Export-level Encryption Proves Insufficient

rossjudson writes: "The Independent is running an article about the shoe bomber terrorist. The interesting bit for Slashdot readers is at the bottom -- apparently the 40-bit encryption in the export version of Windows 2000 was cracked by a set of computers using a brute force method. So let's confront the question: Should the US prohibit the export of high-encryption software? Here is a case where the default values (40 bit) clearly helped recover valuable information from a system." There's another article in New Scientist focusing on the encryption issue.

Comments

To really be safe...

[wfrp01]

If you really want to make the world a safer place, please demand that everyone wear helmets all of the time.

Re:well that settles it..

[linzeal]

I thought the US annexed the UK with mtv and endless pop culture in the early 80's.

Yes, this is definately the way to go.

[Anonymous Coward]

In fact, we should just make terrorism illegal, then people would stop. Because criminals follow the law, right?

Even though Osama was able to get a bunch of people into US flight schools, he surely wouldn't've been able to go to CompUSA, buy a copy of W2K off the shelf, and somehow get a 5 x 5 x 1/16" piece of plastic outside a country with roughly 10,000 miles of borders and 1500 international flights daily. Nope, no way that coulda happened.

Re:It doesn't matter because:

[alteridem]

The problem with that is that your implementation may be flawed - this accounts for the bulk of the cracked encryption. That's why it's best to use known good encryption.

That is probably why the export version of M$ Windows 2000 now ships with 128 bit encryption. The NSA knows that everything Microsoft does is flawed, but figures that it will lull the terrorists into a false sense of security...

Re:New slashdot poll

[curunir]

Unfortunately, even computers will stop reading before they reach the end of the article, so you'd probably have some data loss.