Schneier Analyzes Palladium
bcrowell writes "This month's CryptoGram from Bruce Schneier has an analysis of what little information people have been able to glean (without signing an NDA) about Microsoft's Palladium initiative." We might as well throw in a direct link to Schneier's look at the MPAA License to Hack bill as well.
This sums it up pretty nicely, I think.
Bruce Writes:
"It's hard to sort out the antitrust implications of Pd. Lots of people have written about it. Will Microsoft jigger Pd to prevent Linux from running? They don't dare."
I dont have the same impression of Microsoft that Bruce seems to have. If i go trough what they have done in the past there is nothing they wouldnt do to get more control. They will almost certainly have a licence tailored to make it hard for Open Source/Linux to implement it without breaking GPL.
Considering that GPL is a bigger threat to them than linux itself i assume they will take a shot at it. GPL is the one thing stopping them from stomping all over Open Source wreaking hawoc like in Simpson. They much prefer the BSD licence where they can "borrow" code since the despite their extremely big cashpile cant get people who knows how to code.
HTTP/1.1 400
We're already well down that road. It is very easy to see a day when the general computing device we all know and love will be illegal because it makes it way too easy to copy digital data. Nevermind that what made the general computing device popular is that it manipulates digital data so easily.
We all know what the industry wants. THe industry wants a pay per view world where every consumer pays every time he views industry owned content and the industry is protected from competition because they control the technology that allows content to be created. It isn't about fairness. It isn't about content authors getting paid. It's about greed, plain and simple.
I'm trying to teach myself to set people on fire with my mind... Is it hot in here?
This brought two ideas to mind...
Ok, time for work...
Curmudgeon Gamer: Not happy
So the smart people at Microsoft made every mistake that had been made in computing since 1938 all over again, without knowing they were making those mistakes or what their consequences would be. Networking is a perfect example: in their haste to bring something to market that would displace Novell (keeping in mind that Novell created the market for MS-DOS networking), the genuii at MS built a clumsy, difficult to manage, insecure contraption of a networking system that ignored every lesson Xerox, Novell, 3Com, Wang, and others had already learned.
And, thanks to the power of the installed base, we are now stuck with Microsoft Networking and its insecurities for at least the next 20 years, because everything has to be backward compatible with what is already out there.
So I would say a combination of smartness, arrogance, and lack of perspective is exactly what has brought Microsoft code to where it is today. And a corporate culture of that nature is very, very hard to change.
sPh
The base assumption in the XBox paper is that the key is unique to each box. But that it isn't relevent.
Once captured off the bus the key can be revealed and used to decrypt everything else as necessary.
By the way, the hardware used may have been expensive, but the hardware PRODUCED to do it was valued by the author at about $50. So a device could be created to spit out the codes easily and cheaply. It also would not have to be attached for a long period of time, just long enough to retrieve the key. As such you could, theoretically take your xbox to a shop, and be handed the key 2 minutes later. Wouldn't have to solder anything either.
Can someone please explain why the desired level of security can't be obtained by only software?
Because the control mechanism in any von Neumann machine is in the same band as the stuff being controlled (ie, the OS - which enforces the security policy - operates in the same space - the CPU's available memory - as the programs which may, or may not, behave themselves).
Ultimately, the only way to have a secure audit trail for how a computer got to its current state is to have the verifier out of band from the verified. This is why you need the trusted component (the tamper proof verifier which can sign the logs of the host system). Assuming no-one can get to the trusted component private keys (even, or especially, the computer owner), another computer can trust the signature to be an accurate representation of the state of the original machine.
By the way, it's this in-band control mechanism which means that the Internet Protocols have an incredibly hard time defending themselves against DoS attacks - because the ICMP packets travel along the same route as the TCP/UDP packets. If you can interfere with the data stream, you can interfere with the control stream as well. The phone companies found this out ages ago, which is why whistling at 2600Hz doesn't work any more.
--Ng
The home user bought Office 2000 because of the helpful little paperclip. He will buy this.
Wrong, the home user did not buy Office 2000. If they have it at all, they pirated it.
And that's Palladium's problem. Currently, the home user is used to pirate software/music/movies and if anything tries to stop him doing it, he will refuse to use it.
There will be a market for non-Palladium systems (to be more specific, there will be no market for Palladium systems) so companies will produce for that market. If AMD and Intel are relly so stupid to refuse to make any non-Palladium chips anymore, be ready for VIA and Transmeta chips that will be bought if there is no other chance to watch "insecure" content on the PC.
Come on, this has been tried before (DivX-hardware player) it just does not work.
VmPd runs on a PC, VmPd contains all keys required to access all areas of itself. VmPd is trusted, because it is a trusted PC (which is the point of this whole mess) to do what it is expected to do.
This might work if and only if you gain access to the private keys of the Pd hardware chip.
If you have these keys, the security is broken completely and you can do whatever you want. Getting them is the hard part.
Keep in mind that you, the owner of the machine, is NOT supposed to have access to these keys. In fact they are specifically protected against YOU.
Pd is trusted in this context means that a Pd machine is trusted by Disney, etc. to display some copy-protected crap. You, the owner, is NOT the trusted party, you are the bad guy, the malicious bastard that your machine has to be protected from.
Kaa
Kaa's Law: In any sufficiently large group of people most are idiots.
I don't think any of us here will disagree that piracy happens, and, to individuals such as yourself, it might truly be a problem. However, our two main gripes are 1) they're going about fighting it in all the wrong ways, and 2) the amount of money actually lost to the RIAA through piracy is so small as to be insignificant (to them; if any of us actually got that amount of money it would probably make us very happy), and, from what I can tell, only a very tiny fraction of that would get back to the artists/movie makers/etc.
To address these points more fully:
1) Yes, the piracy happens, and digital piracy happens, but by far the biggest piracy is analog. Most of the problem isn't people ripping a DVD of a movie and distributing that (though it happens); the problem you mentioned, movies appearing early, is usually accomplished by some insider (or semi-insider) leaking it; they have access to the original source material, so none of this would stop them from copying it. The other problem is that they are assuming the consumers are all thieves, and thus punishing everyone for the sins of a few. What they could be doing instead is looking for better ways to make buying the product attractive (like dropping prices or something).
2) The RIAA/MPAA talk about numbers of pirated copies sold in a certain period (side note: how the heck do they even know? Do the pirates tell them??), and take those, with the amounts they would have been paid, had all those copies been bought from them, and come up with an amount that they call the amount of money they've lost to piracy during that period. The first problem with this is that, if they had not bought the pirated copies, most of those people would not have bought anything from the RIAA/MPAA. Then, even if those numbers were correct, I think they could afford it. How much do they spend on campaign contributions a year? I would bet that it's at least as much. And, of course, the "poor artists" who are being robbed by the "evil pirates" would get very little of the money.
Once again, if any of this information is inaccurate, please do not be offended; instead, simply tell me what I've gotten wrong.
Dan Aris
Fun. Free. Online. RPG. BattleMaster.