Security In Voice Over IP Converged Networks

dotslash writes: "This article at Internet Telephony Magazine has a very interesting analysis of security issues created by converging data and telephony networks with VoIP: "When the phenomenon of "convergence" between telephony and Internet started, it also brought closer the world of the phreaker and the hacker. VoIP brings all this to the next level. Unfortunately, the security inherent in VoIP solutions is equivalent to that of the early Internet: Non-existent.""

Comments

Some good points, some dumb ones...

[cfulmer]

Finally, something I know about! This is what I do for a living.

The fact of the matter is that most of the large emerging packet telephony networks are not being deployed in enterprises, but in the carrier networks -- telephone companies around the world are replacing their old circuit-switched back-haul networks for packet-switched networks, either ATM or IP. These are private networks which are not open to the general public, and so do not have the same risks as, say running VoIP on the internet would. Sure, the telcos still need to watch out for attackers... it's just that you've raised the bar far enough that 'script kiddies' would have a tough time.

The article also has an over-simplified view of the effort needed to tap an IP phone call. Even if the user were able to mirror any port on the network onto his computer, he still has the extremely hard task of figuring out which port(s) he needs to monitor -- they typically change on a per-call basis, and the user would actually have to mirror two ports (one for each direction of speech) in order to get the entire call. Now, it can be done, but it's difficult. And, it's made even harder because the signalling path (the communication link that handles setting up calls) is usually encrypted, so it becomes impossible to distinguish among calls.