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There's a difference between minimalistic and tacky

Not surprisingly, Bush signed a Belarus Democracy Act, to end this last dictatorship in Europe. And, as with all places where "US Democracy" should be put into place, the US is learning pretty quickly from them.

Today Novell is the only company in our industry that is able to provide a customer not only with the code to run Linux, not only the service and support for it, but the patent, a patent covenant that runs for Microsoft Corporation, and that we think is very important, again, as you heard from Ron, for all of the customers in the industry.

... And you'll see, as well, an economic commitment from Novell to Microsoft that involves a running royalty, a percentage of revenue on open source software shipped under the agreement.

And then the second thing I'm going to say is, if you want to use Linux, let's make sure that you get a version of Linux that respects our intellectual property, and I will even help you with that because of the commitment we made.

...we've struck a deal under which we can provide patent agreements to Linux customers in which Microsoft's intellectual property is respected, and we are appropriately compensated for the use of our intellectual property.

... Novell is actually just a proxy for its customers, and it's only for its customers.

Who has a volunteer army? Not us, our soldiers get PAID. We have a professional army. There is a big difference between a volunteer and someone who is being paid for their services. Many of the people who have enlisted normally go for the GI bill and things of that nature. If we truly had a volunteer army, the amount of soldiers would be a small fraction of a professional army. I guess the Marines, Special OPs etc would remain because they are so dedicated they probably wouldnt mine not being paid.

In the case of history, it tells us much that invading Afghanistan is nothing like Iraq or Vietnam. First, Alexander the Great had much trouble in this part of the world. Mostly from guerilla fighters who knew the terrain very well. It was only the supreme loyalty of his troops that in end allowed him to win out.

The second and last time that Afghanistan was sucessfully invaded was by the Arabs in the 8th century. What makes this interesting is that the Arab armies were very poor quality and considered by their foes to be 'primitive warriors'. However these 'primitive warriors' were able to defeat the highly disciplined and organized armies of Byzantium and Persia. The simple reason why was their great determination fueled by Islam. These warriors felt that no matter what they were going to win because they were on side of Allah. This never-ending blind faith of victory is very hard to overcome. This is the major motivator for the Afghanistan soldier.

This site shows in great detail the many problems the Soviets faced while fighting in Afghanistan.

The major problems are:

1. We will be fighting a highly motivated guerilla force. In guerilla warfare the side with the most moral committment will be victorious. The Afghani warriors have shown they are almost unmatched in this catagory.

2. A professional army trained in conventional warfare must be retrained to fight in a guerilla conflict. Many of our soldiers have not be faced or trained against such an enemy as the Afghanis. Learning in the field will mean thousands of additional casualties. While the Afghanis are already battle-hardened and remember the lessons learned from the Soviet conflict.

3. The Persian Gulf War saw very little casualties, is America ready to pay the price in the thousands? This is yet to be determined. When an expected 2 week campaign turns into 2 years will the moral committment still be there?

4. Technological superiority has little influence on a guerilla conflict. Guerilla warriors do not come out in the open and fight. They will appear and disappear. Our technology is designed to help with a conventional warfare conflict. How do you fight an enemy that does not play by your rules?

I know the Taliban has very little support inside and outside Afghanistan. However this could rapidly change. An invasion of Afghanistan could rally Taliban support. The Afghanis will see the Taliban as defending their homeland from outside invaders. The 50,000 troops of the Taliban could quickly turn into 500,000. Also if the Afghanis make some progess and win some victories, outside help would not be hard to find. America has many enemies and if the Afghanis show promise, expect outside help. Much like in our own War of Independence it took some victories to turn some heads our way.

All this said, I believe a small special ops centered attack will work. Simply go in, attack the training camps and get out. This coupled with air attacks will increase the probability of a victory. Yet, this will not bring down the Taliban but only destroy major terrorist operations within Afghanistan. And isn't that what we want?

THE SOVIET WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: HISTORY AND HARBINGER OF FUTURE WAR?

The problems and losses documented in this in-depth article about Russia's experience in Afghanistan are staggering. From 1/4 to 1/3 of a unit's strength was often sick with hepatitis, typhus, malaria, amoebic dysentery, and meningitis. 15,000 dead, 415,932 troops fell victim to disease, 73 percent of the overall force, who were wounded or incapacitated by serious illness. Soviet equipment losses included 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 tanks, 1314 armored personnel carriers, 433 artillery pieces or mortars, 1138 communications or CP vehicles, 510 engineering vehicles and 11,369 trucks.

It scares the sh*t out of me to think that the US could attempt something similar.

Part of my job involves performing research that supports simulation and training for the Army, so in the days after the September 11 attacks, I began to research the history of military engagements in Afghanistan to try and gain an understanding of the Army's near term simulation and training requirements. The parent article was new to me, but there are several other related articles I found that may be of interest:

This link covers the history of the first anglo-afghan war, culminating in the wintertime British retreat from Kabul of 16,500 soldiers and camp followers, of which only one person survived.

An excellent "lessons learned" overview of the recent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is given here, written by a General of the Soviet Army of Afghanistan. One of the most striking revelations are that disease incapicated far more Soviet soldiers than Afghan bullets. Demoralization of the Soviet soldier also played an important role in the eventual failure of the operation, making the regular soldiers more likely to shield themselves behind massive but ineffective artillery fire, without engaging in the close-in infantry fighting that was necessary for success. Operations of the Spetsnaz (Soviet special forces) generally met with better success. A very interesting preview to tactics that are likely to be employed, vs. those tactics that are likely to be avoided by the US Army.

This article on Artillery tactics provides a detailed review of the success and failure of Soviet artillery tactics in Afghanistan. Conclusions are that the Soviets too often attempted to substitute firepower for ground maneuvers, and that such tactics, while sometimes appropriate for conventional warfare, are ineffective in battling guerilla forces in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.

One of the best overall analysis I have found of the military and political history of Afghanistan is given in the article "Afghanistan as a Rentier State Model: Lessons from the Collapse". The thesis is that Afghanistan is a "rentier state", a nation that cannot survive without economic support from external sources. In recent times this support has come from the Soviets, and then the US and other western sources. After the support was withdrawn, the expected disintegration of the Afghan state occurred, until support from the Pakistanis allowed the Taliban to become a unifying force. Highly recommended reading if you want to get a better understanding of the internal politics of Afghanistan.

Finally, on a related note, the first three chapters of an English translation of the Russian historical novel "Assault on Grozny Downtown" can be accessed here. The Russian version is written by former Russian Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, describing his experiences in fighting the Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya. The translations are provided by volunteers, and more volunteers are needed to finish the translation. More than anything else I have read recently, this piece most accurately communicates what I imagine to be the horrors of urban warfare in which no quarter is given and none is received.

Part of my job involves performing research that supports simulation and training for the Army, so in the days after the September 11 attacks, I began to research the history of military engagements in Afghanistan to try and gain an understanding of the Army's near term simulation and training requirements. The parent article was new to me, but there are several other related articles I found that may be of interest:

This link covers the history of the first anglo-afghan war, culminating in the wintertime British retreat from Kabul of 16,500 soldiers and camp followers, of which only one person survived.

An excellent "lessons learned" overview of the recent Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is given here, written by a General of the Soviet Army of Afghanistan. One of the most striking revelations are that disease incapicated far more Soviet soldiers than Afghan bullets. Demoralization of the Soviet soldier also played an important role in the eventual failure of the operation, making the regular soldiers more likely to shield themselves behind massive but ineffective artillery fire, without engaging in the close-in infantry fighting that was necessary for success. Operations of the Spetsnaz (Soviet special forces) generally met with better success. A very interesting preview to tactics that are likely to be employed, vs. those tactics that are likely to be avoided by the US Army.

This article on Artillery tactics provides a detailed review of the success and failure of Soviet artillery tactics in Afghanistan. Conclusions are that the Soviets too often attempted to substitute firepower for ground maneuvers, and that such tactics, while sometimes appropriate for conventional warfare, are ineffective in battling guerilla forces in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan.

One of the best overall analysis I have found of the military and political history of Afghanistan is given in the article "Afghanistan as a Rentier State Model: Lessons from the Collapse". The thesis is that Afghanistan is a "rentier state", a nation that cannot survive without economic support from external sources. In recent times this support has come from the Soviets, and then the US and other western sources. After the support was withdrawn, the expected disintegration of the Afghan state occurred, until support from the Pakistanis allowed the Taliban to become a unifying force. Highly recommended reading if you want to get a better understanding of the internal politics of Afghanistan.

Finally, on a related note, the first three chapters of an English translation of the Russian historical novel "Assault on Grozny Downtown" can be accessed here. The Russian version is written by former Russian Captain Vyacheslav Mironov, describing his experiences in fighting the Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya. The translations are provided by volunteers, and more volunteers are needed to finish the translation. More than anything else I have read recently, this piece most accurately communicates what I imagine to be the horrors of urban warfare in which no quarter is given and none is received.