OpenSSH Package Trojaned
cperciva writes "The original story is here.
And more details are available from the guy's weblog here." Here's a mirror of that email message. Another reader writes, "Not really a trojan because all it does is make a connection to 203.62.158.32:6667." Still another writes "The tarball of the portable OpenSSH on ftp.openbsd.org is trojaned. The backdoor is only used during build - generated binaries are fine." There isn't much authoritative information available, but this appears legitimate - please be careful if you're updating any of your machines with code from ftp.openbsd.org, and we'll update this story with more links as information is available. Update: 08/01 19:13 GMT by M : OpenSSH now has an advisory.
So the sources are bad but the binaries are good? Is today bizarro-world day or something?
C:\>bf-output.sh
'bf-output.sh' is not recognized as an internal or external command,
operable program or batch file
This trojan doesn't look very 31337 to me.
This comment was generated by a Squadron of Ultra Ninjas
...for hosting ftp.openbsd.org on a box running SunOS, not OpenBSD!
It was "no remote holes in 5 years". Now it's "one remote hole in the default install, in nearly 6 years!"
Next it will be "one remote hole and one 'harmless trojan' in the default install, in really very close to 6 years!"
If there would be some configure/make environment that prevents or asks before outgoing connections and checks for possibly dangerous commands, that are unusual to call upon a ./configure run, wouldn't that prevent things like this to happen again?
Yes, I recommend having the installation banned from creating / deleting / running any files.
So there are positive features to the *BSD splits after all! :-)