IBM Crypto Up For Grabs?

An Anonymous Coward writes: "BBC Newsnight have tonight shown an article about a groups of hackers who are about to release details of the vulnerability of the IBM Cryptographical processors. ( Details here.) The BBC article can be watched online here. Alan Cox makes a starring role ;)" windowlicker adds some detail: "Mike Bond and Richard Clayton, from Cambridge University, have cracked IBM's 4758 crytoprocessor running the 'Common Cryptographic Architecture' (CCA). You can do the same with $1000-worth of hardware and the info from here. Many banks use this system for protecting PINs." The video file requires Real software; here's the BBC's article online for those of us without.

Comments

Lessons to be learned:

[alewando]

1. Hardware encryption will always be more difficult than software-based encryption to patch when vulnerabilities arise. There are advantages that can offset this when deciding whether or not to go with hardware, but contingency plans must be put in place for yanking the hardware back when a vulnerability is discovered.
   
2. Homogeneity in network environments is nearly always bad. This particular vulnerability wouldn't be nearly as critical if it weren't for the fact that all banks who use these cryptoprocessors either use the same ones or use ones that are similar enough that vulnerabilities like these can be used on more than one "different" type. It's much harder to crack one and then crack another and another than it is to crack one and have therefore cracked them all.
   

At least I have high hopes that this vulnerability will be patched forthwith -- not only does IBM have a better track record than certain other corporations, banks have both the money and the clout to demand and receive.

Only a matter of time

[CmdrTroll]

My brother used to work as a contractor for Cirrus. He said that the PIN encryption was a private joke amongst all of the engineers there. The suits all believed that cryptographic mumbo-jumbo and really expensive chips sold by "connected" salespeople at IBM would protect the banks' assets. But, he said, the problems with the PIN were nearly impossible to solve. Consider:

• The PIN is four decimal digits = 10,000 combinations ~= somewhere between 13 and 14 bits of security. It is entirely feasible for a quick P4 to encrypt every single PIN within an hour, with time left over to play Unreal Tournament.
• There is no trusted path between the user's memory and the bank. Fake ATMs have been installed in shopping malls, collecting PINs and ATM cards from unsuspecting victims. Do you *really trust* every single PIN keypad at every shady gas station, grocery store, and Wal-Mart, not to have logging devices installed? Replay attacks are not rocket science.
• Embedding DES keys inside a chip will inevitably lead to compromise. One needs to look no farther than the DirecTV access cards (particularly the H and F cards) to see the amount of damage that a few determined hobbyists can do. Imagine if there are billions of dollars at stake rather than just a little free TV.

Regardless, this is not a widespread problem. It is a weak system and it was always a weak system. But it's not worth thieves' time to steal PINs yet (for the most part anyway) just because PINless credit card fraud is still so easy.

-CT

Re:Only a matter of time

[WasterDave]

10,000 combinations ~= somewhere between 13 and 14 bits of security. It is entirely feasible for a quick P4 to encrypt every single PIN within an hour, with time left over to play Unreal Tournament.

But if you read their page about how PIN works it becomes aparrent that you still need the derivation key, which is the hard bit to get.

Fake ATMs have been installed in shopping malls, collecting PINs and ATM cards from unsuspecting victims

LOL! Someone did a whole bunch of these in the UK a couple of years ago. Looked and smelled like an ATM, but took the PIN then complained that the card was borked, or something. Easy EASY kill.

because PINless credit card fraud is still so easy.

Exactly. 1e6+1 easier ways of stealing money than opening an ATM with an oxy-acetylene, spending two days cracking it with an FPGA and using all that to hack the banks comms. Easier to just look over some lamers shoulder then pick their pocket. Not that I would know. Not at all.

Dave

Some corrections

[hearingaid]

I live in Canada. Some of this may not apply to your jurisdiction.

My bank uses a PIN which is a minimum of 4 digits long. I believe the maximum is 12. This solves the length problem. I have a 4-digit PIN, but that's mainly because I'm a grad student, and anybody who steals my bank card and gives me money has my thanks. Unfortunately, no luck yet. :)

We have Interac cops. Interac is the Canadian banking network; the ATMs you see in malls in Canada are usually run by chartered banks, and when they're not, they're run by somebody on the Interac network. These devices get policed, and they have some pretty serious security measures on them.

There's still the basic vulnerability of the encryption scheme to consider, of course. But the other concerns you bring up can be dealt with.

Re:Insiders

[swillden]

Then again... I guess you'd only need to be an insider at the phone company (or whatever company might be leasing a cable to a phone company) to exploit ATM transfers.

Nope, read the article. Performing the attack requires that the insider have permission to use the Combine_Key_Parts function of the board. That means, essentially, that you have to have an "account" on the board with a username and password, and that your account has to have those permissions. Generally, only a very small number of people will have accounts, and only two or three at will have this permission.

Most worring aspect

[Martin S.]

The most worring aspect of this is that if this discover had been made by American academics (rather than British) it would have been squashed by the DMCA.

A nice real world example, that you should be able to exploit, to beat the politicians, to our collective benefit.