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This lovely fellow was also on my mind. Or this rather sordid story...

One could also look to the ongoing "hydrofracking" saga, or the vast number of leaking mine sites in the American west whose owners disappeared once the extractable minerals were gone, leaving the heavy metal leachates for somebody else to drink. Because extraction industries are always rather ugly(or, at best, are much more expensive to run cleanly), an ability to evade liability for environmental destruction and human casualties is a valuable competitive advantage in the sector.

In terms of sheer political rot caused by this, coal country is probably the worst domestic location; but one can, of course, find much more extreme examples in the assorted despotic oil princedoms and warlord-controlled African mines and other such delightsome places...

You're looking too hard for slippery slopes.

Technically, you're right, it is possible that copyright could be broadly re-purposed to stifle political dissent. But to do so would be incredibly unwieldy. First, you'd need to assign the copyright of all "controversial" speech to a friendly agent, then they'd need to sue each speaker and overturn the fair use doctrine, which allows me to reproduce a few bars of a politically powerful, but copyrighted song in another work for the purpose of commentary. Then they'd have to impose tough enough sanctions for this to be effective.

All in all, it's too complicated. Even if the the UK had convinced the guy who owned the copyright to "don't tread on me" to sue, there's no way he's going to track down all the flag makers.

In reality, the government has much better tools it could re-purpose to stifle dissent. Hell, just yesterday, SCOTUS found that giving "material aid," including advice (read:speech) to foreign terrorist groups is not constitutionally protected. I would think that it would be easier to define reading controversial material to be giving "material aid" than to try to extend copyright to do the same thing.

[...] the constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity protects states from prosecution under federal law [...]

I never thought the day would come when I'd be happy to read those words. What with the government using sovereign immunity, among other things, to protect prosecutors who fabricate evidence and use it at trial, I'd forgotten that the doctrine can be used for good as well.

Let's assume we ban campaign donations from foreign individuals -- can they give money to citizens who may be sympathetic to their cause? Or organizations formed inside the U.S.?

What about, say, BP, which, though of foreign origination, is a legally recognized entity inside the U.S.? Now that the Citizens United Ruling has come down, what kind of law will you pass to keep them from spending as money as they like getting people who are sympathetic to them elected this fall?

Even if you manage some way to fence out campaign donations flowing through citizens and businesses -- how will you keep them from spending huge amounts of money on PR firms? Without creating an highly regulated press and broadcast industry... and preserving internet freedoms?

I'm with you that these things are all real and significant problems, worthy of some serious thought about how to fix. I'm just trying to point out that even apparently simply fixes like the idea of banning foreign campaign contributions are harder than they might seem to implement. The problem of the power of money is a deep, deep topic.

they are fearful their corpocleptocractic campaign donors will support someone else if they don't stop this return to normalcy.

And thanks to a recent supreme court decision uncapping corporate election spending, they're right to be fearful.

they are acting against their own interests - just wait until they end up having to pay extra to all the ISPs so that the voters can get to their own campaign websites.

As long as incumbents are good at falling in line with the interests of people with money, higher expenses for all comers actually give them an advantage, because it's easier for them to raise money than it is for contenders, and they probably have a war chest from past elections.

If you are going to ask someone to study up on some law, you should at least read the opinion you are referencing:

The question presented is whether the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 18, grants Congress authority sufficient to enact the statute before us. In resolving that question, we assume, but we do not decide, that other provisions of the Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause—do not prohibit civil commitment in these circumstances. [...] In other words, we assume for argument’s sake that the Federal Constitution would permit a State to enact this statute, and we ask solely whether the Federal Government, exercising its enumerated powers, may enact such a statute as well.

This decision makes no decision on the government's ability to incarcerate someone forever, without a proper trial. It simply says assuming the state law is valid, then the Federal government can also make a similar law.

The case has been remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Read page 4 of the opinion for a quick history of why the limited question was before the court. The case is United States v. Comstock.

She also argued that prosecutors who deliberately manufacture evidence to convict innocent people should not be civilly liable for their actions.

Before you use her participation in support of the Pottawattamie prosecutors to extrapolate her entire character, I recommend reading the Pottawattamie County v. McGhee article over at SCOTUSWiki. Among other things, you'll find out that even the McGhee and Harrington side of the case agrees that prosecutors "enjoy immunity when they knowingly introduce false testimony during trial" based on the 1976 SCOTUS decision in Imbler v. Pachtman. All the legal wrangling was over drawing lines across contiguous situations, like whether or not that immunity extends to pre-trial conditions. The central idea of immunity for prosecutors during trial apparently wasn't even really being questioned, because much of the lawyering world apparently believes that if you open prosecutors to liability, it'll have a "chilling effect" on their ability to pursue justice even in situations where the defendant is guilty as sin because of the threat of being buried under lawsuits.

Now, from an ethical and liberty-focused perspective, I completely agree that a lot of this is ridiculous. I think that fabricating evidence is flat-out simply beyond the job description of any state officer, and so by definition, whether or not it happened pre-trial or during the trial, it's outside of official prosecutorial duties and can and should incur criminal and civil liability. But there are beings who walk the earth who see court cases very differently than a normal citizen does, who don't operate directly on matters of ethics and policy and justice and liberty, but instead on the law as the instrument which serves those matters, and who apparently see a prosecutors role as such an important one in actually pursuing justice that it's deserving of considerable latitude. I disagree and I think there's a cultural problem here that needs to be addressed by legal means: we're apparently going to need a law stating that fabrication of evidence is explicitly outside any public duty and that no immunity of any kind applies.

I'm unimpressed by Kagan's advocacy, and think everybody should contact their Senator -- particularly if they've got one that's on the judiciary committee -- if for no other reason to highlight this issue, which hasn't received anywhere near its due attention, but flogging Kagan in particular for it probably isn't going to address a systemic problem.

As I said before, she's evil.

Before you use her participation in support of the Pottawattamie prosecutors to extrapolate her entire character,
I recommend reading the Pottawattamie County v. McGhee article over at SCOTUSWiki. Among other things, you'll find out that even the McGhee and Harrington side of the case agrees that prosecutors "enjoy immunity when they knowingly introduce false testimony during trial" based on the 1976 SCOTUS decision in Imbler v. Pachtman. All the legal wrangling was over drawing lines across contiguous situations, like whether or not that immunity extends to pre-trial conditions. The central idea of immunity for prosecutors during trial apparently wasn't even really being questioned, because much of the lawyering world believes that if you open prosecutors to liability, it'll have a "chilling effect" on them.

Now, from an ethical and liberty-focused perspective, I completely agree that a lot of this is ridiculous. I think that fabricating evidence is flat-out simply beyond the job description of any state officer, and so by definition, whether or not it happened pre-trial or during the trial, it's outside of official prosecutorial duties and can and should incur criminal and civil liability. But there are beings who walk the earth who see court cases very differently than a normal citizen does, who don't operate directly on matters of ethics and policy and justice and liberty, but instead on the law as the instrument which serves those matters, and who apparently see a prosecutors role as such an important one in actually pursuing justice that it's deserving of considerable latitude. I disagree and I think there's a cultural problem here that needs to be addressed by legal means: we're apparently going to need a law stating that fabrication of evidence is explicitly outside any public duty and that no immunity of any kind applies.

I'm unimpressed by Kagan's advocacy, and think everybody should contact their Senator -- particularly if they've got one that's on the judiciary committee -- to highlight this issue, but flogging her in particular for it isn't going to address a systemic problem.

Interesting case.

Personally, I would be against the prosecutorial immunity she's arguing to maintain; but she's not really trying to create some new right because of a personal ideology. She's arguing on behalf of the current administration to maintain a principle that is in place to allow prosecutors to be dilligent in their pursuit of criminals. There are other safeguards in place for prosecutors who cross the line (that are in the actual amicus but not the article you referenced), and although this case was settled before a decision - the SCOTUS gave no strong indication that they disagreed with her side enough to destroy prosecutorial immunity.

Seems like she's doing her job. I wouldn't call her "evil" because of it.

This doesn't deny corporations from running ads, they just have to do it on their own, and out in the open where everyone can see who they are telling people to vote for. They have to buy their own ads to tell people to vote for Harry Reid or Mitch McConnell.

I don't think you are familiar with the case. What you describe above and said should be allowed is exactly what Citizens United did. They released a feature length film called "Hillary: The Movie" about Hillary Rodham Clinton. The Federal Election Commission said that you can't spend that much money on a movie like that so close to the election, so they took them to court.

After much research I think I agree with you on the speech part.

Specifically it appears that any "legislative act" taken by a congressmen or anything/one under their direction (for that legislative act) would be protected (specifically this includes their staff). Also it appears that this includes an immunity from action by congress (criminal or civil but not procedural).

Also it turns out that the "arrest" reference was only to Civil arrests and not criminal arrests (civil arrests don't happen any more).

Here are the two most informative links:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/article01/21.html

http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=John_R._Sand_and_Gravel_v._US

"Public school employees are government employees. Therefore they are subject to every restriction that a police officer would be subject to with respect to dealing with citizens."

Unfortunately no. This case among many others... http://scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=Safford_United_School_District
Among other things, the requirements for searches is much lower, no warrant requirements, etc.

These days, unless there is an important Constitutional interpretation at stake, the Court will typically pass on the case.

Not true. Let's just look at the opinions issued today.

• Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Issue: Whether a 1993 congressional resolution requires Hawaii to reach a political settlement with native Hawaiians before transferring some 1.2 million acres of state land.
• Rivera v. Illinois, Issue: Whether the erroneous denial of a criminal defendantâ(TM)s preemptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated requires automatic reversal of a conviction.
• Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, Issue: Whether the Supreme Court of Oregon, on remand from the Courtâ(TM)s 2007 decision on the constitutionality of a $79.5 million punitive damages award based on harms done to non-named plaintiffs, improperly asserted a state law procedural bar having the effect of precluding Phillip Morris from asserting a constitutional claim.

Now, it is entirely possible that by "important Constitutional interpretation," you meant "issue that touches on the Constitution." However, that would be so broad as to be meaningless. Everything that may be tried in federal court touches on the Constitution in some way, even in mere diversity cases. It would be like stating that "these days, all cases before the Supreme Court involve some legal controversy."

So I'm assuming you mean that the core issues are about interpreting some provision about the Constitution.

The three links above are decent evidence against your assertion.

These days, unless there is an important Constitutional interpretation at stake, the Court will typically pass on the case.

Not true. Let's just look at the opinions issued today.

• Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Issue: Whether a 1993 congressional resolution requires Hawaii to reach a political settlement with native Hawaiians before transferring some 1.2 million acres of state land.
• Rivera v. Illinois, Issue: Whether the erroneous denial of a criminal defendantâ(TM)s preemptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated requires automatic reversal of a conviction.
• Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, Issue: Whether the Supreme Court of Oregon, on remand from the Courtâ(TM)s 2007 decision on the constitutionality of a $79.5 million punitive damages award based on harms done to non-named plaintiffs, improperly asserted a state law procedural bar having the effect of precluding Phillip Morris from asserting a constitutional claim.

Now, it is entirely possible that by "important Constitutional interpretation," you meant "issue that touches on the Constitution." However, that would be so broad as to be meaningless. Everything that may be tried in federal court touches on the Constitution in some way, even in mere diversity cases. It would be like stating that "these days, all cases before the Supreme Court involve some legal controversy."

So I'm assuming you mean that the core issues are about interpreting some provision about the Constitution.

The three links above are decent evidence against your assertion.

These days, unless there is an important Constitutional interpretation at stake, the Court will typically pass on the case.

Not true. Let's just look at the opinions issued today.

• Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Issue: Whether a 1993 congressional resolution requires Hawaii to reach a political settlement with native Hawaiians before transferring some 1.2 million acres of state land.
• Rivera v. Illinois, Issue: Whether the erroneous denial of a criminal defendantâ(TM)s preemptory challenge that resulted in the challenged juror being seated requires automatic reversal of a conviction.
• Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Williams, Issue: Whether the Supreme Court of Oregon, on remand from the Courtâ(TM)s 2007 decision on the constitutionality of a $79.5 million punitive damages award based on harms done to non-named plaintiffs, improperly asserted a state law procedural bar having the effect of precluding Phillip Morris from asserting a constitutional claim.

Now, it is entirely possible that by "important Constitutional interpretation," you meant "issue that touches on the Constitution." However, that would be so broad as to be meaningless. Everything that may be tried in federal court touches on the Constitution in some way, even in mere diversity cases. It would be like stating that "these days, all cases before the Supreme Court involve some legal controversy."

So I'm assuming you mean that the core issues are about interpreting some provision about the Constitution.

The three links above are decent evidence against your assertion.

If the courts worked, we wouldn't have decisions like Wickard v. Filburn, Hiibel v. 6th, Herring v. US, etc. It seems like every other month the SCOTUS is shitting on the constitution in one way or another.

ICBW, of course, but I suspect that the ACLU found a ruling it liked and decided that it was the One True Ruling and all others would be ignored.

#include <ianal.h>
#include <just_a_court_junkie.h>

For better or worse, US vs Miller is the one and only ruling the Supremes did on the Second, and because it was fairly limited in scope (The court ruled that the federal government did have a compelling interest in the transportation of weapons across state lines, which I'd generally agree with), there's a lot of room to argue about what might or might not be considered legal under that ruling.

A decision will be handed down on District of Columbia v. Heller , which will give an opinion on what the rights are of the individual states to pass laws to regulate the ownership of firearms.

That is because there is a disagreement over what the 2nd amendment means. One side argues that the right to keep and bear arms only applies to "[a] well regulated militia," but the other side argues that it applies to the general populace. The U.S. Supreme Court is actually faced with this question this term in DC v. Heller. More info here.