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Can Poisoning Peer to Peer Networks Work?

Posted by ryuzaki0 on from the stuff-to-read dept.

andrewchen writes "Can poisoning peer to peer networks really work? Business 2.0 picked up my research paper from Slashdot and wrote an article about it. In my paper, I argue that P2P networks may have an inherent "tipping point" that can be triggered without stopping 100% of the nodes on the network, using a model borrowed from biological systems. For those who think they have a technical solution to the problem, I outlined a few problems with the obvious solutions (moderation, etc.)."

2 of 391 comments (clear)

  1. Re:Simple! by decathexis · · Score: 4, Interesting
    A more 'toothful' modification of this idea would be to require all files to include some DMCA-protected text, like DeCSS.

    Or, maybe, a "licence":

    By making this File available on the Network, directly or through an Agent, the Distributor hereby gives up any and all Rights to its Content, as well as any other Works of Art matching this File in name.


    Having distributed content together with such licenses (or hired someone to do so), it might be a bit harder for the labels to defend copyright claims for individual songs.

  2. Comparisons to the War on Drugs by bwt · · Score: 4, Interesting

    In particular, our analysis of the model leads to four potential strategies, which can be used in conjunction:

    1. Randomly selecting and litigating against users engaging in piracy
    2. Creating fake users that carry (incorrectly named or damaged files)
    3. Broadcasting fake queries in order to degrade network performance
    4. Selectively targeting litigation against the small percentage of users that carry the majority of the files

    This mostly summarizes the war on drugs and the government's strategy against alcohol prohibition in the 1920's. Neither worked and the countermeasures are simple and straight forward.

    A "directed" web of trust, objective quality measurement, and knowledge compartimentalization defeat the above strategy. The countermeasure of creating large numbers of mutally trusting attackers doesn't work when trust "flow" is taken into account. The keys to such a system are:
    1) trust is assymetric
    2) nodes define and change who they trust based on their own assessments
    3) Nodes protect their knowledge of the web of trust

    To see how this works, consider the cops and the drug dealers. The fact that the cops all trust each other does not result in the drug dealers trusting them. When a dealer is compromised, no matter how high up the chain it goes, trust shifts to rivals. Even when a kingpin falls, lines of trust will still exist that aren't compromised.

    Drug dealing is not as popular as file sharing, is substantially more damaging to peoples lives and society, and has motivated levels of funding that are not matchable by publicly traded firms (who must demonstrate at least mid-range ROI). Despite all of these advantages, the war on drugs has been a dismal failure. The bottom line is that the internet makes distribution of content a commidity, where it was formerly a task of enormous complexity and value add. Economics will determine the rest, unless the US adopts and maintains a totalitarian government.