Toronto, The Naked City

PunWork writes "In an effort to promote wireless network security, Toronto consulting firm IpEverywhere (pun intended) has published a map of downtown Toronto, showing the location of both encrypted and unencrypted ('naked') wireless networks. Is this going to help spread awareness, or is this just going to encourage people to abuse the (apparently) ignorant? The Toronto Star has a story about the map and the consulting firm here."

Comments

Spammers

[The Turd Report]

I wonder how long it will take spammers to clue in on this? It is a wonderful deal for spammers; as they are untraceable via this method. There are steps that people running these networks could do to prevent spammers, but still allow legit users. But, you all know how well some admins look after security...

Unencrypted != unsecured

[Leto2]

People, unencrypted by WEP doesn't mean unsecured. We all know 802.11 WEP has its shortcomings, so more and more administrators are relying on different techniques to secure their wireless LAN, IPsec and VPN to name a few.

And after you've secured your network on a higher level than OSI 1, you can be less paranoid about WEP. So much less, that some claim that DISabling WEP is not a bad thing at all. Think about it, you already have encryption taken care of, so why not make your network more stable, robust and fast by disabling WEP?

Those 'wardriving' pictures should make a distinction between "secured with WEP", "no WEP, but I cannot use the network because of IPsec/VPN/whatever" and "no WEP, and I can surf freely through it".

-Leto2

Naked != unprotected or insecure

[mouthbeef]

I just spoke with the COO of the IPEverywhere about this study, and confirmed that the methodology only established whether a node was running WEP (a "security measure" of dubious value).

That means that many of the "unsecured" nodes in this report may have had other means of securing themselves, from switch- or AP-based MAC filtering to captive portals such as NoCat. Moreover, the protocol for this study did not establish whether the open APs in question were handing out DHCP leases (or, indeed, whether they were connected to the Internet at all).

Finally, this study did not investigate in any depth whether the open APs were deliberately or accidentally left open. Many of us run open "community" networks around the world (I operate one in Toronto at King and Niagara, and three in San Francisco, two at 19th and Shotwell, and one on Sycamore near 17th and Mission). These networks are deliberately "unsecured" and are provided out of public-spiritedness, or even out of a political commitment to providing tools for anonymous speech on the Internet -- anonymous speech being fundamental to democratic discourse.

Since WEP is such a poor "security" measure, the best practice for wireless users is to use SSH and/or SSL tunnels to secure sensitive traffic to a proxy (either remote or on your own network). In fact, if you're a promiscuous user of any network -- conference centers, airport lounges, hotel rooms, schools, etc -- you should assume that unless your messages are encrypted, they will be sniffed on the wire.

The primary "security" concern about open wireless seems to be that a "rogue" AP will be installed behind a firewall. The firewall, of course, is hardly sufficient in and of itself for securing a network. It's based on the presumption that everyone on one side of the firewall is trustworthy, and everyone on the other side is untrustworthy. We know, though, that this is a fallacy. Getting inside the firewall -- either through physical intrusion (think of visitors to your office plugging into the the network to check mail) or virtually, by 0wning a box on the network with a trojan -- is not difficult for a determined intruder. Meanwhile, the legitimate users of your network resources are often outside your firewall (mobile execs at a client site, for example) and thus not only walled off from the rest of the network, but also vulnerable to attack, since their machines' first line of defense is the firewall, which they are suddenly out of.

Security is hard. The proper place to draw your network perimiter isn't around your office, but around each machine. Personal firewalls, regular applications of security patches, good passwords and user education provide genuine security. Firewalls (and FUD about open APs) doesn't.