Domain: ttias.be
Stories and comments across the archive that link to ttias.be.
Stories · 7
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Chrome To Force Domains Ending With Dev and Foo To HTTPS Via Preloaded HSTS (ttias.be)
Developer Mattias Geniar writes (condensed and edited for clarity): One of the next versions of Chrome is going to force all domains ending with .dev and .foo to be redirected to HTTPs via a preloaded HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header. This very interesting commit just landed in Chromium:
Preload HSTS for the .dev gTLD:
This adds the following line to Chromium's preload lists:
{ "name": "dev", "include_subdomains": true, "mode": "force-https" },
{ "name": "foo", "include_subdomains": true, "mode": "force-https" },
It forces any domain on the .dev gTLD to be HTTPs.
What should we [developers] do? With .dev being an official gTLD, we're most likely better of changing our preferred local development suffix from .dev to something else. There's an excellent proposal to add the .localhost domain as a new standard, which would be more appropriate here. It would mean we no longer have site.dev, but site.localhost. And everything at *.localhost would automatically translate to 127.0.0.1, without /etc/hosts or dnsmasq workarounds. -
'Severe' Systemd Bug Allowed Remote Code Execution For Two Years (itwire.com)
ITWire reports: A flaw in systemd, the init system used on many Linux systems, can be exploited using a malicious DNS query to either crash a system or to run code remotely. The vulnerability resides in the daemon systemd-resolved and can be triggered using a TCP payload, according to Ubuntu developer Chris Coulson. This component can be tricked into allocating less memory than needed for a look-up. When the reply is bigger it overflows the buffer allowing an attacker to overwrite memory. This would result in the process either crashing or it could allow for code execution remotely. "A malicious DNS server can exploit this by responding with a specially crafted TCP payload to trick systemd-resolved in to allocating a buffer that's too small, and subsequently write arbitrary data beyond the end of it," is how Coulson put it.
Affected Linux vendors have pushed out patches -- but the bug has apparently been present in systemd code since June of 2015. And long-time Slashdot reader walterbyrd also reports a recently-discovered bug where systemd unit files that contain illegal usernames get defaulted to root. -
MIT No Longer Owns 18.0.0.0/8 (ttias.be)
An anonymous reader shares: MIT no longer owns 18.0.0.0/8. That's a very big block of scarce IPv4 addresses that have become available again. One block inside this /8, more specifically 18.145.0.0/16, was transferred to Amazon. -
Rethinking Security Advisory Severities
An anonymous reader writes: The recent OpenSSL vulnerability got the internet all hyped up for a security issue that, in the end, turned out to have a very limited impact. This is good news of course, we don't need another Heartbleed. But it raises the question: should security advisories be more clear on the impact and possible ramifications of such a vulnerability, to avoid unnecessary panic? Developer Mattias Geniar says, "The Heartbleed vulnerability got the same severity as the one from last night. Heartbleed was a disaster, CVE-2015-1793 will probably go by unnoticed. ... Why? Because CVE-2015-1793, no matter how dangerous it was in theory, concerned code that only a very small portion of the OpenSSL users were using. But pretty much every major technology site jumped on the OpenSSL advisory. ... The OpenSSL team is in a particularly tricky situation, though. On the one hand, their advisories are meant to warn people without giving away the real vulnerability. It's a warning sign, so everyone can keep resources at hand for quick patching, should it be needed. At the same time, they need to warn their users of the actual severity. -
Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Found In Windows HTTP Stack
jones_supa writes: A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the Windows HTTP stack that is caused when HTTP.SYS parses specially-crafted HTTP requests. An attacker who has successfully exploited this vulnerability could execute arbitrary code under the SYSTEM context. Details of the bug are withheld, but exploit code is floating around. Microsoft describes the issue in security bulletin MS15-034. An update (KB3042553) is already available for all supported editions of Windows 7, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows 8, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012 R2. As a workaround, Microsoft offers disabling IIS kernel caching. -
Systemd Getting UEFI Boot Loader
New submitter mrons writes: Many new features are coming for systemd. This includes the ability to do a full secure boot. As Lennart Poettering mentions in a Google+ comment: "This is really just about providing the tools to implement the full trust chain from the firmware to the host OS, if SecureBoot is available. ... Of course, if you don't have EFI SecureBoot, than nothing changes. Also if you turn it off, than nothing changes either. [sic]" Phoronix notes, "Gummiboot is a simple UEFI boot manager that's been around for a few years but only receives new work from time-to-time. Lennart and Kay Sievers are looking at adding Gummiboot to systemd to complete the safety chain of the boot process with UEFI Secure Boot. Systemd will communicate with this UEFI boot loader to ensure the system didn't boot into a compromised state." -
Serious Network Function Vulnerability Found In Glibc
An anonymous reader writes: A very serious security problem has been found and patched in the GNU C Library (Glibc). A heap-based buffer overflow was found in __nss_hostname_digits_dots() function, which is used by the gethostbyname() and gethostbyname2() function calls. A remote attacker able to make an application call to either of these functions could use this flaw to execute arbitrary code with the permissions of the user running the program. The vulnerability is easy to trigger as gethostbyname() can be called remotely for applications that do any kind of DNS resolving within the code. Qualys, who discovered the vulnerability (nicknamed "Ghost") during a code audit, wrote a mailing list entry with more details, including in-depth analysis and exploit vectors.