Collapsing P2P Networks

Andrew writes "I'm a undergraduate at the University of Washington, and after seeing this article on Salon, I dusted off a paper I had written last year. I examined P2P networks under a model usually used in describing animal populations, and found that it may be possible to cause a collapse in the network based on the intrinsic nature of the technology. Just as in animal populations, P2P networks require a sizable "critical mass" of users, and overharvesting can cause a systemic collapse - what if this were done on purpose? Quite ominously, my second recommendation on disruption was carrying damaged or incorrectly named files. You can read theabstract and the actual paper"

Comments

Well, atleast we know who skipped maths lessons

[GnomeKing]

In particular, our analysis of the model leads to three potential strategies, which can be used in conjunction:

1. Randomly selecting and litigating against users engaging in piracy
2. Creating fake users that carry (incorrectly named or damaged files)
3. Broadcasting fake queries in order to degrade network performance
4. Selectively targeting litigation against the small percentage of users that carry the majority of the files

Re:Well, atleast we know who skipped maths lessons

[Saeger]

1. Randomly selecting and litigating against users engaging in piracy

countermeasure: encryption + the bad press that randomly sueing upstanding citizens would bring.

2. Creating fake users that carry (incorrectly named or damaged files)

countermeasure: webs of trust & md5 hashes.

3. Broadcasting fake queries in order to degrade network performance

countermeasure: evolve to shun the DoS nodes (again, webs of trust & a 'witness system' needed).

4. Selectively targeting litigation against the small percentage of users that carry the majority of the files

countermeasure: This being the most effective [scare] tactic of the four, the best way to deflect it would be hiding your identity, or somehow spreading everything available very thin (freenet style) for plausible deniability, or serving from offshore, or rotating selections...

--

Re:Well, atleast we know who skipped maths lessons

[LordLucless]

Yes, you can probably counter all these tactics, but they would still do their job.

If the labels can force p2p networks into a more complex model, it culls the less technically able users. I think if the p2p music sharing networks evolved into systems requiring md5 hash lookups, trust networks and other countermeasures, Joe Schmoe wouldn't be bothered using them. He wants something he can just hook up to, grab stuff, and leave.

Music piracy has always happened. Its just booming now. They just want to stop the boom, not eradicate it entirely.

Re:Start of a bad trend

[oakbox]

Isn't that the point though? You can't go to court suing Sony because they created a lot of damaged versions of their songs. How does this sound?

"I was trying to download an illegal copy of their copyrighted music and it was damaged!"

I think this is one case where they could simply set up some distributed PC's (different IP's in different class C's) and just have P2P clients serving 'bad' versions of their own copyrighted music. Set up a little consortium of several different records companies, and it becomes DAMN hard to apply an effective filter.

You might counter by setting up a central key list of 'correct' MD5 checksums, but then THAT list becomes a target of litigation from the RIAA.

I don't like it, but it is an elegant solution. Use the power of P2P against itself. Anonymity works both ways.