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Secure IRC?
priikone writes: "IRC has had a lot of problems related to security and network scalability in the past, and
recently as well. However, there is an alternative -- secure alternative to IRC; the Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC), which has all the same features IRC has, with addition of superior security, and hopefully more scalable and powerful network topology. It is for all those who cares who's listening. It works, and is of course all Open Source." We posted an article about another secure IRC system last year.
We where just talking about setting up something like this for our private core developer mettings. Nothing that secret happens there, but be had a small problem a few weeks ago. We had someone hijack someone elses connection. We are still tring to figure out what and how it happened.
Using encryption will prevent this. Not only sniffing, but connection hijacking. (At least I would think :)
I think a secure IRC network is needed and has been needed for a long time. Too many people tring to pretent there someone else. If you know there key finger print, you can compiar them.
Time to download it and give it a try :)
until (succeed) try { again(); }
Those two points have already been implemented on IRC in some servers.
1) An authentication system exists in the form of nickserv (although optional, can be made to prevent other users from using your nick), and no other information would be released if the user does not provide it. The only information released would be the hostname/ip, which is solved by point 2...
2) I can't remember which ircd does it now (one of the dalnet/undernet ircd's?), but there is a hostname cloaking feature, which removes the last 2 parts of a persons ip, or the first part of their hostname, while leaving enough information to determine what ISP a person is using (useful for legitimate reasons, such as finding out what country a person is connecting from without needing to ask), it prevents script kiddies from obtaining enough information to DoS a user. However it is still possible (even with any ip address blocking) to determine a users address by using netstat on a shell. (This has been done an servers where public shell access is given on the same machine as the ircd)
The problems not solved by those two methods are firstly, no encrypted communications can be made.. anything sensitive could be sniffed, even over a DCC connection (the paranoid types, like me, who wave hi to echelon and its ilk during most sensitive 'private' irc chats). To solve this, client side scripts could be used to encrypt DCC communications, no new server needed.
The other problem is lag/netsplits. For some purposes (talking to a small group of friends), this could be solved by using a single-server 'network' (no netsplits) and no server to server lag.
Most of these solutions require setting up your own irc server, but this isnt too hard to do and is no less hassle than moving to a completely new, incompatible system.
This is not a reason you need more security. Let me give you an
example: I hang on IRC to chat with friends. I usually sit there in
passive mode and if somebody wants to talk to me, they could. Kind of
instant messaging, but using more popular and accessible
media. Sometimes my colleagues from across the ocean stop by and want
to discuss some business related issues. Main problem is our
conversation (if it is not DCC, which in most case does not work
because of firewalls) could be observed by any IRC server
operator. There are dozen servers on network, some administrated by more
than one person. You could not assure integrity of all these people.
Proposed system will solve this problem, since all communication will
be encrypted using public keys of participants and channel keys. So
several people can chat on channel in confidence that nobody is
snooping their discussion.
I thought UnrealIRCD already had ssl connections, and XChat 1.6.4+ have an option to connect in ssl mode.
1. add an authenticate system like slashdot, but does not release any info - I.E. bubbles is your nick? well then you are bubbles and that is all that is released.
2. BLOCK ip address discovery. The Irc servers you are connected to dont have to tell everyone that you are at 192.168.1.1 and if you dont release what IP you are at then the script kiddies and other tripe cant attack.
IRC was a great idea, when people on the net had a maturity level higher than that of an 8 year old. Today we have to give up those niceiteies of yesteryear to give a nice big thump on the head of the idiots and morons.... but the coolest thing is that the above ideas would bring back registered nicks.
Do not look at laser with remaining good eye.
As discussed recently on bugtraq. . .
The IRC protocol is a badly designed protocol. Permitting DCC connections is a security risk to your computer or network, because DCC is even stupider than active ftp.
It *is* broken and *should* be fixed.
And I don't expect pure water in gutters, either.
Yet both seem to serve a purpose, don't they?
Cheers,
Jim in Tokyo
-- My Weblog.
Sounds just like just about every ignorant Internet critic, RIAA or MPAA member, government official when trying to justify DMCA or some other piece of legislature/censorship. Get a clue, troll. Just like every other area of the Internet, IRC does have its "hackers, pirates, and kiddieporn scum", but it also has a great array of technical resources and general chat areas. I don't know of many other places where I can drop in and get real-time support from peers when trying to chase down a network or OS problem. Hate to burst your bubble, but many people might think of IRC and Usenet to be the bottom of the Internet barrel, I find them to be two of the most useful technical resources I have at my disposal.
secure alternative to IRC; the Secure Internet Live Conferencing (SILC)
They should have called it just Secure Internet Conferencing (SIC). This term would provide connotations about the content and would help to excuse some of the spelling errors.
In other words, trying to secure IRC would be difficult to do successfully. Most of the problems associated with IRC come from it's allowed annonymous access by many servers. IE, you don't need an account with a password to join. This gives annonymous access and hence can be nice if you have debatable things to say that you don't want others to see. However, it also allows for "flashing" DoS and other IRC related fun. The proper way to secure IRC against abuse would to be only allow servers that check authentication and make people accountable. It is possible to do this, however, without sacrificing annonimity if you trust the servers you're using (ie, they authenticate you for accountability purposes promising they won't give out who you are without a court order). This will likely not prove to be popular among people who want to be annonymous further than that (like Flashers, of course).
The next site to slashdot will be ready soon, but subscribers can beat the rush and start slashdotting it early!
The big-sell factor for IRC at the moment is its age. It's been around forever, and there's enough knowledge of it and how it works / software / literature / networks etc etc out there to form a user base.
It'd be far too hard to implement this system attractively wide scale, simply due to the fact that IRC has been losing usefulness (in it's intended form) for quite a while now.
There's no real demand for such a system. If people care who's listening they use encrypted email / private messaging software - they may themselves not be totally secure but you've got a better chance if you talk to 1 person than a room of 78.
Current IRC users don't give a shit who listens. Just the way it is.
People continue to use IRC, by and large, as a method of open communication because of its particular user base: friends, acquaintance, partners, groups, and like-minded individuals use it.
It's basically a network effect, much like that which allows MS to continue to produce relatively mediocre products. In other words, you won't use method XXX, because your friends won't be there. Your friends won't because you (and others) won't be there. Unless a substantial portion of the given social groups actually agrees to coordinate a movement, the entrenched users will stay and put up with the crap (to a point).
The bottom line is that IRC, in and of itself, has very little going for it as an open forum: it's harder to learn and use; it's laggy; its service is poor; it's insecure; and so on. It's continuing use owes largely to its users, not to the technology itself.
Public IRC should be extinct by all rights. That said, the fact that is easy to setup a server and free, means that it still has a role for private/commericial uses.
Okay, so let's go down a checklist: 1) No file transfer yet, and when it comes, we don't know what the protocol will be. You know, IRC is really more than just a chat network, Files are also important. When you want to find a hard-to-find mp3, where do you turn? IRC. If you want the latest Southpark episode because you forgot to tape it, where do you turn? IRC. If you want to fine fansubbed anime, or test out a series before you spend money on a DVD, where are there tons of fservers dedicated to anime? IRC. If you're looking for almost any type of file, where to turn? IRC. SILC, even if it does get a protocol (which allows fserves) couldn't get the sheer volume of stuff that IRC has. SILC will never replace IRC, for that reason alone.
2) Wow, it's more secure, but they aren't really sure how secure it is. It might as well be the latest security feature out of Microsoft, for all that they can tell us. They mention stuff, but they don't actually answer the question.
Well, these two, for me, are enough to persuade me that I'm not uninstalling mIRC, and not going to be d/ling SILC any time soon. Besides, IRC is great because of the variety with the people, does SILC have that? Nah. I'm sticking with my beloved IRC, thankyouverymuch.
Erik
"You," Bite me.
"Each and every one of you." Bite me.
I am not talking about the embarrasing mutilation of the english language, but the fact that you can tell from the wording that the person who wrote it is neither a cryptographer by profession or someone who seems to have digested any significant amount of litterature related to cryptography or security in general. If you've read a good deal of scientific papers on cryptography and related areas, perhaps digested a couple of books you can spot this quickly. People who understand cryptography express themselves quite differently. They strive to be precise and they are much more reluctant to call anything safe without at the same time either giving some measure of what they mean by "safe" or pointing out limiting factors. And God forbid: they'd never point their finger at a complex system and say that it was provably safe unless they could actually prove it.
I doubt you'll ever se any formal proof that SILC is secure.
I know most people would say "so what?". A lot of people would even say "well, you don't need a Ph.D to write a crypto app" -- and they would be right. you don't. however you still have to know a bit about cryptography and a LOT about how you avoid basing conclusions on assumptions.
(Just ask Bruce Schneier if his book "Applied Cryptography" suddenly lead to more quality crypto software being written. Tip: it didn't. It lead to more inept people writing even more bad crypto software). But you do need to understand what you are doing to make any kind of valid statement about what one should expect.
In any case, my point is that it takes a certain kind of mindset to design and implement anything having to do with security. The aforementioned white paper was apparently written by someone who understands some of the mechanics involved, but who doesn't seem to have absorbed any of the intellectual discipline good cryptographers convey in their writings.
I was thinking about downloading the thing and possibly install it, but if the white paper is that naive, what is the actual system going to be like? Probably not worth the bother from a security point of view, although one might actually learn other things from such a system (for instance their approach to message routing etc. I don't know I never got that far once it became obvious to me that this was the wrong place to look for a *secure* system)
So why am I writing this? To slam SILC?
Definitively not.
I'm writing it because most people are too ignorant, or to arrogant about their ignorance, to realize that they probably wouldn't be able to tell a more secure system from a less secure system. Also, because I think it is important that people try to make an effort to understand what type of security something provides -- ie. exactly what does the system prevent and what doesn't it prevent. I'd like people to *think* instead of choosing their security solutions the way most consumers choose toothpaste.