Justifying the Common Criteria Security Evaluation
lewko writes "Microsoft has just received a Common Criteria certification for Windows 2000 at Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4. Security experts have been saying for years that the the security of the Windows family of products is hopelessly inadequate. Now there is a rigorous government certification confirming this. What does it all mean? This paper suggests that Microsoft spent millions of dollars producing documentation that shows that Windows 2000 meets an inadequate set of requirements, and that you can have reasonably strong confidence that this is the case. Microsoft bashing aside, the process in evaluating a security product is relevant to anyone considering the deployment of technology into their environment." The EROS operating systems he mentions looks interesting - of course, it also looked interesting three years ago.
"...[Windows 2000] has no real firewall built into it!"
Where do you draw the line? Microsoft is stuck between a rock and a hard place here. On one hand, if they don't put in a firewall, people will complain that they have to buy additional software or hardware to secure the OS (which is true.) On the other hand, if Microsoft does add a firewall, Norton, Symantec, and 50 other "personal firewall" software makers would scream bloody murder: "Microsoft is leveraging their OS monopoly to put us out of business!"
I'd guess the crappy firewall built into XP is a sort of compromise. On one hand, you don't want millions of unsecured Windows boxes running around on the Internet. So Microsoft surreptitiously adds an incoming-packets-only firewall to XP. Sure, it's a crappy firewall, and it doesn't offer real protection. But it keeps the firewall software makers at bay, and it keeps Microsoft out of the Justice Dept. gray area.
Most sysadmins would buy a hardware firewall or dedicated NAT device with firewall anyway... so at least in corporate settings, that problem is solved. Really, it's going to be tough for Microsoft to add any decent programs to the OS at this point, since they've already been found guilty of illegally bundling Internet Explorer. I'd watch for more stuff to be attached to Office or offered as a free download instead.
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There is really only one reason why MS went through all the trouble to get Win2k certified at CC-EAL4 (Equivalent to Orange book c2). MS wants the governemnt to upgrade to Win2k. Until now, many government sites would only use NT4.0 SP6a because that was the lates MS OS with the C2 certification. But now that Win2k SP3+ has recieved the, C2 equivalent, EAL4 certification, the government will be free to use Win2k on many of their systems without violating any secirity regulations.
The CC certification does not prove that Win2K is free from security related bugs, nor does it realisticaly prove that Win2k is secure. All it does is prove that Win2k, in certain configurations, adhears to the requirements of a EAL4 rated protection profile.
You're right, but...
There is nothing which *would* constitute a sufficient condition for security. You can't check any particular property, of the product or process, and say "Yup, it's secure." We should all know that by now. In general, the closest we come is to haul out a long list of known mistakes (the absence of which is a necessary but not sufficient condition) and hope not to find them.
It's also helpful to remember that the Common Criteria don't define try to define a reasonable security certification. What they do provide is a list of things which might be interesting and ways of measuring those things. It's up to the "end user" to choose which things are important to them (define a protection profile).