Interview with Phil Zimmerman
A reader writes "PGP's creator is participating in an online interview this week. Phil
is mainly interested in clearing the air about the recently discovered
ADK bug, but the larger topics of encryption and worldwide organized snoop rings (Echelon) have already come up. The interview is open
to questions from anyone; runs through Friday 9/8."
In other words, all the strong crypto in the DATA segment of the SMTP transaction isn't gonna save you if an FBI agent decides he wants to forge a "From: kiddypr0narchive@fbi.gov" in an email to you. For mail to truly be secure, it's clear that we now need to encrypt all headers in the SMTP and/or POP transactions.
Likewise, for safe browsing, SSL on the content of the pages isn't enough; all the metadata in the HTTP GET requests have to be encrypted too.
Traffic analysis makes sense; it's machine-readable data, machine-parsable, and very easy to inject into a database for profiling purposes. Scanning a database for all From: addresses associated with To: fields of osama_bin_laden@secretterroristcamp.iq, or IP addresses associated with Referrer-ID: fields matching the regexp *janetreno*goat*pr0n* is a lot easier than actually trying to examine a terabyte of .JPGs.
We've seen it in the public domain with the "auto-sue" programs used against Napster users.
We're seeing the gummint getting into the act with Carnivore. Whaddyawannabet that 5 years from now, when Jaz and ZIP drives are no longer available, the "physical evidence" ceases to be a piddly 120M disk (which can probably only hold the sniffed headers from a handful of users before it has to be swapped for another disc) and becomes a 200G hard drive (which can hold everyone's traffic for a few days)? Hell, the cost of the "removable hard drive Carnivore" isn't much more than the ZIP drive one today.
At what point will we redesign our basic communications protocols to be snoop-resistant?
I'm sure everyone here has read about the quantum computers that are still in the pre-infancy stages at places like IBM and Los Alamos. Because of their peculiar nature, the quantum computers can factor numbers as easily as they can multiply them, rendering public-key encryption schemes useless. Of course, these systems are still very primitive, the latest ones at around 5 to 7 qubits. Still, it is inevitable that this technology will grow to the point where it could be capable of cracking 128-bit encryption or whatever we are using when the rapidly advancing quantum technology starts to catch up with traditional computers. Quantum computers do offer the possibility of quantum encryption, but due to the inevitable extreme expense of quantum computers at the early stages of development, it is quite likely that intelligence organizations or large corporations will have the ability to crack our codes several years before we gain the ability to protect ourselves from this threat. When this happens, what will we do to protect our privacy against powerful forces that can compromise it at will?
WARNING: there is a trojan on your
The reason for encrypting everything you can is a concept called "plausible deniability". If you only encrypt important things, someone can point to encrypted data and say "that's important, he must be up to something, I can tell because it's encrypted." If you encrypt everything, you can deny that any of it (or any given piece of data, more importantly) is at all interesting, and such denial is entirely plausible.
Whatever your opinion on encryption is, Phil Zimmerman deserves some respect. He released PGP despite very legitimate threats to his own personal well being.
I read an interview a long time ago about his reason for doing do. He said he had heard of a rebel group (forget which country) that was fighting against an oppressive govermnent was using PGP to communicate.
He decided that if his tool could be used to help people struggling for freedom, it did not matter what would happen to him. He released the software shortly thereafter. In my opinion, he's of the earliest true idealists in the world of hi-tech.
Actually, one wonders if this will become the method of choice for distribution of 'illegal' source code such as DeCSS, etc...
-jerdenn
This has to do with the interview topic of encryption as you may be able to see
-Daniel
In all fairness, this latest incident may have never happened to begin with if the code was GPL'd from the start.
...it would have likely been an option that could easially be left out...
How? The code is not GPL'd for sure, but it sure as hell is open for us to see. Just because it uses the MITPGP License not the GPL does not make it any less secure.
It is an option that is easially left out. Just dissable it. Or, for that matter, don't complile it in, just as you would have the option of doing so with GPL'd code.
I really don't see what the big deal is that this doesn't use GPL. For security purposes, one Open Source License is just as good as the next.
There comes a time in every man's life when he must say, "No mother! I do not want any more Jell-O!"
Go to the actual site (http://forums.itworld.com/webx?14@@.ee6 caf5) to post a question. /. is not hosting the interview.
Thrashing...please wait...
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The truth is out th- oh, wait, here it is...
PGP seems to be a case study in this in that the recent bug has no effect on the older, simpler PGP 2.6. As requests for features by everyone from paranoid hackers (bigger keys) to corporations (ADK's) come in, it is natural to want to add things to software. The problem is that as the software gets more complex, dangerous flaws get much harder to spot (even in open source software). Once a bug like this creeps in, the "feature-rich" software is significantly less useful than the old version in that it doesn't accomplish its original goal: privacy.
How do you think one should go about trying to achieve a good balance of features/complexity and security?