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Whalen also argues that she has standing because she lost time and money associated with credit monitoring and other mitigation expenses. (Pl.’s Opp. Br. at 8.) But the Supreme Court has dismissed this type of argument, explaining that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture standing” through credit monitoring. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151, 185 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2013). “If the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.” Id.

That conclusion rings especially true here where Whalen cancelled her affected credit card. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 14-CV-4787, 2014 WL 7005097, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (“[T]here is no reason to believe that identity theft protection was necessary after [the plaintiff] cancelled the affected debit card.”). Thus, these allegations are insufficient to confer standing.

The judge's argument here seems weak to me. In Clapper v Amnesty, the credit monitoring was somewhat speculative. In this case, when you know your personal information has been stolen, it is best practices. Also, the judge completely ignored the time wasted cancelling the credit card. You can read it yourself.

As someone else mentioned, I'd think the fact that the credit card number was demonstrably given to a criminal is already prima facie evidence of harm. If I stole your credit card, handed it to the nearest homeless person and told him, "have fun with this," that would be some clear harm, even if the CC company reimbursed me.

Moreover, even thought the First Amendment clearly forbids Congressional abridgment of the Press, the Supreme Court has allowed multiple exceptions [wikipedia.org].

Oh, of course. Can't let the citizens go saying anything they want any time they feel like it, can we? Need to get that Constitutional Amendment passed quickly, too, since the SCOTUS Citizen's United decision is so dangerous! After all, four years of campaign financing is now ALMOST as much money as is spent on Halloween candy every year.

Plus, well, with all the hand-held devices available all over the place, that "press" moniker is a little too loosely interpreted, isn't it? Time to require licensing for journalists, wouldn't you say? After all, we can require licensing for owning a weapon, why not for having protections of "the press", too? The pen, after all, is mightier than the sword.

The First Amendment doesn't have the "In order to maintain a well regulated militia"-type clause.

Since you point out the speech limitations the SCOUST has allowed, I should point out that they have rule that clause really has no bearing on the right to bear arms, which was unequivocally ruled to be a right of the people, not state governments.

(Sorry it's not a Wikipedia link - since I'm not a douchebag, I don't link to Wikipedia as a reference.)

> The first sentence of TFA and TFS says "The U.S. Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that police can stop and search a driver based solely on an anonymous 911 tip."

Adorable.

> I haven't read the decision myself

Perhaps you should.

> so I could be wrong,

You are.

> but that's what it says here.

Adorable.

Allow me. From the decision

Syllabus

A California Highway Patrol officer stopped the pickup truck occupied by petitioners because it matched the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As he and a second officer approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. They searched the truck's bed, found 30 pounds of marijuana, and arrested petitioners. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Their motion was denied, and they pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.

Held: The traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the truck's driver was intoxicated. Pp. 3-11

http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/p...

It seems to me that this could be interpreted to allow the following scenario: A police informant runs out of gas in front of your house. You let him in to use your phone so he can get a ride. The police then mysteriously show up wanting in. You tell them no but from behind you the informant yells "come right in."

That's not what's going on in this case though.

The /. summary is wrong.

Using your case as an example, you kindly let the informant in. Later, police come to your door. The officer asks "may we search your place?" You say "no". Doesn't matter what the informant says. Your "no" still rules, as long as you are still there. That's still going to be the case.

US v. Matlock, 1974 allowed the search as long as someone who could consent did consent. "Government must show, inter alia, not only that it reasonably appeared to the officers that the person had authority to consent, but also that the person had actual authority to permit the search..."

Georgia v. Randolph, 2006, changed it so that if any occupant objected, then the search could not take place.

Today's ruling, Fernandez v. California clarified and limited the exception from Georgia v. Randolph. If the person who objected to the search isn't there, and the person there is able to and does consent to a search, the search is valid.

It seems to me that this could be interpreted to allow the following scenario: A police informant runs out of gas in front of your house. You let him in to use your phone so he can get a ride. The police then mysteriously show up wanting in. You tell them no but from behind you the informant yells "come right in."

That's not what's going on in this case though.

The /. summary is wrong.

Using your case as an example, you kindly let the informant in. Later, police come to your door. The officer asks "may we search your place?" You say "no". Doesn't matter what the informant says. Your "no" still rules, as long as you are still there. That's still going to be the case.

US v. Matlock, 1974 allowed the search as long as someone who could consent did consent. "Government must show, inter alia, not only that it reasonably appeared to the officers that the person had authority to consent, but also that the person had actual authority to permit the search..."

Georgia v. Randolph, 2006, changed it so that if any occupant objected, then the search could not take place.

Today's ruling, Fernandez v. California clarified and limited the exception from Georgia v. Randolph. If the person who objected to the search isn't there, and the person there is able to and does consent to a search, the search is valid.

Economic damages are seldom considered "irreparable harm". Harm, yes. Irreparable, no.

And you (and the court) appear to be positing two logically incompatible scenarios:

1) publishing the code (open or not) as his own product
2) hiding the fact that he published it.

These are mutually incompatible goals.

Well, you could do worse than to look at 17 USC sections 106(3), 602, 109, 107, and the recent Kirtsaeng decision from the US Supreme Court (find that here: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/mobile/document/Kirtsaeng_v_John_Wiley__Sons_Inc_No_11697_2013_BL_71417_US_Mar_19/1 [bloomberglaw.com] )

So, that's the tale of somebody who was challenged on his right to dispose of books that he lawfully had sent to him from outside the country.

He had to go all the way to the Supreme Court to get the adverse claim dismissed.

Is that much like an enouraging example??

Or is it to tell the OP that he needs to get used to the custom of treating law-courts as a kind of social meeting-place?

-wb-

Well, you could do worse than to look at 17 USC sections 106(3), 602, 109, 107, and the recent Kirtsaeng decision from the US Supreme Court (find that here: http://www2.bloomberglaw.com/public/mobile/document/Kirtsaeng_v_John_Wiley__Sons_Inc_No_11697_2013_BL_71417_US_Mar_19/1 )

No, it is very clearly a copyright case. It was questioned as to whether or not first sale applied here, and the courts so far have determined that it does not. It's got nothing to do with import duties or the like.

Anyway, here's a link to the actual appellate opinion, so that you can read it and fully understand the situation yourself.

He had somewhere between $900,000 and $1,200,000 in revenue (no idea what the profit margin was).

Argument seems to be that 17 U.S.C. S 109(a) says:

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title,
or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.

And something manufactured overseas isn't "lawfully made under this title" is what the Court of Appeals ruled.

http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/John_Wiley__Sons_v_Kirtsaeng_654_F3d_210_99_USPQ2d_1641_2d_Cir_20 has details.

Here's links to a few of the patents in question:
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=5747282.PN.&OS=PN/5747282&RS=PN/5747282
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=5837492.PN.&OS=PN/5837492&RS=PN/5837492
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=5693473.PN.&OS=PN/5693473&RS=PN/5693473
And here's the Federal Appeals Court case, which lists the rest of the patents:
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/document/Assn_for_Molecular_Pathology_v_US_Patent__Trademark_Office_653_F3