University of Twente NOC Destroyed
JanJoost writes "Around 08.00 CET today the University of Twente Network Operations Center, which amongst other things hosts a SURFnet PoP as well as security.debian.org and non-us.debian.org, caught fire.
The UT, which hosted the HAL in august last year is completely unreachable and is not likely to come back up any time soon. The fire department has given up every hope on protecting the server area and is now trying to protect the surrounding buildings.
More information can be found at the Telegraaf,
Planet Internet and Twentsche Courant.
Pictures can be found here and here.
It's a shame to see a great infrastructure go down in flames like this."
This shows the vunerability of putting all computers in one building. To have a safe network one needs to spread (duplicate) the information over several computer at several locations. How far apart these locations has to be is depending on how important you data is.
It is a shame that a building hosting so many good initiatives should be the one to go, but as always: there is no excuse for not have a backup. By that I don't only mean that tape that always seems to go missing when needed, but multiple sites (or at least buildings) that provide redundancy.
This is something I keep hearing from people, particularly those who balk at paying for upgrades to expensive fire suppression systems. "They're always built so well that there's never been a case of a server room destroyed by fire." I always did doubt that, and now whenever they tell me that, I can point to this.
What a shame.
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
lo0.ar5.enschede1.surf.net 3613: Nov 20 07:20:50.927 UTC: %ENV_MON-2-TEMP: Hotpoint temp sensor(slot 18) temperature has reached WARNING level at 61(C)
few seconds later on the local side:
lo0.cr2.amsterdam2.surf.net 1146: Nov 20 07:20:56.458 UTC: %CLNS-5-ADJCHANGE: ISIS: Adjacency to ar5.enschede1 (POS2/0) Down, interface deleted(non-iih)
I hope Debian practices good management principles by having offsite backup.
Best Slashdot Co
Whilst I'm no expert in fire supression systems, I have studied a few data centres in my time as a Senior Sys Admin for a number of companies. Most (decent) NOC's have a fire *supression* system based on gas or (more likely these days) some form of liquid (gas has the nasty side-effect of potentially killing humans).
These are for small fires that can be contained within a data centre, ie. a computer catching fire or emitting smoke. Really good systems are very localised (racks or cage specific). A big fire just isn't going to be stopped by such a system.
I haven't read too much into this particular incident (ie. not at all), but my initial thought was that something more serious must have happened (well, duh!), perhaps a fire outside of the main suppression system (outside of the raised floor area?). Or perhaps the paint on the walls/carpet wasn't fire resistant and just took hold very quickly.
Or a large initial fire (gas leak?) that just didn't die down when the supression system kicked in. Maybe the type of fire (again, gas? oil?) didn't die down because Data Center supression systems presumably focus on electrical fires.
A well, just my 2p's worth.
ooooooh! What does this button do? - DeeDee, Dexters Lab.
Most NOCs I've been in have an oxygen-deprivation gas that's dispersed in the case of a fire (after a series of highly visible and audible warnings). The one I'm in right now seems to have gone the inexpensive (and arguably safer) way of a two-stage dry-pipe water sprinkler system where the pipes are usually dry (empty). In case of a smoke detection above a certain level, the pipes are "charged" (filled with water), and if the heat gets above a certain level, the sprinklers go off. Basically, the decision was made that if there's a fire, the equipment will probably need replacement anyway, so why not use sprinklers?
Personally, I'm not too sure of this route. I can understand it, from an environmental and human-safety perspective (the gasses eat the ozone layer, and you *really* don't want to inhale stuff that ties up oxygen at those rates), but if it ever happens here, it's going to be an awfully hurried mess to get everything back up and running in a reasonable timespan, even if the fire is only a small one that doesn't destroy the building.
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
If you ever smell smoke in a computer enviroment, take it serious! I once was in a computer pool room and only the smell of burning paper made me aware of the fire. Only then i realized a beeping noise, simlar to the noises some computers or cardreaders make to draw maintainace attention towards them.
In that environment an old fashion siren would have been a much better solution.
Cantor Fitzgerald, the company hardest-hit in the attack with 700+ employees killed, had just that viewpoint. eSpeed, a subsidiary of CF, had all trading activities back up and running by the morning of Sept 13, due to the multiple locations and real-time backups being done on the network. My understanding is that the time from loss of connection with CF headquarters to full resumption of its trading activity around the world was about 46 hours.
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
You can't install new halon systems, but existing ones are still legal (in Canada, anyway).
However, I wouldn't want to have to fill out all the paperwork involved with a discharge! We had an accidental discharge (a leak, I believe) and they decided it was enough impetus to remove the system.
I think they are using CO2 now. The advantage of Halon is that you can breathe quite comfortably in an atmosphere that will not sustain fire. CO2 works just about as effectively but will not sustain life.
OTOH, more recent studies have shown that just because you can still breath in a Halon infiltrated environment doesn't mean that there are no health effects!
I expect there are more CO2 systems going in now, with lots of alarms to make sure people get out before the atmosphere gets unlivable.
Michael
Well, they came in to do the test, everything but actually spraying water, and managed to flip the breaker. It was interesting to note, that only a few of the machines actually powered off. Some are on smaller single machine UPSs, so those stayed running. The most expensive piece of equipment in there, a Nortel Telephony Switch which handles 6 PRI lines (almost 150 ISDN lines) is on battery backup, and kept running.
All in all very little powered down. In the even of a real fire, we would have had sparks flying everywhere. What did management do when I mentioned this to them? That's right, nothing.
When I worked for DEC they actually had sprinkler systems in their data centers (I couldn't verify first hand that every data center had sprinkler, but I was told so).
The reasoning was, that even if they was one big, bad, evil, wicked water damage in a data center, that the company considered this to be better then one killed employee by gas extuinguishing systems.
That was in the early 90ties
ich bin der musikant
mit taschenrechner in der hand
kraftwerk
My mistake: 47 hours.
3 959,36807,0 0.asp
0 08S0007
1 192001.htm
Details on the recovery:
http://www.baselinemag.com/article2/0,
Some information on the scale of what eSpeed handles:
http://wstonline.com/story/mag/WST20011
Even Cantor Fitzgerald mentions it in their Q3/01 results summary:
http://www.cantor.com/articles/article1
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
Nonsense. UT used to be the largest user in the Netherlands until about 14 months ago. After that, they were surpassed by Delft University of Technology, which until the fire today used about 50% more bandwidth as the UT. And even they aren't the biggest anymore, because the University of Utrecht recently became larger than them.
:)
In total, about 20.000 rooms for individual students in the Netherlands are responsible for over 1 Gbps of traffic. This is non-stop (i.e. during the evening it is closer to 2 Gbps), and over 90+ % is outgoing traffic from 'unknown ports'.
I guess forcing the RIAA and the MPAA to change their business models the hard way counts as innovation nowadays