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``In short, accurate elections with anonymous, non-voter-provable (to prevent blackmail/vote purchasing) votes are hard, but since they are the basis for our system of government, we need to do the work to do it right.''

The good news is that the hard work has been done.

The bad news is that none of the better systems have taken off yet. Part of the problem is that people really don't care. Part of the problem is that politicians actually don't _want_ to admit there is something wrong and fix it (that, at least, is how it is in the Netherlands). Part of the problem is that people keep re-inventing the wheel, usually poorly, instead of using the solutions others have already come up with. And part of the problem is that all these new systems are just _complicated_.

All things considered, I believe simple paper voting and counting votes by hand is the best solution to date. It isn't perfect, but the security implications are easy to understand, and there are established procedures that provide the desireable properties for voting systems (accuracy, verifiability, privacy, etc.)

Are you familiar with the cryptographic voting system created by Andrew Neff of VoteHere? Unless you know otherwise, I believe that this system features live auditing that prevents ballot loss, allows all sorts of independent verification, and works in a simple and open way that we can actually have faith in. I have never heard a coherent criticism of VoteHere except that it is a tad complex for a high school grad to grasp. It seems there's a new company with a superficially similar process, at punchscan.org . Can they be hacked? Will they save us billions in labor and legal costs, and armored-car/affadavit service for paper ballots? Read their bit or see my prior slashdot posts if you like.

VoteHere is open source. I believe that it is a secure system even though I haven't analyzed the code personally. Further, its design and implementation adhere very well to the 'trust no one' concept that is one advantage of open source (the crucial one in this context).

With this software, which I think will run on most or all of the machines that have already been purchased by all states, each vote is encoded, encrypted, and published (online) with each step of the process mirrored in an auditable backup channel. Voters don't need to trust local authorities' honesty and capability because they can check for themselves whether their vote was counted via their encrypted receipt. But no one can determine the content of specific votes unless they gather all the decryption keys to themselves. VoteHere

From reading the site (especially this page), it seems to work like this:

1. The receipt is optional.
2. The receipt lets voters check that their ballot was counted, a) overall, and/or b) with regard to a specific contest.
3. The receipt does not say who you voted for, nor is it possible to derive such information from the receipt.

The first point wouldn't solve the problem of "Want to go to Heaven? Then hand over that receipt," because you could still tell people they'll go to hell if they choose not to print the receipt.

However, there's no point in demanding the receipt, because it doesn't say how you voted, it only says whether your vote was counted as part of the results. Only the voter (and anyone he told) would know who he/she voted for.

Probably the REAL reason this hasn't caught on is because most people haven't heard about this (I didn't know about it, and I had searched for something like this!), and most of those who do hear something about it (like jesdynf here) assume that it is something much worse than it is.

So write your Congresspeople, let them know that this exists, and make sure they know it doesn't compromise voter privacy! If you don't get a response, write another letter. Keep writing until they pay attention! And tell your friends and family to do the same.

The only way government can represent the people is if the representatives know what the people want. So tell them.

This entire debate is made obsolete by VoteHere's (open source) software that creates an encrypted serial number for each vote. After you vote your code can be printed on a receipt and you can use the code online to verify that your vote was counted correctly. There are also analytical tools that can be used by election officials to search for fraud. This approach takes out the tedious, inaccurate hand-counting and gives mistakes a far better chance of being noticed. On top of that, it gives voters a privlege they have never before enjoyed - the right to certainty of their vote's integrity.

The software is designed to be installed on third-party touch screen voting machines. VoteHere has opened the source so that the public can be confident that nothing fishy is happening on that front.

VoteHere has all the advantages of any other system, together with no drawbacks. At least that's how it seems to me. I can't understand why it hasn't caught on more strongly.

This entire debate is made obsolete by VoteHere's (open source) software that creates an encrypted serial number for each vote. After you vote your code can be printed on a receipt and you can use the code online to verify that your vote was counted correctly. There are also analytical tools that can be used by election officials to search for fraud. This approach takes out the tedious, inaccurate hand-counting and gives mistakes a far better chance of being noticed. On top of that, it gives voters a privlege they have never before enjoyed - the right to certainty of their vote's integrity.

The software is designed to be installed on third-party touch screen voting machines. VoteHere has opened the source so that the public can be confident that nothing fishy is happening on that front.

VoteHere has all the advantages of any other system, together with no drawbacks. At least that's how it seems to me. I can't understand why it hasn't caught on more strongly.

By an amazing coincidence, my company's product meets all the above requirements.

Votes can be "bought" if there's any sort of verifiable paper trail linking a voter to their vote

I think it's obvious the poster added the DRM bit to be inflammatory but why does /. insist on using these submissions? Nowhere in the article does it mention or refer to DRM yet there it is, like the ugly weed sitting in the crack of the sidewalk for all to see. Not even the VoteHere website mentions DRM in their products decriptions.

After checking the VoteHere website I also discovered some discrpencies between what Dan Spillane is claiming in his suit and the products VoteHere is offering. According to the company their voting system called VHTi includes a verifiable paper trail. Their other product called RemoteVote was a bit sketchier about the audit trail but considering you can use means of voting that make printingvery difficult or impossible (cell phones, PDAs, etc.) this is not surprising. Perhaps Dan Spillane was simply an annoying prick that tried to make a mountain out of a molehill and got fired for it.

Funny, I've yet to see a license that explicitly tells the licensor, "you are not allowed to generate revenue with this product under this license."

Yeah you crack me up :). Seriously though, I couldn't find this clause in their license but I guess you don't see it a lot because it is implicit. You are not allowed to make money off someone else's IP unless you are explicitly given that right.

Which is why the GPL (among others) is so nice since it gives you this by default.