Slashdot Mirror
Crack a Password, Save Norwegian History
Christian writes "With the death of the only person who knew the password to an archive held at a museum in Norway, suddenly the data became inaccessible. The result? A nationwide radio appeal asking for "hackers" to volunteer to help solve the problem! The
Norway Post has the story." I wonder if they looked under his keyboard yet..
5. Juni 2002
Hackers respond to password challenge
Hackers have responded in large numbers to an appeal from the director of a culture center and literary museum on the west coast of Norway.
The password to one of their library archive systems is missing.
The museum built in honour of the famous Norwegian linguist Ivar Aasen received a gift of more than 1600 books and documents which had been catalogued and registered in a national data bank, which researchers and interested people may access.
Only trouble was that the expert who had helped the donor with the archiving work had died, and had failed to pass on the password.
In order to get access to the data base, Director Ottar Grepstad appealed on nationwide radio for help to solve the problem.
The response was above expectations, and the director is now busy chosing the expert most likely to solve the problem.
(NRK)
(this loaded very slow, but I got it.)
The truth shall set you free!
A little info:
The database is from Dbase 4, I don't know how the security is on that format. It contains data about the norwegian linguist Ivar Aasen. For those interested in giving it a try, just search on norwegian pages to find the directors email address (name in another post). He's received quite a few emails already... (No, won't give the address here, pity the one who gets his email published on Slashdot).
Please excuse crappy english, save your grammatic flames.
Are you a grammar Nazi? I'm trying to improve my English; please correct my errors!
Google for "secret sharing" and you'll find plenty of references. Essentially, the secret (i.e. the password) is converted into a value that intercepts an axis of a n-dimensional graph. m points in n-dimensional space are then generated such that they lie in a straight line on a single plane. You can then distribute the values of the m points safe in the knowledge that you need at least n of them in order to calculate the point of interception of the secret.
AFAIK, this is how things like launch codes for nukes are stored and distributed (to counter the twin threats of elimination of keyholders preventing nukes from being launched, and to prevent a single rogue keyholder launching without appropriate authorisation).
Apologies to the maths/crypto purists out there if my description is fuzzy, over-simplified, or plain wrong, but it's been a while... ;-)
Better explanations can be found on RSA's site and in Ross Anderson's book "Security Engineering"
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Er, I'm not sure what you're getting at. For example, any set of points (in a space of more than two dimensions) that "lie in a straight line" are necessarily also in a plane and are in fact in infinitely many planes.
Shamir's secret sharing is easy to describe: Any polynomial of degree k-1 can be completely figured out from k points on it but not from k-1 points. So to share a secret among any number of people so that any k of them can figure out the secret and any k-1 of them cannot, you make up a polynomial whose value at x=0 is the secret and you tell each person the value of the polynomial at other points (at x=1, x=2,...).
For example, any 2 points define a line (a polynomial of degree 1). If you tell me where the line is at x=1 and x=2, I can figure out where the line is at x=0. But if you only tell me where the line is at x=1, I haven't got a clue where it is at x=0, because it could still be anywhere. If you gave a million people different values for x=1, x=2,... x=1000000, no one of them would know the value of the line at x=0, but any two of them could figure it out.