Slashdot Mirror

Read this instead: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11f0012/a11f0012.asp

At 0155, the captain made a mandatory position report with the Shanwick Oceanic control centre. This aroused the FO. The FO had rested for 75 minutes but reported not feeling altogether well. Coincidentally, an oppositeâ"direction United States Air Force Boeing Câ"17 at 34 000 feet appeared as a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) target on the navigational display (ND). The captain apprised the FO of this traffic.

Over the next minute or so, the captain adjusted the map scale on the ND in order to view the TCAS target 5 and occasionally looked out the forward windscreen to acquire the aircraft visually. The FO initially mistook the planet Venus for an aircraft but the captain advised again that the target was at the 12 o'clock position and 1000 feet below. The captain of ACA878 and the oncoming aircraft crew flashed their landing lights. The FO continued to scan visually for the aircraft. When the FO saw the oncoming aircraft, the FO interpreted its position as being above and descending towards them. The FO reacted to the perceived imminent collision by pushing forward on the control column. The captain, who was monitoring TCAS target on the ND, observed the control column moving forward and the altimeter beginning to show a decrease in altitude. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pulled back on the control column to regain altitude. It was at this time the oncoming aircraft passed beneath ACA878. The TCAS did not produce a traffic or resolution advisory.

The rule in this case was that the flight crew was supposed to notify the cabin crew of the start and end of any naps so they can act as a secondary check against going over the time limits -- that required notification didn't take place on this flight. There were several sleep-related breeches of airline policy cited in the report.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11f0012/a11f0012.asp

Lots of facts wrong. . .

First Officer woke up. Captain said "hey, sleepyhead, you see that Air Force cargo plane coming towards us that the TCAS is telling us about?" First Officer points, "That thing?", "No, that's Venus, the Air Force cargo is lower." "Oh. Ah! It's coming right at me!" (Dives instinctively)

All within a couple of seconds after waking from 75 minutes of REM sleep in his chair, groggy as hell.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11f0012/a11f0012.asp

Please, please, please -- there are tons of very well-considered safety points in the real report, and the linked articles are very very very wrong.

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11f0012/a11f0012.asp

To quote:

At 0155, the captain made a mandatory position report with the Shanwick Oceanic control centre. This aroused the FO. The FO had rested for 75 minutes but reported not feeling altogether well. Coincidentally, an opposite–direction United States Air Force Boeing C–17 at 34 000 feet appeared as a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) target on the navigational display (ND). The captain apprised the FO of this traffic.

Over the next minute or so, the captain adjusted the map scale on the ND in order to view the TCAS target 5 and occasionally looked out the forward windscreen to acquire the aircraft visually. The FO initially mistook the planet Venus for an aircraft but the captain advised again that the target was at the 12 o'clock position and 1000 feet below. The captain of ACA878 and the oncoming aircraft crew flashed their landing lights. The FO continued to scan visually for the aircraft. When the FO saw the oncoming aircraft, the FO interpreted its position as being above and descending towards them. The FO reacted to the perceived imminent collision by pushing forward on the control column. The captain, who was monitoring TCAS target on the ND, observed the control column moving forward and the altimeter beginning to show a decrease in altitude. The captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pulled back on the control column to regain altitude. It was at this time the oncoming aircraft passed beneath ACA878. The TCAS did not produce a traffic or resolution advisory.

Maybe read the report(which was linked in the article) instead of just the news article?

The media reports are all harping on the idea of "crash dive to avoid Venus", but that's incidential. There was an oncoming aircraft (but not on a collision course) and the FO erred in thinking it was going to collide. Source - TSB report.

I'd be very skeptical this program given the history Airbus aircraft have had with their control systems and their general managerial attitudes for safety.

For instance, the crash of Flight 587, an Airbus A300 in November 2001 was caused by a "delamination" of the vertical stabilizer's composite structure - moisture got in between the layers of composite material and caused them to pull apart. Subsequent inspections found other aircraft with signs of vertical stabilizer delamination. The Canadian Transportation Safety Board has recommended detailed checks of Airbus A3000 rudder assemblies because of the issue.

The problem is that manual inspections can't always reveal signs of delamination - it often requires ultrasound inspection - something Airbus has refused to support, and there has even been accusations that Airbus has tried to inappropriately lobby the NTSB against such a recommendation.

Airbus' overreliance on technology and dysfunctional managerial culture continues to put passengers at risk - and this new automated system ensures that the pilot has even less control than he or she did before. Trusting that system to do the right thing in a crisis is always a risky proposition - trusting a manufacturer with such a generally shoddy attitude towards safety makes it even riskier.

At least one crash can be directly attributed to the closure of a control tower "to save costs". This is one crash too many.