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ICANN Releases Reform Plan
If you've followed the history of ICANN at all, you know that it was originally set up to have substantial representation from the general public (known as At-Large representatives) - 9 of 18 board members. The original unelected board immediately set about undermining that, only electing 5 members and keeping on four "board-squatters" from the original unelected bunch.
The elections of the five At-Large members had two flaws from the point of view of ICANN's unelected board:
- There were assorted technical issues with the voting process, due apparently to incompetence from the contractor who handled it.
- Two of the five new board members who were elected did not represent the same corporate interests as the rest of the board.
Of these two flaws, the second was by far the more severe. The board risked losing control of ICANN to people who might run it for the public good rather than for the good of the corporations represented on the board. They started backing away from having any sort of elected representation whatsoever. In February 2002 ICANN President Lynn floated a reform proposal which would eliminate the At-Large representation - or rather, it would keep something called "At-Large", that would no longer be elected by the general public but instead appointed by the Board itself. Instead of the general public picking new ICANN Board members, the ICANN Board would pick new ICANN Board members. This was followed by a vote which confirmed ICANN's commitment to eliminating elected representation.
Now the reform proposal is out. There would be two classes of board members:
- approximately eight ex-officio members (members holding the board seat due to some other title or position they hold)
- approximately five to eleven members picked by a Nominating Committee (the Committee to be chosen by the current Board) and perhaps confirmed by the Board
It is important to note how thoroughly captured this process is. Many of the ex-officio seats accrue from positions that are selected by the ICANN Board. So the ICANN Board picks someone to be chief dogwalker, and the chief dogwalker gets an automatic position on ICANN's Board.
The seats selected by the Nominating Committee are also extremely vulnerable to capture. Let me use a real-life example of how nominating committees work to show what I mean: my credit union.
My credit union has a board structure very similar to the one proposed for ICANN: several ex-officio members, and a number of seats elected by the general populace (everyone who has an account at the credit union). This structure is actually more flexible than that proposed for ICANN, since ICANN does not plan any direct elections at all. However, the credit union membership picks from among candidates selected by a Nominating Committee. Every year or two, I get a ballot in the mail. I can choose from among all the candidates selected by the Nominating Committee, and I can check boxes for the candidates that I prefer, up to the number of open seats available on the Board.
I never return these ballots. Why, you might ask? Because the number of candidates is usually identical to the number of open seats. Three empty seats, three candidates to choose from. Six empty seats, six candidates to choose from. I think one year they might have had more candidates than open seats, but it was an aberration.
This system apparently works well for credit unions: would you believe that they pay interest on my checking account? What it does guarantee is that all future Board members will represent the same biases that are present in the Board at the instant the system was instituted. In my credit union's case, this guarantees "fiscal responsibility" or "fiscal conservatism".
For ICANN, what it would do is institutionalize the biases currently present. Whatever biases are there right now, will be there forever, as the system becomes a self-reinforcing feedback loop with no external controls.
The Board's current biases are toward:
- expanding ICANN's mission from a purely technical body to one that is willing to govern the Internet - taking on assorted social/political issues as it sees fit
- running ICANN for private profit rather than public benefit
Neither of these two traits needs reinforcing. Karl Auerbach, one of ICANN's At-Large directors, has his thoughts on a possible ICANN structure.
The difference lies in the fact that you can choose what OS/Kernel/distribution you want to use, but you can't choose not to use ICANN if you want to use the Internet. ICANN controls the NANA, which means they control the IP addresses, and they control who manages the TLDs.
If you have a problem with the direction that Linus and the Linux kernel developers are going, you can (1) fork the kernel, (2) use Free/Open/Net BSD, (3) use some variant of Windows, or (4) find something else. If you have a problem with ICANN's policies, you're stuck. They've got a monopoly, and they're using it with an agenda. You may or may not agree with their agenda (I don't), but their proposal for eliminating elected board members means that they're eliminating any hope that you or I could influence their agenda short of completely overthrowing the system.
Even dictators have to pretend to have laws and courts...
We call it art because we have names for the things we understand.
You *ARE* crazy if you think corporate interests represent stability and strength. That has been, for so many decades, a mere illusion.
With the recent collapse of so many corporations and related scandals, I'd say it's time to have a closer look at what we consider to be stability and strength. With only a glance at the TV you would find that corporations are anything but stable right now... moreover, they're irresponsible and self-serving. Since Microsoft is the popular "bad corporation" example, look at the recent situation with their accounting practices. For some reason there was no fines or formal accusations and while they agreed to change their ways (yeah, right!) they admit to no wrong doing.
Okay maybe I'm just reacting to a troll and... oh well, my bad then... or maybe it was supposed to be funny, in which case, I'm trying to laugh but I just can't.
I know this has been discussed before, but it seems that now is an appropriate time to bring it up again. It seems high time for an overthrow of ICANN.
Yes, we have alternate registrars with alternate TLDs, but I don't mean that. I mean that there isn't anything stopping anyone from setting up an alternative to ICANN, with all its constituent committees and groups. Give the new organization several key features, such as a charter that can't be changed at the whim of the leadership of the day, a clear method of representation for Internet users and a straightforward method for choosing reps, and a progressive method for selecting new TLDs that doesn't take decades to work through. Make it everything ICANN isn't, and then make a play for control of the root nameservers. If the new organization can't get them directly, then it could set up its own. The best part of this strategy is that if the alternate organization starts to gather support, ICANN, the DoC, and Congress would be forced to acknowledge it or risk breaking the DNS system as the two organizations take divergent paths.
This may not work, and it'll probably be messy as hell, but it'll be fun, and it'll scare the hell out of some people and groups who desperately need the hell scared out of them.
That light you see at the end of the tunnel might be from an oncoming train.