Domain: votetrustusa.org
Stories and comments across the archive that link to votetrustusa.org.
Comments · 11
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Re:You are ignoring the key issue that led to this
A few points:
- Florida did not simply use paper ballots; it used mechanical voting machines to punch those ballots.
- Paper-punching machines are needlessly complicated, opening them up to unique kinds of disruption. Their performance in Florida may have been deliberately degraded: there are allegations that substandard paper was sent to that state by a voting-machine company for use in the machines (read more here)
- In voting, the simplest is the best: paper + pencil for the voter; trustworthy citizens for the counting. This is what we use in Canada; a country of 30m people, and we are able to announce election results the night of the election. There is universal trust in the voting process - though not, I am sad to say, in politics in general :) -
Ed Felten's comments.
Ed Felten's comments on the bill can be found Here.
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Re: Funny -- No, I was Serious!As noted by VoteTrustUSA the Election Assistance Commission's Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines:
This standard allows 9.2% of all e-voting systems to fail in any 15-hour Election Day, and a much higher failure rate during the extended "Early Voting" periods now being implemented in many states.
It is important to note also that these standards are voluntary and as such are the "upper bound" for the practical rules, and many states ignore them altogether. Few if any exceed the standard, especially when it comes to "failure rates".
This is true! Apparently this rate of failure is fine for the backbone of our democracy. -
"stopped criminals from defrauding the 2004..."
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Re:So It Begins
Hear hear!
It's the rush to embrace electronic voting that has led to these catastrophes. In the haste, we allowed the wrong people to be in-charge of how they are used.
How many of the electronic voting systems are actually proven? How many are tamper-resistant? How many use public and openly available source code to operate?
We've already seen the results of "black box" voting. Though the jury may be out, my money is riding on, "not working in the slightest".
If the public is not allowed to understand the voting process, it is NOT a democratic vote!
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You mention standards in the video
First of all, I'm from Missouri. Missouri approved a company to create touch screen voting machines to Missourians. According to Voter's Unite, one of those companies is AccuPoll - a company that is now bankrupt. The CEO of that company recently spoke out against voting machines, saying the following: I am not happy about the outcome, or the state of the industry. I think that something needs to be done. I'm not sure what it is, it probably doesn't include AccuPoll at this point, but I do not feel that any of the vendors has a system that voters can trust,"
"I think that vendors outright misrepresent the robustness, stability, and security of their systems. You just have to look at the litany of problems and it points at one thing, bad fundamental design, and not enough checks and balances. I also wonder why the other vendors were so adamant in fighting a VVPAT system requirement. They spent much more in fighting it than in implementing it,"
What standards do you think could be put in place that would prevent the problems, and should there be harsh penalties for the above behavior (misrepresenting security, stability, etc)?
In addition, I just read one Missourian's complaints about the voting process and the supposed paper trail. What standards do you think should be in place regarding the people volunteering at the polling stations? I do tech support for a living, and I can tell you that the average joe should not be working at these polling stations without extensive training. Do you think there should be some sort of technical certification process for voting machines? If so, what? -
How you can help.
Additional State info can be found at VoteTrustUSA vtUSA has good links to individual state and local groups as well as to programs that one can become involved in such as
Voters Unite is also a good resource especially for lists of State Groups, Failures grouped by individual vendors, and a howto on helping entitled Pray With Your Feet. -
Physical access not required
Voting machines with WiFi have been produced, and apparently not as a joke. The commodity hardware from Diebold includes an IRDA port.
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Mine too...
This is what LA County is using.
Here's warts-and-all analysis.
The InkaVote Precinct Reader can be used to physically count votes. However, LA County will NOT be using them for that purpose. In LA County, the physical ballots, marked with ink dots, are the official vote. Period. End of story. The InkaVote Plus units are being used to "proofread" ballots before they get dropped into the bin.
The Reader will kick a ballot out for two reasons and two reasons only:
1.) Blank ballot. Try again, this time push down HARD on the ink stylus.
2.) Overvote. Turn in your botched ballot and get another try. However, you used up one of your three.
I don't know wtf they have reading the votes in Norwalk, where the LA County Registrar/Recorder's office is. But the vote of record is on PAPER. Not on a chip inside the reader. The version of the reader LA got is DUMB. No memory. If there needs to be a recount, it's done by humans. Reading ballots. And the way the system is set up, there is no ambiguity. A mark in the bubble is a mark in the bubble. And the new system warns about overvotes and blank ballots. You can skip a contest, it's your right. As it should be.
I'm going to be a pollworker November 7th. I went for it because of the 2000 and 2004 "Electoral Dysfunctions." I worked the primary in June and it was a grueling 13+ hour day. I was paid chickenshit for it. But it was worth it. I know that if some RoveDroid came sleazing around our precinct I would DOCUMENT IT and REPORT IT to HQs. Los Angeles, CA is not Ohio. We defend the vote here. -
Re:Private Voting, Public Counting
Why can't an electronic voting machine with a paper trail satisfy the private voting/public counting principle?
Damned good question.
The reason is because the VVPAT (voter verified paper audit trail) is a placebo.
What reason would anyone have to believe that the tally recorded in the memory card (and uploaded to the central tabulator) is the same as what is printed? Two different data paths. Enables two different results.
Voter Action determined that in New Mexico that Spanish language ballots were printed corrected but not recorded in memory. (Sorry, I couldn't quickly find the specific cite.)
The report from the recent botched election in Cuyahoga County Ohio had all sorts of problems related to the VVPAT. Sure, hypothetically one could design and build a VVPAT system that wasn't likely to break down, rip the paper, had good ergonomics, etc. But I prefer to talk about the actual systems we're actually using. And these actual systems actually suck.
The one attempt to audit the VVPAT that I know of resulted in the election officials quickly choosing to use PBOS over electronic voting systems with VVPAT. You can read the testimony Jill LaVine, Sacramento County's Registrar of Voters, gave to the Election Assistance Commission this last April. Brief summary: The manual recount took 1 hour and 15 minutes per ballot cast.
Lastly, your mileage may vary state to state. Some states treat the VVPAT as the legal ballot of record. Some treat the memory card as the legal record. Some don't use the VVPAT for recounts. Etc. Honestly, I don't keep close track of such things. The proponents of Holt's HR 550, like Verified Voting do a good job on that issue, if you want to know more.
Again, great question. Keep 'em coming. -
Paper Records.
Leaving aside the Sarcasm, that's exactly what we want. Other states including New Mexico and Washington have gone this route as have many counties. In all cases its because of the demonstrated problems with voting systems. In New Mexico's 2004 election we have a perfect test case. In that year the state employed eight different systems scattered more or less randomly thuought the state. Four of these systems were optical scanners and four were paperless touchscreen or push-button DREs (Direct Recording Electronic systems). In the 2004 Presidential race it was found that votes were missing largely from minority voters. Worse yet the missing votes were in up-ticket races, noteably the U.S. Presidential Race. Typically votes are missing for down-ticket races like local judges. Interestingly enough these patternes appeared on all the paperless systems not just systems made by one company or another. Lost votes were not a problem in precincts using the optical scanners. The excess (overcounted) votes were removed because they had the paper backup.
At the risk of nagging people, this info doesn't belong just on /. It belongs in letters to our state and local elections boards (whoever actually sets the law). It belongs in local newspapers via op-eds. Other people are concerned but most of then simply know nothing about these problems. Changing opinions on this issue won't really happen here, but elsewhere.
Some choice morsels of info can be found Here, here, here, here and here