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Does this alleviate Bob's problem of determining whether or not Eve has gotten the plate before it got to Bob or after it got to Bob? Is it not really impenetrable encryption, or does it just move the challenge from "snooping electronically" to "stealing without detection"? If Eve got a hold of the plate before Bob did could she not even in theory substitute a different plate? Copy the plate? Provably too hard or just too hard as far as we know or doable given resources, which? Bob would have to destroy / mutate the plate right after use- destroy after reading. Humans are the weak link in that scheme, right? Bob can't be relied to remember much info without the aid of some form of transcription. So good for secure launch codes, the ultimate in "use-once-and-render-irrelevant" , (but what if there's failure to launch? What do you know ? Can you still destroy the glass or do you have to keep it around for forensics examination and what are the security implications there? ) but not so good for ad hoc communication. And anyways how is this better than the one time pads you can listen to on shortwave radio? http://www.spynumbers.com/ Or the mysterious Yosemite Sam broadcast coming out of NM? http://www.spynumbers.com/ys.wav Which may effectively be a one-time pad where numbers are represented by hard-to-detect changes in the background noise / amplitude of the seemingly same Bugs Bunny excerpt?

Does this alleviate Bob's problem of determining whether or not Eve has gotten the plate before it got to Bob or after it got to Bob? Is it not really impenetrable encryption, or does it just move the challenge from "snooping electronically" to "stealing without detection"? If Eve got a hold of the plate before Bob did could she not even in theory substitute a different plate? Copy the plate? Provably too hard or just too hard as far as we know or doable given resources, which? Bob would have to destroy / mutate the plate right after use- destroy after reading. Humans are the weak link in that scheme, right? Bob can't be relied to remember much info without the aid of some form of transcription. So good for secure launch codes, the ultimate in "use-once-and-render-irrelevant" , (but what if there's failure to launch? What do you know ? Can you still destroy the glass or do you have to keep it around for forensics examination and what are the security implications there? ) but not so good for ad hoc communication. And anyways how is this better than the one time pads you can listen to on shortwave radio? http://www.spynumbers.com/ Or the mysterious Yosemite Sam broadcast coming out of NM? http://www.spynumbers.com/ys.wav Which may effectively be a one-time pad where numbers are represented by hard-to-detect changes in the background noise / amplitude of the seemingly same Bugs Bunny excerpt?

Shouldn't it be possible to use a directional antenna or some similar technology, from several points around the globe to locate the source of the transmissions with a reasonably high degree of precision?

Reminds me of those crazy numbers stations for one way communication with deep cover spies.

http://www.spynumbers.com/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Numbers_stations

Or the Navajo code talkers in WWII

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_talkers

My grandpa served in the IVth infantry in WWII, signal corp and worked with some of the Navajos.

You should try listening to some of the "Number Stations".

Spam is a covert communication channel that is completely immune to traffic analysis on the receiving end (since it's broadcast to so many people, and there's no way of telling if one of them is reading another message steganographically hidden in the p3n!s pill ad). Spam offers the Internet equivalent of a numbers station broadcast.

Maybe the Feds have gotten a clue (in either sense of the phrase), and are anal-probing some spammers (using fraud, cracking, etc as probable cause and leverage) to investigate this possibility.

However, some of the "laundry lists" were actually coded messages

Uh, this still happens... but without the silliness of disguising it as laundry (which never fooled anyone). International spymasters run numbers stations, which just read out random-like numbers continually. Most of the numbers are random, but at certain pre-arranged times a spy will listen to the station and copy down his coded instructions.

Civilians can only speculate how often an actual message goes through, and how much is just chaff keeping the station busy.

In addition to the 1337 hax0rs, I wonder if the international spooks are using Spam instead of/in addition to the shortwave spy numbers stations? Maybe it's the CIA or MI5 wanting to enlarge your penis and breasts!

Yeah, I spent years cracking the code from one of the consistent Number Stations that was operating off the coast of California, only to discover that they were transmitting the ascii-art picture of the goatse guy.

My favourite shortwave phenomenon was always the numbers stations. Where else can you listen to real-life spy messages, even if there's not a hope in hell you'll ever be able to decode them?

As I recall there was always a ton of mysterious signals on shortwave - wierd humming stations, modem-ish tone stations (in the 70's)and all sorts of strange, intelligent-sounding clicks and pops. Shortwave is a peculiar little world.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.

The general theory is that a so called "dictionary" is used to convert words or phrases to code numbers. Unlisted words or names are spelled out. These codes are then "modulated" if you will by a series of random numbers - the One Time Pad. It could be as simple an operation as adding each dictionary output number to the corresponding number in the OTP (ignoring carry). I briefly touch on this. The reverse process is used by the recipient.

It's quite likely that the bulk of the transmissions observed are dummy traffic. This serves several purposes - first, it makes traffic analysis more difficult. Otherwise, when something important was going on, the "other side" would notice a sharp increase in transmissions. Interesting, this effect IS noticed with the MOSSAD stations from Israel. The so-called 'Message String' transmissions appear whenever there are increased tensions in the Middle East. Second, it can give the appearance to the other side that you have many more agents than you really do.

"Between Silk and Cyanide" by Leo Marks is a must read. He worked for British Intelligence during WWII, and ran the department that communicated with British agents in Nazi occupied Europe via radio. At that time, they did not use OTPs, but instead used a convoluted method involving poems as the encryption/decryption key. But Marks does touch upon OTPs near the end, it seems the British finally moved towards them. The present Lincolnshire Poacher and Cherry Ripe stations can probably trace their origin back to Mark's operations.

Any transmissions encrypted using a OTP are not breakable. Period. (Yes, you could try to bribe someone for the message, but that really isn't breaking it) It's the most secure encryption system possible. Yes, it's cumbersome, having to deal with shuffling around the pads, but if handled properly, 100% secure. No other encryption system can claim that.