Using RFC 1918 IP Addresses on Internal Routers?
braek asks: "Our network has expanded to the point that I have about 6 separate
network links to remote networks. I would like to avoid using public IP addresses for the routers to conserve my limited global IP addresses, and I don't expect any additional IP's for a while. :(
What do you guys think about assigning internal routers a private, RFC 1918 IP address, like 10.0.0.1 or something? (For security, RFC 1918 addressess would be filtered at the border routers.)"
"I am testing this right now, and routing seems to work fine, the only problem I can think of, is when someone does a traceroute, it will show up like:
10 120 ms 131 ms 120 ms 152.63.67.97 11 130 ms 130 ms 131 ms 66.141.21.1 12 * * * Request timed out. 13 130 ms 130 ms 140 ms 66.141.21.185Hop 12 is the router with the private RFC 1918 address, and I am assuming it is not responding to a traceroute because the IP is not globally routable. However, all the clients behind the router have complete, unabashed network access. What problems may one encounter if implementing this kind of addressing scheme?"
When I traceroute from my Road Runner Pro connection (which uses statically-assigned routable IP addresses), I see at least one 10/8 network:
Technically, this is the Wrong Thing. Likewise, your routers should never respond to or generate traffic using RFC 1918 addresses.
I'm proud of my Northern Tibetian Heritage
I thought that was what the 1918 addresses are for? We use a whole crapload of them (10.*s, 172.16.*, 192.168.*) for both internal/external segregation, as well as additional 'real VLANs'...for example, seperating our storage networks (192.168.10.0) from our 'normal PC net' (10.48.0.0). It works wonderfully!
Uh... until they compromise an internal host, or internal router, that is. If you think that you can lock down a network simply by using private IP's, think again.
Here is one scenario; compromise a Windows machine on 10.0.0.0/8 by sending it an email with an auto-executing file type. Have that executable run a trojan with an IRC daemon. Have that IRC daemon connect back to a channel where you have channelops.
Once you can issue commands to the shell running on that Windows box inside that network, use the compromised machine to scan every other host on the internal network for vulnerabilities. You can even use port forwarding on the compromised machine to directly attack other hosts, in a fashion similar to having a VPN. Or, you can bootstrap Gnu-style utilities such as CygWin or NT rootkits to turn that Windows machine into a fairly powerful Unix emulator. Take your pick.
The attack vectors available for compromising a host on a private subnet are many; once a host is compromised, the attacker can do whatever they'd like inside your network, "private", or not.
Free music from Jack Merlot.
I've been doing this WAN/LAN thing since 1982. Ever IP shop save one that I have worked in has used RFP1918 addresses.
I cannot think of a situation, even a single end-point PC, that would not benefit from intellegent and thoughtful use of RFC1918, and even that single PC, if it offers no externally accesses services, has no need for a globally routed IP address of its own.
For all its faults, AOLs use of externally invisible addresses has meant 33 million surfing consumers without wasting routable IP addresses. The masses are (comparitively) secure from DOS and crack attacks, and the technically astute ones can still get little patches that let IP native software on their AOL attached machine work fine.
Even the Mom&Pop dial-up ISP customer, or DSL or Cable subscribers can benefit by only paying for globally routable addresses if/when they want to offer services, or the service provider can simply not offer such routable addresses. The vast majority of home users won't notice the difference.
And anyone with an internal point to point circuit can use RFC1918, anyone who uses a "real" router to link to their ISP (that includes *nix running IPMasquerade) benefits by putting their internal office on RFC1918 address except those few machines that are offering services to the outside world. And if their business depends on it, why are they putting the server in their office anyway? That's what professional datacenters are for.
Of course it can cause problems if done randomly or without consideration that yes indeed this same "10.0.0.1" is used by thousands if not hundreds of thousands of other 'Nets around the world.
However, the benefits of implementing RFC1918 far outweigh the potential problems. At the absolute worst, two sites might have to use masquerade between them to hide the fact that years before they knew they would be working together, they both used 10.0.0.1. That's it, that is the one "danger", and it's little more than another option on the (hopefully used, like a condom) firewall that is also installed between the two offices.
Re-reading, this is in fact a "big picture" spewing on my part. I really wish the "doom and gloom" nay-sayers on both sides, the "We're Running Out Of Addresses" and "RFC1918 Use Is Dangerous" would take cold showers and relax.
Extensive use of RFC1918 is saving lots of money in those places like Asia where routable addresses cost a bundle, and putting off IPv6. Renumbering at some point is the greatest "danger" that any use of RFC1918 can cause, and not using it will require renumbering any time someone changes ISP's anyway. Such is not the case if you're already using unrouted addresses. Something to think about, with the merger/failure cycle in ISP's, ne?
So my advice, do RFC1918 where ever you can!
And for the "I'm Sid, so there" urge, the CCIE "certification" didn't exist yet at the time when I took all the Cisco classes. So There!
Bob-
The Ludwig von Mises Institute. The reasoning individuals economics