Schneier On Full Disclosure
Bruce let me know that he's written a piece on ZDNet (original home of the for the Window of Exposure idea is on Counterpane ? ) about the problems of not following full disclosure. Very well written and does a great job of summarizing why full disclosure works. The original piece from Culp @ Microsoft is also available, along with the PowerPoint that they did.
From the powerpoint slide:
Grace Period
Purpose: Give users a reasonable interval during which to protect their systems against newly reported vulnerabilities
- Begins with public notice of vulnerability, and lasts for 30 days
- Is immediately curtailed if vulnerability becomes actively exploited
Do I read this correctly? Does this mean that when an exploit is shown to exist in the wild, then they immediately switch to "full disclosure" mode? This means that there is now an incentive to put an exploit in the wild: it means you can publish your work. Even if you leak the exploit surreptitously.
I know I must be preaching to the choir here, but, this seems exceedingly stupid. Am I missing something?
If guns kill people, then CmdrTaco's keyboard misspells words.
So just hiding information doesn't necessarily make you more secure.
sPh
[1] OK, the Soviet Union had spies inside the project before it started, but that doesn't count!
The CIA and such are, in this case, in the position of the vendors: it is their responsibility to fix the vulnerabilities.
The disclosure should be done by people who identify the vulnerablities. If you know where you can cross a border undetected, you ought to let someone know. Particularly in that case, the hole would probably get closed pretty quickly. And if some random person notices a hole, it would be pretty easy for someone actually looking for a vulnerability to find it.
For example, if in August (or before) someone had said to the general public something like, "You can probably hijack an airplane with legal objects and then destroy a building with it", the passengers wouldn't have let the hijacking get anywhere, and the hijackers probably wouldn't have tried. There's obviously the risk that some groups that wouldn't have thought of it would get the idea, but it would have gotten fixed in policy before anyone could do anything to exploit it.
would you extend these arguments to support it in non-virtual security?
Yup.
Should the CIA and other international organizations use full exposure? Should they publish something titled, "This is the vulnerability of our Nuclear Piles"? "This is where you can cross the border undetected", "This is how to make a Fake ID?"
That's not quite the same. I no more expect the CIA to use full disclosure than Microsoft. Full disclosure is about third parties pointing out problems.
A better analogy would be "Should anyone who wants be able to publish things like, "Guide to Lock Picking"? Sure enough, you can find works on picking locks, defeating car and home alarms, hotwiring cars, making fake ids, and a host of other real world security issues. And these works are good things. Individuals affected by these risks can use this information make their own judgements on how to protect themselves.
but by the same token, releasing information about a vulnerability is admitting that your application is flawed. This also harms the reputation of your product among some user groups. With Windows XP Microsoft has conclusively proven that their target market is People Who Don't Know What A Mouse Is; these are the same people who would react most negatively to MS security alerts.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/defau
Copper was being used elsewhere in the war effort, so:
and Swiped from http://members.aol.com/fmcguff/dwmodel/intro.htmfencepost
just a little off
-- ;-)
Kuro5hin.org: where the good times never end.