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Lessig's Thoughts On Eldred v. Ashcroft Arguments
yokem_55 writes "Lawrence Lessig has updated his blog giving his thoughts on how the oral arguments for Eldred vs. Ashcroft went before the Supreme Court on Wednesday. He discusses the goals and methods he used in framing his arguments to convince the court to overturn the Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, how he felt he did in presenting his arguments, and also provides some analysis on how he thinks the court might rule."
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from the front line
So there's an extraordinary (and extraordinarily interesting) range of reporting about the argument before the Court. As I was on the front line, let me add a bit more. My hope in doing this is to put this in a bit of context, and to highlight at least what we should be looking for. (EV predicts a 6-3 victory, which is significant, because he and I have a bet, and he took the other side.)
Aaron reports Brewster's statement to him that "it was a dance for which I don't know the steps." That's close. I think the better analogy for someone viewing an oral argument for the first time is the first time you see a cricket match. There are some moves you are certain you know are bad (a swing and a miss); but there's lots that plays into something you can't quite get till you know the context of the game. Here, then, the context of the game, as well as the moves from last Wednesday.
the aim
Our aim from the start was to get this Court to view this case in the same frame that they viewed another important line of cases limiting Congress's power -- the commerce clause. In those cases, the Court has said, ours is a constitution of enumerated powers (i.e., the only powers congress has are the powers the constitution gives it); it follows that Congress's power must therefore be interpreted in a way that is limited; in the context of the Commerce Power, the government had argued for a standard (Congress can regulate anything that "affects" interstate commerce) that essentially meant it had no limit; therefore, in a line of cases beginning with Lopez, the Court said we need a different interpretation of "commerce" that actually recognizes limits. Limits, not control of Congress's discretion. Congress has discretion within the limits set by the constitution; but it has no discretion over what, or where, the limits sit.
We want the Court to think in the same way about the Copyright Clause. As Judge Sentelle argued in dissent in the Court of Appeals, the Copyright Clause too is an enumerated power. It too therefore must have limits. But under the government's interpretation of that clause, "limited times" has no limits. Under its interpretation, Congress has a perpetual power to extend subsisting terms. Thus, under the Lopez-line of reasoning, that interpretation must be wrong. Instead, we wanted the court to adopt one of the plain meanings of the term "limited" (limited as in limited edition print) that would also produce an effective limit on Congress's power (that it could not extend existing terms) and would also achieve the ends that the framers sought to achieve (no continuing incentive of Congress to reward, as the Supreme Court said in Graham, "court favorites," but instead to create an incentive for "new" creativity only).
Now that strategy was controversial from the start, especially because some of our natural allies (Stevens, Souter, Breyer) were so strongly opposed to the Lopez line of cases. But our call early on in this case was that they could be brought around to see that even if they oppose the results in Lopez, there was no reason to oppose the same reasoning in this case. Indeed, they could use this case to show why they were right in Lopez: They could argue that unlike the Copyright Clause, the Commerce Clause has no express limitation built into it; unlike the Copyright Clause, the limit the Court has found is wholly implied; thus, they could say, it is not appropriate to imply limits where not expressed. But, they could also say, where a limit is plainly express (as it is in the copyright clause, which is one of only six clauses in Article I, sec. 8 (the part of the constitution with the core grants of power to Congress) that expressly limits a grant of power (the others are clauses 1, 12, 15, 16, 17)), then it is appropriate for the Court to find a way to enforce those limits. In other words, they could write, "for the reasons given in Lopez, you were wrong in Lopez, but it would be right to limit Congress here."
the fear
The greatest fear we had about this strategy (beyond the backfiring point) was that it all presupposed that the Court got it. It presupposed that the Court understood the problem with extensions of existing terms; that it understood the harm that would do to the internet, and the ability of people to build on the internet; that it saw the law as useless. And before the argument we struggled over and over again with how best to focus the Court on the costs, if in fact they didn't get it.
the argument
(1) The most important first indication that was absolutely clear from the argument is that our fear was misplaced. The Court clearly got it. Though the other side had written literally 300 pages trying to show all the good CTEA did (and pronounce it like it is a disease -- sateeeya), the Court hadn't bought any of it. Congress was not acting to promote progress, it was acting to reward "court favorites." The only question the Court was struggling with is whether it has the power to do anything about it.
Now pause for a second to think about how important and good this struggle is. First: It is a rare but valuable exercise for any branch of government to worry about the scope of its own power. And the greatest virtue the Court exercises is the virtue of self-restraint. This is a reason to respect the Court, not criticize it (though how they exercise their restraint, or where, can be criticized, as I suggest below). But the general idea that it will restrain itself, despite believing a law is stupid, is a feature, not a bug in our constitutional tradition.
And second: that they are struggling with this question of restraint means they clearly get the problem. They are motivated to do the right thing; they are resisting the right thing for the right reasons. Both sides are good.
(2) Though it took some hammering, they clearly understood by the end of my argument the dynamic of the argument that we were making. I said, over and over again, that we were advancing an interpretation of "limited times" that had the virtue of actually imposing limits, because otherwise the clause would have no limits. The aim, and I think effect, was to repeat this idea so many times that they had in their heads a simple picture: There was a way to read "limited" so that Congress would not have unlimited power.
Thus, for example, when I said that limited should be read like "limited edition print," Justice Souter interrupted to say that this was a different kind of case (not a contract, etc.), and I said, yes, but we are simply showing you that there is a plain meaning of the term "limited" that actually produces a limit. He's a very careful justice; he got the point, as did the court by the end. That's not to say he bought it, but he clearly gets the dynamic of the argument: if you believe you must impose a limit on Congress's power, here's a way to impose that limit.
(3) The government then helped us immensely by simply confirming what we had said: under their theory of the case, there was no constitutional limit on Congress's power to extend terms; it was always a matter of Congress's discretion. Congress could perpetually extend existing terms; it could even extend a copyright to works within the public domain.
The Court clearly did not like this answer. They had bought the idea that the Constitution intended there to be a limit; the government's interpretation meant that this was a limit that was solely a matter of legislative grace. (Compare: "Under our written Constitution the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.") They were not comfortable with the idea that they would simply say that though the constitution expressly limits Congress's power, it is Congress that gets to say what that limit is.
(4) This gave me the opening I wanted in the rebuttal to say: On the government's view, the Copyright Clause means Congress has total discretion; but that is plainly inconsistent with 125 years of Supreme Court authority. The very first time the Supreme Court ever struck down a law of Congress because it exceeded a particular grant of power in Article I, sec. 8, was in 1879 in a Copyright Clause Case. Since that time, the Court has repeatedly and unanimously imposed limits on Congress's power in the name of Copyright Clause. All of those limits so far have been implied limits. The Court has held that of all the "authors" and "writings" that might be granted copyright, only those that are "original" are allowed copyright; and it has held that of all the inventions or writings that can get patent or copyright protection, only works that are not in the public domain can get the benefit of the copyright and patent clause protection. Both of these limits are implied. Yet here, with the only express limit on Congress's Copyright Clause power, the government was arguing that in effect, the limit was limitless. This, I argued, is fundamentally inconsistent with this 125 year history, and shows the government must be wrong in its view.
(5) Finally, the government's repeated invocation of the "delicate balance" that Congress has struck became too much to ignore by the end. My final point before the Court is ultimately the most compelling politically, though not directly relevant to the constitutional argument: Under the current term of 95 years, under the most conservative assumptions about royalty income and interest rates, the current term gives authors 99.8% of the value of a perpetual term. Put differently, the current "delicate balance" between author and the public is 99.8% to the author,
after thoughts and advice on interpretation (read: clues on the game)
Lots of people have made tons of noise about what the court asked questions about and what it did not ask questions about. In my experience, this is not an indicator of anything. One hour is an extraordinarily small amount of time to consider the issues in this case. They ask question about things that need to be discussed. They let go things that they get from the briefs. When I clerked, oral argument was irrelevant to 90% of the cases; that is because they do their work based on the writing, and unlike most branches of government, they actually do their work.
That said, there was lots I was unhappy we didn't get more of a chance to discuss. Here's an enumeration of what's open and what we've got to win.
(1) 1790 Act: We lose if they are not careful about the interpretation of the 1790 Act. We need the originalists; we therefore need to defeat the government's claim that "CTEA = the 1790 Act." The arguments here are not even close if you pay attention to the history. It is simply and absolutely false to say that the 1790 Act "undoubtedly extended existing terms" as the government says. The 1790 Act (1) did not extend any term (since there was no federal term before 1790); (2) it did not, on balance, effectively extend existing terms (because the law at the time included both state common law and statutory law granting copyrights, and while it may have extended the term of the works protected by the state statutes, it shortened the term of works protected under the common law); and finally (3) even for works protected under the state statute, 3 states expressly stated they didn't mean their statute to displace the common law. Thus, it is more likely the 1790 Act shortened, not lengthened, terms.
That conclusion is supported by the numbers reported by William Maher. He actually counted the number of copyrights granted to works published before 1790. Of the 21,000 works published between 1790 and 1800, we have record of just 699 copyrights. Of the 699 copyrights, only 12 are for works published before 1790. Of the 12, 5 are for works protected by state statute. The remaining 7 were presumptively protected by the common law. Thus, of the records we have, the majority of terms were plainly shortened, rather than lengthened. And the clearest reading of what the framers thought they were doing was simply moving to a new federal regime, and ending the continuing effect of the old state regime.
We need to win this point. Of all the arguments in this case, it is the only one that I am 100% certain of (the rest I'm at 99.8%). But it wasn't discussed much, which creates lots of anxiety.
(2) The Lopez-Eldred link: The other point that seemed lost on the Chief Justice was that this was a Lopez case -- or more importantly, it was a Lopez-plus case. If the Commerce Clause must be interpreted to imply limits, then the Copyright Clause must be interpreted to give effect to express limits. There is no principled way to distinguish them, except to say that between the two, it is the Copyright Clause that more clearly demands judicial enforcement of its limits. Yet the Chief Justice (author of Lopez and this line of authority) didn't seem to recognize the link. If it is not made, then again, we lose. Yet of all the parts of this that will be hardest to accept, it would be a decision that is inconsistent in just this way that would be worst. What possible reason of principle could there be for restricting Congress when it comes to federalism interests, but not when it comes to the public domain, except the ugly reasons? For someone who must teach constitutional law every year, this is the part I fear most.
(3) Which Bright Line: Justices Souter and Scalia were trying to figure out which bright line made most sense: that Congress can't restore copyright to works in the public domain, or that Congress can't extend the term of existing copyrights. The obvious question which no one asked is: Why do we expect works will be allowed to pass into the public domain again? Look at the pattern:
The effect of term extension is to toll (stop) the passing of works into the public domain. In the first 100 years of the republic, the public domain was tolled like this for only 14 years (14%). In the next 50 years, the public domain was tolled for 14 years again (28%). But when CTEA expires, the public domain will have been tolled for 39 out of 55 years, or 70% of the time since 1962. If the Supreme Court says ok to this, then why would anyone expect 70% won't become 100%? The line that says Congress can't restore copyrights to works in the public domain may be bright, but it is in a very dim world indeed.
final thoughts
I am obviously extremely happy with where we are. The Court is struggling with the right issue; they are motivated to get the right answer; they have a clear and simple way to give the right answer; the government has made it very hard to accept its answer. It is always hard to get the Court to strike a law of Congress, but this law is so universally flawed, and the case against it is so universally strong, that I continue to be confident that the Court could choose to strike the law.
I am obviously also unhappy with those "swings-and-a-miss" that happened in the argument. As I said before the argument, if we win it will be because 4 years of activism by many many people have changed the public's view about the importance of these issues. But as someone who believes this the rare case where the law, properly and carefully read, yields one right answer, there is no way I will ever be able to escape the thought that if we lose, it is because I am not the advocate that some could have been. It is the particular hell for lawyers that after an argument, we live in the purgatory of constantly reliving the argument. Every night since Wednesday I have awoken in the middle of the night, to spend the rest of the night reanswering Justice Ginsburg, or asking Chief Justice Rehnquist just how he could distingiush Commerce from Copyright. The kind words of so many notwithstanding, I know and have always known I am not Larry Tribe, or Kathleen Sullivan. And if, after getting this so close to the right result, I have lost this by not being them, then I am not quite sure how I will live with that fact.
So please, no more of the bullshit about "rockstars" or "visionary." I've lived this struggle every moment of the last 4 years; it will take a long time for me to escape it, especially if we don't prevail. I want to turn my head elsewhere, and my heart elsewhere too. So I apologize if I don't follow up on this, or the arguments this might begin. Please, in the spirit of the best of this sphere, carry these argument along, and correct the many mistakes I have made. But I need a night when the limits of this lawyer don't keep this lawyer awake.
I am grateful to an extraordinary number of people, most importantly, Eric Eldred, but also the hundreds who have worked on this case, the people, like Lisa, who slept out at the court to watch this argument, and Brewster who drove across the country to teach the lessons -- too many to count. If we have won, it is your work that has made this happen. That the press chooses to focus differently does not change that fact. At least this space can speak the truth about this fact.
Peace, quiet, and may terms be limited.
posted on [ Oct 13 02 at 4:51 AM ] to [ eldred.cc ] [ 13 Comments ]
keeping focus
Tomorrow the Supreme Court will hear arguments in Eldred v. Ashcroft. In the past weeks, and especially the past week, I've received an extraordinary amount of mail, ranging from wishes of good luck, to demands that I "win." And as well has the press been extraordinary. (Check out Google's cool new service for a list. Even Declan is reporting the story, if only to report that the Ayn Rand Institute has pronounced me a Marxist (along with Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase, James Buchanan and Phyllis Schlafly I assume.)).
When we brought this case 4 years ago, there were many allies who said that there was no way we could win. The reason they were right four years ago is that the world did not yet see how important these issues are, and just what's at stake. In four years, that has changed. Not because we brought this case, or because of anything I've done in this case, but because of an extraordinary number of people who have been pushing to make this issue understandable.
It is extremely hard to win a case like this. I have given it everything I have, and I believe we are right, and have a good shot in showing it. But the important lesson from the attention this case is getting now is this: There is an extraordinary passion and energy out there for the ideals that Eric Eldred and others represent, and that if we do something to push these ideas, we can have an effect.
Thank you for the extraordinary outpouring of support. But please, regardless of what happens here, let us not lose the momentum. Freeing culture is what our framers did; we can do it again, regardless of what 5 justices on the Supreme Court say.
posted on [ Oct 9 02 at 5:09 AM ] to [ eldred.cc ] [ 18 Comments ]
For those of you who are too lazy to actually follow this, here's the quick summary of where we are at:
Remember that just because a law is "bad" and horribly unbalanced towards lobbists doesn't make it illegal unless there is some specific legal reason the law is unconstitutional.
Basically, Eldred is arguing that because we have a Constitution of enumerated powers (Congress can only do what the constitution specifically allows), that the power to extend copyright must be limited. In other words, the Constitution grants Congress specific powers. If Congress continually extends copyright, than it has unlimited power (which the Constitution doesn't give it).
So far it seems the court is buying this argument. The court seems to be unsure though if it has any power to do anything about it. This is good news to Lessig, because it means the court buys the limited power argument.
The case was also helped by a government bumble. The government argued that there is no constitutional limit on the ability of Congress to extend copyright, thus the extention was legal. This actually helped Eldred because the court did not like this view at all. The court did not support the idea that the constitution limits the powers of Congress, but that Congress gets to set what the limits are. In effect, the government proved Eldred's point themselves.
So there is a fighting chance that Eldred might win. Everyone say a big thanks to people like Lessig who are fighting hard for the public's right to the "creative commons".
To quote Lessig:
"Peace, quiet, and may terms be limited."
Uninnovate - Only the finest in engineering.
As you say, this is an off-topic thread, of course.
I think the idea behind "well-regulated" might mean that the people (whoever they are) MUST be in control of the militia. That is to say, the 2nd ammendment in no way justifies private armies, but is designed to encourage every able-bodied man (or person, nowadays) to take seriously his (or her) obligation to defend the country against hostile takeover.
Here is a URL to a (pro-gun) discussion of this idea:
http://www.2asisters.org/unabridged.htm
Since I admit that this is off-topic, and posted with "No Score +1 bonus," and since this is a reply to a reply to a reply, and thus will not be read by many people, please don't mod me down!
MM
By including this sig, the copyright holders of this work or collection unreservedly place it in the public domain.
You should realize the GPL is successful because of copyright law. No copyright, then companies could freely use GPL software without having to release their source modifications.
Shakespeare's work should be unencumbered, but specific performances and derivative works may not be. I wouldn't recommend trying to videotape, say, The Reduced Shakespeare Company performing one of their altered versions and using the clip in a music video unless you get their permission first. Likewise for classical music; you should be able to get the sheets and perform it yourself, but a specific performance by, say, the Boston Philharmonic may be off-limits.
Only the dead have seen the end of war.
Remember that just because a law is "bad" and horribly unbalanced towards lobbists doesn't make it illegal unless there is some specific legal reason the law is unconstitutional.
Exactly right - and the Supreme Court would be correct in maintaining a law passed entirely by lobbyists over the objections of 90% of the American people. Why? Because the Constitution doesn't prevent it. And in the U.S., there is no law higher than the Constitution. Immoral, yes, but illegal, no.
I even think this is necessary - because think of the opposite. How many laws were passed with the support of 90% of the people over the objections of lobbyists? Answer: a whole bunch of important ones. Taft-Hartley (sp?) on labor laws, Sherman Antitrust, Amendment 19 (?) (women voting). If we want the people to overrule lobbyists sometimes, we need to let lobbyists overrule us sometimes - because the people can always re-elect a more favorable Congress.
So far it seems the court is buying [the limited powers] argument. The court seems to be unsure though if it has any power to do anything about it. This is good news to Lessig, because it means the court buys the limited power argument.
It's actually a very good thing the court is unsure if it has power. In fact, the court almost ALWAYS asks if it has power to intervene... you'll notice that since the court rejects upwards of 90% of the cases appealed to them. A big part of those appeals are cases where the court doesn't feel it should issue a ruling.
Another example, the Florida election stuff. That debacle was an example of the Court deciding it DID have power (and deciding very quickly, and without much justification). IMO, a more correct ruling would have been to just say that "how a state runs its elections is its own business" and just refuse the matter entirely. This was basically the minority opinion. I'm not arguing the merits or outcome of the decision (I would have remanded it with instructions for a re-hearing, but I'm not a Supreme), but most of the mess occurred because the Court jumped too quickly into an area it shouldn't have entered.
Perhaps the Court even feels burned because of the Florida voting episode, and is trying to be extraordinarily cautious with its power (and even more so because more eyes are looking for faults!)
The case was also helped by a government bumble. The government argued that there is no constitutional limit on the ability of Congress to extend copyright, thus the extention was legal. This actually helped Eldred because the court did not like this view at all. The court did not support the idea that the constitution limits the powers of Congress, but that Congress gets to set what the limits are. In effect, the government proved Eldred's point themselves.
As much as the Court hates giving itself power, it likes giving someone else power even less. A better argument might have been that there is a limit but Congress should determine it; but instead, the government chose to try to defend the whole thing. It almost feels like they're giving the case away. Thus: I'm watching carefully to see if someone responds to "an erosion of copyright law" by introducing a new, draconian law with overwhelming support. Cyncial, yes, but I'm very cynical when politicians are involved.
Very good summary, my complements to you good sir.
A witty [sig] proves nothing. --Voltaire
Interesting, but totally off-base.
Consider the memoirs of U.S. Grant. Their are considered to be a model for military memoirs, and he wrote them while he was dying of throat cancer. He did so with the specific intent of restoring his family fortune (lost in bad business deals) and providing for his family.
That alone demonstrates that heirs should be allowed copyright protection for a limited time.
Every year during my review, I just pray the words "slashdot.org" aren't mentioned.
Free Mickey Mouse is the Economist's story on Lessig, subtitled "Lawrence Lessig wants less copyright protection, including for Disney's famous rodent". Good article.
It begins as follows:
This is part of the Bern Convention. This is an international treaty on Copyright policy. The policy favors inherited royalties (lifetime plus 50 years) on all works, and sets a standard for which works are still covered by copyright. Realistically, it clears up if heirs should still recieve royalties.
The US would have to break from the Bern Convention for meaningful copyright reform, though we only signed on in the last two decades. This itself is pretty encumberant, but it's the least of our troubles. The US is also a member state of the WIPO and WTO, each of which have the power to repeal (without popular vote) laws which impeed international trade. Google for the Clean Air Act.
I'm as mimsy as the next borogove but your mome raths are completely outgrabe.
Just as a slightly off-topic tangent, there is a fairly good source of public domain classical sheet music available here. I especially like the quote from Beethoven at the top. It sounds like he was an Open Source advocate nearly 200 years before our current movement began.
"Any fool can make a rule, and any fool will mind it."
--Henry David Thoreau
I like the declaration of rights as far as it goes, but I should have been for going further. For instance, the following alterations and additons would have pleased me... Article 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding ___ years, but for no longer term, and for no other purpose.
Letter from Jefferson to James Madison, 1789
The ___ years is in there because Jefferson hasn't figured out what that term should be.
Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention for some certain time. It is equally certain it ought not to be perpetual; for to embarrass society with monopolies for every utensil existing, and in all the details of life, would be more injurious to them than had the supposed inventors never existed; because the natural understanding of its members would have suggested the same things or others as good. How long the term should be, is the difficult question. Our legislators have copied the English estimate of the term, perhaps without sufficiently considering how much longer, in a country so much more sparsely settled, it takes for an invention to become known, and used to an extent profitable to the inventor. Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.
Letter from Jefferson to Oliver Evans, 1807
In a series of letters between Jefferson and James Madison (Madison as well as George Washington supported copyrights) prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, Jefferson agreed that a limited term for copyrights was OK. Jefferson's difficulty lay in figuring out what that limit should be. He tried to solve the problem at one point by basing the length of the term on statistical mortality tables, arriving at a term of 19 years. Using Jefferson's formula with today's actuarial tables results in a term of 30-35 years.
I doubt that you (the_2nd_coming) have more than a superficial understanding of Jefferson's views based on sound bites rather than real research.
If you care about this issue and want to really educate yourself about it, there is a whole branch of Economics known as Information Economics that tries to understand the effects of copyright and other IP protections. Try this for a very quick intro.
FreeSpeech.org
Simplest explanation: the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws apply really only to criminal, penal laws. Copyright isn't a criminal law; it's of a civil nature. Also, even though it has prohibitions, etc., copyright really is more of an enumeration of rights, not a penal code.
Metallica, are performance artists, and anyone who writes songs (including metallica themselves) for them are contract writers, remember you can't write a song and own it in america, unless you're a record company, or refuse to sign a recording contract.
Um, yes, there's criminal copyright infringement, but that doesn't make copyright a criminal law. A lot of civil laws have criminal aspects to them, usually when the offender does the act with criminal intent, but that doesn't make them criminal laws. Many torts have criminal law counterparts. Does that make "trespass" a criminal law? No, of course not -- it depends on what a person did, how he did it, and what the government wants to do.
WRT copyright, same thing. More specifically, the criminal element is only in one section of the copyright statutes -- 17 USC 506. That section defines in a very specific way what constitutes criminal copyright infringement. The penalty is outlined in Title 18, where most of the federal criminal laws are. But the rest of the copyright statutes -- all of Title 17, with its 13 chapters and dozens and dozens of sections -- is civil, including all of the remedies but for section 506's and, of course, the DMCA's section 1204's criminal offense.
Anyway, even without the above note, my point still stands -- copyright isn't a "criminal law." Very, very simply: Criminal laws go to the root of basic societal behavior; punishment is for justice. Civil laws go more to getting society running smoothly; suing somebody is for compensation. Often the laws reflect each other, but we need the differentiation because sometimes a wrongful act, while mechanically the same, doesn't rise to the level of a crime. Thus, copyright isn't a criminal law. It has a criminal aspect, but it's not a criminal law.
And yes, IAAL.