OpenSSH Local Root Hole
maelstrom writes: "Looks like someone's found a local root exploit for OpenSSH versions between 2.0 and 3.0.2. Seems as though its a one-off error, there is no public exploit, but there is sure to be one shortly. They aren't ruling out remote exploit. Recommending patching and upgrading ASAP."
This kind of bug would NOT BE EXPLOITABLE if sshd was written in a modern safe language.
9 013 for more info. Synopsis: There are some reasons to use C for a project, but none apply to network daemons. As a proof of concept, I rewrote FTPD in my favorite modern language; the source went from 24,000 lines to 3000 (including support code, like PAM_MD5 password encryption), took me only a weekend to write, and is 100% buffer overflow / format string / heap corruption free.
If the canonical secure software from the canonical secure software people has bugs like this, I don't see how anyone can argue that it's possible to write secure code in C. C makes it easy to make this kind of bug, and the bugs are often exploitable.
Check out my previous post and ensuing discussion on this http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=24271&cid=262
I'm trying to raise awareness about this because I think it's a real obstacle to us having secure software.
> I cry BS. Your previous post claimed that
> performance was not a reason and yet I don't
> believe you. Wake up and stop acting as the HW
> vendors lobbyist.
Actually, I am a "modern languages" lobbyist, not hardware. =) But that's because I study and believe in programming languages, not because I have some kind of financial interest.
I'd love to respond to your post but I don't know what your point is. I guess all I can do is reiterate my point on performance:
1. sshd, running on my machine for about 8 months, has accumulated a mere 2 minutes and 30 seconds of CPU time. Of course, sshd forks off a new process for each connection, but all of the ones on my machine (some of which are at least a week old) have used 0:00. If someone knows a way I can measure the actual time spent by the daemon, I'd like to hear it, but I assume for now that it is *very small*.
2. I can easily fill my 100Mbps connection without breaking 2% CPU usage. (In other words, sshd is bandwidth limited, not CPU limited.)
3. Most home / small business users do not have 100Mbps connections, and could care less about the difference between 2% or 5% CPU usage.
4. However, most home / small business users DO care about having to download patches when their C programs contain buffer overflows.
5. Modern languages are not actually much slower than C. (I estimate worst case 2x slower, typically more like 20% for SML, which is what I wrote my FTPD in.) Being easier to write in, they also give more opportunity for high-level optimizations.
Therefore, I conclude that for almost every user, security is a more important concern than speed, at least as far as network daemons go. How can you argue the opposite?