Slashdot Mirror
Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox
Tucker clearly wrote the book believing that the use of smallpox as a biological weapon was a worrisome, but not especially likely, threat, and on September 10th, most of us would not only have concurred, but would probably never have thought that such a thing could happen; after all, smallpox remains the only infectious disease to have been eradicated by humans. After reading Scourge, you will be grateful that the mysterious sender of anthrax-laced mail doesn't have the power of this infinitely worse pestilence in his or her hands.
The smallpox virus, or variola, is a biscuit-shaped bundle of DNA and protein casing, so tiny it can only be viewed with an electron microscope, yet devastating to the human body. The disease kills up to thirty percent of its victims and leaves the rest permanently scarred after battling fever, nausea, and boils so painful that thirsty patients often refused water, unable to swallow without excruciating hurt. Perhaps to be merciful, Tucker has included no photographs of suffering victims covered in the gruesome pustules of the disease, but should you have a morbid curiosity to see one, visit the Polio Eradication Photo Gallery.
Scourge is not a story about a virus, however; it is a story about people. Tucker tells of the history of smallpox and civilizations, how political machinations combined with idealism to bring about the global cooperation that removed smallpox from the earth, and the elaborate subterfuge used by the Soviet Union to hide its research on smallpox as a potential biological weapon. Fans of Laurie Garrett's (The Coming Plague, Betrayal of Trust) journalistic style will appreciate Tucker's treatment; the major figures in the history of smallpox are presented in terms of their personalities and personal struggles, rather than in simple obituary-style listings of what they did.
In describing the early history of the disease, Scourge is fascinating. You may have known that smallpox helped Hernando Cortes conquer the Aztecs in the sixteenth century, but perhaps you didn't know that smallpox may have been the Athenian epidemic Thucydides describes in his account of the Peloponnesian war. The superstitions that existed prior to the germ theory of disease - and, in some areas, long enough to hinder the last stages of the smallpox eradication campaign in the late 1970s - seem truly impossible now, but such was belief prior to the germ theory of disease.
The conquering of smallpox remains one of the great triumphs of mankind - the only infectious disease successfully eradicated by humans. The history of the eradication campaign is one of cooperation between nations and between scientists, but it is also a story of obstacles placed in the way by reluctant governments, the rapid spread of disease due to world travel, and the stubbornness of the superstitious. Here, you will meet such figures as D.A. Henderson, the reluctant leader of the World Health Organization campaign, and Viktor Zhdanov, the man who first proposed a global eradication campaign to the WHO in 1958, then, ironically, became the first chairman of the Soviet council that oversaw the secret biowarfare program beginning in the 1970s.
The clash between the traditional openness of the scientific community, where information is shared relatively freely, and the secretiveness of bureaucracies, where being in the know is a mark of power, is a recurring theme. Often, you'll find yourself rooting for the researchers, who frequently had to reason with government officials who knew nothing about science, but you may be surprised to find yourself agreeing with the government - specifically, the Department of Defense - a time or two.
The story of the Soviet Union's successful cover-up of its research into the use of smallpox as a biological weapon is unsettling, to say the least. Do you find the aftermath of a nuclear bomb impressive? Imagine that bomb followed by an ICBM bearing smallpox - a disease that kills nearly a third of its victims in a normal situation, but would be attacking survivors of a nuclear attack, whose immune systems would be severely compromised by radiation damage. Lest you think that earlier vaccinations might have helped, the smallpox vaccine is effective for only about ten years before revaccination is required, and the United States had stopped mandatory vaccinations long before the last known case of naturally occurring smallpox was diagnosed in 1978. Such a warhead was one of the foci of the Soviet program, even as facilities were carefully disguised so as to give the appearance of compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention treaty. Western governments did not learn of the full scope of the Soviet effort until 1989, and kept the information classified until former Soviet smallpox research scientist Ken Alibek (ne Kanatjan Alibekov) told the story to the American press in 1998.
Although, officially, the last remaining stores of variola virus are kept in Moscow and at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Tucker raises the possibility that other governments - particularly Iraq - may have retained secret stores of smallpox virus, citing enough circumstantial evidence to keep his speculation from being easily discounted. He also brings up the possibility that a government might, to avoid the certain retaliation that would come from launching a smallpox attack, supply the virus to a group like al-Qaeda, then deny responsibility when the terrorists release the disease. Tucker finished documenting these speculations well before the September 11th attacks; now, one hopes they aren't prophetic.
In the case of smallpox, the truth is as morbidly fascinating as any fiction could possibly be, and Tucker tells the story of those who fought to end the scourge and those who would have preserved it as a weapon with equal aplomb, yet from the perspective of a world where smallpox was a piece of history and sophisticated biological attack a back-burner phenomenon. Now that fears of biological warfare are all too real, Scourge is exceptionally relevant - and hopefully not a prediction of what is to come.
You can purchase this book at Fatbrain.
When I read something like this review, I experience twinges of fear. Smallpox sounds like it is truly terrible. And yet, somehow, we, the people of this world, did manage to get rid of it. For the future of the world, we need to recognize that we are one people first, and citizens of a nation second. This doesn't mean we all need to believe the same things, etc. This is about unity in diversity. And unity isn't abstract: its about action. Getting rid of smallpox was an example of unity in diversity. The people of the world got rid of it. Now, can we get rid of AIDS? Can we get rid of Malaria? What about our physical environment? What about nuclear weapons? What about poverty? These are things that can only be solved with unity of action.
Helping with organizational effectiveness is our job.
There was a episode of Nova about the very same topic last night on our local PBS affiliate. Quite disturbing, especially in regards to the experiments of the Soviet Union even after global treaties had been signed.
The pictures of smallpox victims were even more disturbing.
Check out the schedule, maybe it's on again, for those interested.
I know this is slightly offtopic, but I downloaded a Carlin MP3 from an HBO show from 1999 that I never saw or heard before. The first ten minutes he talked about terrorists and how they're not going to be stupid enough to use a bomb, but they'll take knives and dozens of other weapons that the airlines would let you take on board. He then went into talking about how we'd all be afraid of anthrax in our drinking water.
I know it's just comedy, but he's a smart guy and that was just a little creepy hearing about this stuff from a 2 year old recording.
> Demon in the Freezer
Excellent read! Terrifying stuff.
The article talks a lot about delivery mechanisms, from ICBMS that explode smallpox in the air, to microchip based aerators that spray live smallpox into the air and could fill an airport in a few hours.
But based on our recent experiences with suicide terrorists, has anyone thought about the simplest method of hiding, importing, and distributing the virus?
A suicide terrorist could EAT the virus, and go on vacation in the US, visiting as many places as possible, breathing on as many people as possible.
F*** this is scary! All he would have to do is visit a McDonalds in every big city!
He would have two weeks before he shows symptoms.
I almost hate even SAYING this, spreading the idea. But I'm sure they can think of it on their own.
- For the complete works of Shakespeare: cat