Philip Zimmermann and 'Guilt' Over PGP

Philip R. Zimmermann, creator of PGP, was quoted in a recent Washington Post article as saying he has been "overwhelmed with feelings of guilt" about the use of PGP by suspected terrorists. Zimmermann says the story was not entirely accurate, and has written a response to it (below) that he hopes will clear things up. He has also consented to a Slashdot interview, so please post any questions you have for him. As usual, we'll send 10 of the highest-moderated ones to Zimmermann by email, and post his replies verbatim as soon as we get them back.

No Regrets About Developing PGP

The Friday September 21st Washington Post carried an article by Ariana Cha that I feel misrepresents my views on the role of PGP encryption software in the September 11th terrorist attacks. She interviewed me on Monday September 17th, and we talked about how I felt about the possibility that the terrorists might have used PGP in planning their attack. The article states that as the inventor of PGP, I was "overwhelmed with feelings of guilt". I never implied that in the interview, and specifically went out of my way to emphasize to her that that was not the case, and made her repeat back to me this point so that she would not get it wrong in the article. This misrepresentation is serious, because it implies that under the duress of terrorism I have changed my principles on the importance of cryptography for protecting privacy and civil liberties in the information age.

Because of the political sensitivity of how my views were to be expressed, Ms. Cha read to me most of the article by phone before she submitted it to her editors, and the article had no such statement or implication when she read it to me. The article that appeared in the Post was significantly shorter than the original, and had the abovementioned crucial change in wording. I can only speculate that her editors must have taken some inappropriate liberties in abbreviating my feelings to such an inaccurate soundbite.

In the interview six days after the attack, we talked about the fact that I had cried over the heartbreaking tragedy, as everyone else did. But the tears were not because of guilt over the fact that I developed PGP, they were over the human tragedy of it all. I also told her about some hate mail I received that blamed me for developing a technology that could be used by terrorists. I told her that I felt bad about the possibility of terrorists using PGP, but that I also felt that this was outweighed by the fact that PGP was a tool for human rights around the world, which was my original intent in developing it ten years ago. It appears that this nuance of reasoning was lost on someone at the Washington Post. I imagine this may be caused by this newspaper's staff being stretched to their limits last week.

In these emotional times, we in the crypto community find ourselves having to defend our technology from well-intentioned but misguided efforts by politicians to impose new regulations on the use of strong cryptography. I do not want to give ammunition to these efforts by appearing to cave in on my principles. I think the article correctly showed that I'm not an ideologue when faced with a tragedy of this magnitude. Did I re-examine my principles in the wake of this tragedy? Of course I did. But the outcome of this re-examination was the same as it was during the years of public debate, that strong cryptography does more good for a democratic society than harm, even if it can be used by terrorists. Read my lips: I have no regrets about developing PGP.

The question of whether strong cryptography should be restricted by the government was debated all through the 1990's. This debate had the participation of the White House, the NSA, the FBI, the courts, the Congress, the computer industry, civilian academia, and the press. This debate fully took into account the question of terrorists using strong crypto, and in fact, that was one of the core issues of the debate. Nonetheless, society's collective decision (over the FBI's objections) was that on the whole, we would be better off with strong crypto, unencumbered with government back doors. The export controls were lifted and no domestic controls were imposed. I feel this was a good decision, because we took the time and had such broad expert participation. Under the present emotional pressure, if we make a rash decision to reverse such a careful decision, it will only lead to terrible mistakes that will not only hurt our democracy, but will also increase the vulnerability of our national information infrastructure.

PGP users should rest assured that I would still not acquiesce to any back doors in PGP.

It is noteworthy that I had only received a single piece of hate mail on this subject. Because of all the press interviews I was dealing with, I did not have time to quietly compose a carefully worded reply to the hate mail, so I did not send a reply at all. After the article appeared, I received hundreds of supportive emails, flooding in at two or three per minute on the day of the article.

I have always enjoyed good relations with the press over the past decade, especially with the Washington Post. I'm sure they will get it right next time.

The article in question appears at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A1234-2001Sep20.html

-Philip Zimmermann
24 September 2001

(This letter may be widely circulated)

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Version: PGP 7.0.3

iQA/AwUBO69F2sdGNjmy13leEQIn+QCg2DjDeyibtRe61tUSplSAobdzAqEAoOMF ir3lRc4c1D/0Mmmv/JtP/E73 =HmRO
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Comments

Future of pgp

[Darkstorm]

Although I don't use pgp on a daily basis I do occasionally use it and wish that more businesses supported it for use in email. I would much rather encrypt personal information being sent to a company but they don't support it.

Is there any plans for improving pgp's ability to incorporate itself into email programs and other forms of internet communications that will make it easier for companies and end users to use?

Re:Future of pgp

[tim_maroney]

Is there any plans for improving pgp's ability to incorporate itself into email programs and other forms of internet communications that will make it easier for companies and end users to use?

Take a look at this usability study on PGP. The design hasn't moved forward much since the study was done. PGP is so difficult to use that it may have created a new category: "insecurity through obscurity."

Tim

Anti-Empowerment == Anti-Liberty

[Bruce Perens]

PGP empowers people to exchange secrets. Computers empower people to run flight simulators and much else. The internet empowers people to meet each other, organize, and exchange data. All are used for great good, and some evil. One of the things that threaten government and large industry the most is the fact that these technologies empower the individual in a way that only government and industry were empowered before. They would like to use the excuse that these technologies can be used for crime to remove them from everybody's hands.

What strikes me about this tragic disaster is the way government is targeting technologies that are not connected with the crime, simply because the implication that they could be used is there, using the need to protect the people as a hollow justification to remove our rights.

Bruce

To what point should you go, and would it help?

[shomon2]

I'm sorry to hear about the misrepresentation. I'm sure as well that they will do better next time. It's very important that your reaction to this mistake wasn't anger, which is what I'd have expected of a lot of people. Anyway, here's my question:

To what point would you go with PGP? For example, if it were outlawed, or you considered your life to be threatened through some government's outlawing of it, would you stop working with it, or supporting strong crypto? And if you would actually "go underground" if you sincerely believed that it would help people's freedom, do you think it would matter?

What I mean is... do you think the internet(email, freenet, www, etc) could still be seen as a place where people can somehow communicate and share information, even under a regime that tried hard to stop that information being shared?

Criminalization of Encryption

[JPMH]

The idea is seriously being canvassed in the UK, of making it a criminal offence to send strongly encrypted material by email, or to put it up on a web page. Could such a law be enforced ?

Will US Government export restrictions help?

[ddstreet]

I'll admit I'm not extremely knowledgable about government regulation of encryption. But it seemed to me that previous US Governement crypto was basically focusing on controlling the exportation of 'strong' (large key?) encryption, not on the internal (by US citizens) use of encryption.

My question is, will export regulations help at all? By 'help', I mean 'accomplish what the US Government wants to happen', which I assume would be reducing the strength of encryption available outside the US. The only way I can see export regulations helping is if the large majority of R&D into encryption is done inside the US. Do you know how much work is done inside and/or outside the US in the field of encryption, and would cutting off US encryption research from the outside world (assuming that is possible via regulation) have a major impact on encryption available out of the US, or an impact on the field of encryption itself?

A Related Question

[jalefkowit]

I wonder why the reporter didn't think to ask the CEO of Boeing if he is tormented by feelings of guilt? After all, the attacks showed us that he makes his living selling giant flying bombs that Very Bad People can use to kill thousands of our people in one fell swoop. Surely he must agree that he and his company have blood on their hands, right?

Of course not. Boeing isn't responsible for this tragedy, and neither is Phil Zimmerman (and kudos to Phil for standing up and saying so). Boeing's aircraft have contributed immensely to our national economy by helping make easy commercial air travel possible. Strong crypto has contributed immensely to the economy by helping make the online world a safe, secure place to do business. Both have been misused by evil men to do a great wrong; but they are just tools, with no moral implications beyond those transferred to them through the hands of those who wield them. To place the blame anywhere else is to absolve the monsters behind the attack of the full weight of their crimes.

-- Jason Lefkowitz

Some other bad guys!

[twitter]

Agreed! I'm sure that the Wright brothers, Diesel, Sir Whittle, and others feel no guilt for the actions of criminals.

What WOULD you like to see done?

[Zwack]

Greetings,
Thank you Phil for producing PGP, for standing up for what you really believe, and for re-evaluating your beliefs after this tragic event.
Given the use of techniques like steganography and Chaffing and Winnowing to hide messages with or without encryption, and the many ways of communicating without openly passing a message (codes, one time pads,...) laws on cryptography are obviously pointless as far as stopping terrorism is concerned.
So, What would you like to see being done? What measures do you think might be effective against terrorism?
I don't have any answers, but I haven't seen any that seem effective to me either.

Thanks,
Z.

question to mr. zimmermann ...

[Frizzled]

what, would you say, is the flaw to backdoor'd crypto and how would you explain this defect to someone who lacks a wide knowledge of computers, especially in light of recent events?

thanks, _f

Wow

[NitsujTPU]

This misquoting is absolutely incredible in scope. I've been afraid of being misquoted before, but this quite well takes the cake. The individual writing the article wanted to write ONE THING smacking about the crypto community and perhaps even programmers in general, and took the quotes WAY out of context AND pretty much just took sentences and cut out all the words that he needed.

This is like me saying

"So, if I get my girlfriend a cat, this is what she wants for Christmas?"

and being quoted as

"My girlfriend" "is" "a cat."

Quantum Cryptography

[KjetilK]

We all know that a working quantum computer will make the current algorithms obsolete. Thus, the following questions:

1. Do you think a quantum computer can be developed in secrecy?
2. If yes, how can we tell if our encryption needs to be changed?
3. What are your ideas for a "quantum PGP"?

Also, I would like to thank you for PGP. Indeed, it is making the world a better place, and to me it is even more apparent in light of recent events.

Kjetil (Keyid: 6A6A0BBC)

Re:Clarification Por Favor?

[Bonker]

Okay, I posted the above as a mental excerise and then switched over to Wired News where I read the following:

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,47074,00 .html

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan -- The Taliban have threatened to execute any U.N. worker who uses computers and communications equipment in Afghanistan, forcing a near halt to the remaining relief work in the country, U.N. officials said Monday.

The militia raided U.N. offices in Kabul, the capital, and Kandahar, where the Taliban leadership is based, during the weekend and sealed their satellite telephones, walkie-talkies, computers and vehicles to bar them from use, according to U.N. spokeswoman Stephanie Bunker.

Keyrings are still to easy to read

[Black Art]

The secret keyring in practically every implementation of PGP leaks information off the secret key ring.

Not the messages, but something that can comprimise the existance of the user.

The identities on the keyring can be listed without a passphrase.

This means that if you have a standard keyring with your personal ID and you are also "Chairman X" of the local committee for doing things the State does not like, if they obtain your keyring, they can show that you and "Chairman X" are most likely the same person.

All it takes is "pgp -kvv secring.pgp" and I can tell you all of the aliases and alternate identities that you use.

Currently, using multiple secret key rings is a pain. Most implemenations of PGP do not have the ability to add a master passphrase on the keyring.

BTW, people have been linked to their nyms by just this method. (Ask Carl Johnson. He was a canadian who spent time in an American jail because he said something through a nym that the government found threatening.)

Re:Clarification Por Favor?

[ajs]

If in fact tools such as PGP are used by terrorists, how do governments protect against this?

Ignoring the Tom Clancy-esque view of our intelligence service as a jewel of freedom, what you describe is not a desirable goal. "Protecting" the government from the privacy of its citizens (and those of other nations) is about as awful as protecting them from my freedom to vote.

It's a disturbing reality that when you give people privacy, some will discuss how to blow up your cities. Revoking their freedom to discuss such things is called law enforcement, and it happens by punishing them for committing acts of agression, not for having privacy.

If my mother had been in the WTC, and it were CLEAR that PGP had been used to communicate how to attack, I would still fight to MY death to protect our right to use it. Terrorism can be stopped, but if we give up our freedom to do it, we've defended nothing.

I Like Your Hat!

[4of12]

[That would be the "Phil's Pretty Good Software" hat.]

Questions:

Do you see any reasonable chances for success for a truly free and open system of certification authorities that would enable large numbers of people to exchange ideas and money in a way they would trust and yet simultaneously permit them privacy and anonymity?

What is your opinion of Hailstorm?

Re:Clarification Por Favor?

[Mike1024]

Hey,

What are the uses of cryptography as a "Human Rights Tool"?

On Phil Zimmerman's website, he has some letters from human rights groups. You might consider looking at them.

If in fact tools such as PGP are used by terrorists, how do governments protect against this?

They don't, to put it simply. There would be no beneift - I don't think the terrorists would send e-mails saying "Ready for the WTC attack on 09/11, I have brought knives and plane tickets". They would use a code of some sort, or maybe even phone calls, postal mail or even face-to-face meetings.

Michael

Question for Phil

[merlin_jim]

First off, hats off to a career that has been inspiring to us all. I know that I, for one, cried for joy on the day that cryptographic export was opened up.

Now, the question:

It is hard for the public to hear the message "crypto backdoors are bad" without associating it with an anarchist anti-gov't message.

First off, do you believe it is possible for the gov't to implement a crypto backdoor without "Bad Guys" getting into the backdoor and thereby compromising security?

Secondly, do you have any positive examples or anecdotes of why strong crypto is good for gov't, or at least not detrimental?

Thanks, and once again congrats.