with a brief overview of analyzing logfiles using commonly available utilities.

The final section of the book (ch. 12 - 16), per the book's namesake, aims at defense strategies against worm outbreaks. Beginning with the obvious first steps which anyone reading the book ought to have implemented (firewalls, virus detection software, sandboxing, and patching-patching-patching), the section progresses into less widely used but equally important proxy-based defense methods, and continues on to cover slowing down infection rates and fighting back against existing worm networks. For the sake of thoroughness, an overview of the legal implications of attacking worm nodes receives its fair share of attention simply to alert the reader of the potential pitfalls of proactive defense.

Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms is decidedly aimed at the experienced network security professional, but holds a much broader appeal than most technical books. With its thorough historical analysis of worm progression over the past thirty years, anyone with even a remote interest in the past, present or future of the only network security issues to consistently make headlines in the mainstream press will find this both an entertaining and enlightening read. Overall, it makes a valuable addition to any geek's bookshelf.

You can purchase Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

An anonymous reader writes "For years, noted cypherpunks such as Brad Templeton, Ian Goldberg (PDF link), Bram Cohen, and Len Sassaman (PDF link) have been calling for easy to use email encryption solutions which involve little crypto comprehension on the part of the user. Now, it seems like someone has listened: PGP Corporation has announced its PGP Universal, which says it 'shifts the burden of securing email messages and attachments from the desktop to the network in a way that is automatic and entirely transparent to users'." The Register has more information on these newly announced proxy servers.

scubacuda writes "Cal State Fullerton's Edward Castronova (who recently wrote an excellent analysis of gender inequality between male and female Everquest avatars) has just updated his notes on 'Hacker Court', a mock trial held at Vegas' Black Hat Conference on whether virtual items destroyed during the hack of an online video game constituted real loss. 'No verdict was reached, but the jury and audience agreed that the damages were real,' says Castronova."

Blaine Hilton writes "Stealing the Network is a refreshing change from more traditional computer books. The authors have created fictional stories based on non-fictional concepts that could really happen to our computer systems today. The realistic fiction approach makes the book much lighter to read and actually entertaining. I also believe this approach makes the true methods behind the fictional stores much more memorable then memorizing thousand page textbooks." Read on for his overview of the book. Stealing the Network: How to Own the Box author Ryan Russell, Tim Mullen (Thor), FX, Dan Kaminsky, Joe Grand, Ken Pfeil, Ido Dubrawsky, Mark Burnett, and Paul Craig pages 328 publisher Syngress rating 8 reviewer Blaine Hilton ISBN 1931836876 summary An interesting fictionalized approach to hacking and other aspects of information security.

I'm leery of books that are written by multiple authors because the writing style always seems to keep me off beat from jumping around, however in this book it works out well since the book is organized as a series of short stories. Each story describes somebody involved in information security -- either somebody trying to access a system, or a person trying to keep the bad guys out.

If you are looking for a step-by-step guide to locking down your computer and network, this is not the book for you. Instead, this book is more to help people who already have at least a basic understanding of information security to see from another perspective. Stealing the Network looks at other reasons why people can break in: everything from being told to go to industry conferences to not collecting access cards when an employee leaves the company. What this book left deepest in my mind is to trust nothing, and assume even less.

After the ten short stories of how hacking is really done, there is a nicely done appendix along with Ryan Russel's "Laws of Security," which finishes this fictionalized book in a very non-fictional way. The laws cover most of the problems with current IT infrastructure, but do not go in-depth with what I believe is the biggest security hole, the user. Many of the stories touch on this fact but that's about the extent of it. I believe this may be because there are not any easy solutions to human behavior. This book says it best with "people are lazy."

At 328 pages (in pretty large text), this is a great easy read, though the book would be better with a lower price tag. However if you work with or around computers and the Internet, this book is very enlightening, if not completely informative.

Table of Contents

• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Forward
• Chapters:
  1. Hide and Sneak
  2. The Worm Turns
  3. Just Another Day at the Office
  4. h3X's Adventures in Networkland
  5. The Thief No One Saw
  6. Flying the Friendly Skies
  7. dis-card
  8. Social (In)Security
  9. BabelNet
  10. The Art of Tracking
• Appendix - The Laws of Security

Most of the book's authors have websites you can hit for more information; follow these links to find more from Ryan Russell, Tim Mullen (Thor), FX, Dan Kaminsky, Joe Grand, Ken Pfeil, Ido Dubrawsky and Mark Burnett, as well as Jeff Moss (who wrote the forward).

You can purchase Stealing the Network from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

Effugas writes "After pushing OpenSSH to perform feats of secure tunneling far beyond what I ever expected it could do, it became clear that some genuinely useful modes of network operation were simply inaccessable without either replacing or manipulating core network protocols. Since the basic infrastructure of the Internet isn't likely to change any time soon, that left...creative manipulation and reconstruction of the Lingua Reseaux: TCP/IP. Taking advantage of expectations, pitting layers against eachother, finding new uses for old options and data fields -- instead of simply unleashing the latest incarnation of some "Ping of Death", could such work unveil hidden functionality within existing networks? As I discussed at Black Hat 2002 and the inimitable Defcon X, the answer is yes. And now, proof of this is ready. BSD Licensed (in deference to the very source of TCP/IP), The Paketto Keiretsu, Version 1.0, is a collection of five interwoven "proof of concepts" that explore, extract, and expose previously untapped capacities embedded deep within networks and their stacks, at Layers 2 through 4. The five -- scanrand, minewt, lc ( linkcat ), paratrace, and the OpenQVIS cross-disciplinary-a-go-go phentropy -- demonstrate Stateless TCP Scanning, Inverse SYN Cookies, Guerrila Multicast, Parasitic Tracerouting, Ethernet Trailer Cryptography, and quite a bit more. (For details, stop by DoxPara Research or check out the latest slides. The academic paper is coming "soon".) In terms of actual usefulness, scanrand is no nmap, but it's still interesting: During an authorized test inside a multinational corporation's class B, scanrand detected 8300 web servers across 65,536 addresses. Time elapsed: approximately 4 seconds."

NeedaFirewall writes: "With all of the recent vulnerability announcements and increased concern about terrorism, a lot of folks are starting to take security and privacy more seriously, both at the network and node levels. Large companies can afford to send their IT people to detailed technical security conferences offered by the likes of SANS, Blackhat, and others. Some of these cost thousands of dollars for a single seminar, class, or other event. Small companies and individual programmers, network admins, etc (like me!) often can't afford these. Where can they go to learn more about security? Are there quality security conferences, seminars, trade shows, and the like out there that the little guys can afford? Particularly broad-scope gatherings that can teach these 'security newbies' the basics and alert them to the most pertinent threats?"