Slashdot Mirror
AMI Introduces 'Trusted Computing' BIOS
An anonymous reader writes "American Megatrends announced its 'trusted computing' Palladium BIOS on Jan 6. It seems that the encrypted BIOS' integrity will be verified by a special chip or flash ROM, and will in turn verify the 'authenticity, integrity and privacy' of the boot loader and the operating system. Does that mean such machines may refuse to boot any other non-'trusted' OS? After all, the list of supporting corporations include AMD, Intel, IBM, and HP, of whom we heard quite favourable statements about Linux (just for example -- *BSDs will be equally affected) so far."
Does that mean such machines may refuse to boot any other non-'trusted' OS?
I'm pretty sure it won't. For now it'll just not have a trusted signature, so no access to Palladium-protected content. But I'm pretty sure that's the bait of a bait&switch operation...
Kjella
Live today, because you never know what tomorrow brings
...the first "trusted" bootsector virus appears?
Comment removed based on user account deletion
I honestly don't understand the value (or perceived value) in having this.
My beliefs do not require that you agree with them.
Comment removed based on user account deletion
Just follow this little (hypothetical) chain of events:
/dev/null of the computing industry, the OS community is going to need each other to maintain a DRM-free computing zone. Open source, open protocols, open formats, open beer.
1) BIOS on new motherboard will only go into "Palladium-mode" if you're booting a "trusted" OS. For the time being, you can still run linux, but it won't have access to any "Palladium" features.
2) If you're running a "trusted" OS (eg. MS Windows UY [Up Yours]), the OS can hit the 'Net and automatically download and apply updates to itself. At some point, it could quite easily detect the BIOS on your system and apply an update so that...
3) The BIOS will no longer boot non-trusted systems. Also...
4) The OS could download a new protocol stack that could render it inoperable with other protocols. An entire new Internet based on the MSOY/BO (Microsoft Ownz You/Bend Over) protocol could spring up almost over night. MS-only network services, online shopping, etc.
Is any of this likely to happen? I don't know. But it would be possible, and I'm not sure I trust Microsoft not to try it. Even if Open Source doesn't relegate MS to the
bytesmythe
Hypocrisy is the resin that holds the plywood of society together.
-- Scott Meyer
I think this reminds me of the situation with the CPU IDs in the Intel Pentium processors. I have yet to see a BIOS supporting such processors without the ability to disable the serial number.
I suspect that the "trusted computing" features will be similar it its ability to disable such things. It will be required of virtually every motherboard manufacturer who wants to compete. I can't imagine hardware manufacturers being pressured into making a palladium only system.
Comment removed based on user account deletion
According to US patent 6,327,652 that is indeed correct-- unsigned code simply doesn't get any access to secured data, and may not even be allowed to run on the same desktop as signed code. If the boot sector doesn't pass the BIOS's signature check, it's not given access to the machine private key, and therefore can neither unlock locally stored encrypted content nor pose as a trusted system to other machines on the net. The only bait-and-switch here is the possibility of a concerted push by software or content producers to require a trusted runtime. One minor wrinkle is that this will require boot-selector programs like LILO to either be code-signed or be unable to properly boot signed operating systems.
...when you're writing a game...tweak the difficulty of "Easy" to something [your mother] can cope with. -- onion2k
I told AMI (link in the article: marketing@ami.com) that I don't think of this as a "feature". Computer manufacturers have backed down on much less invasive technologies (Pentium III's unique ID, for instance) before; I'm still a little bit hopeful that with all the competition in the mainboard scene we might be able to convince manufacturers not to adopt consumer-hostile technology like this.
Well, I am worried about the development too, but at the same time, I think we must realize that no matter what they throw at us, someone will crack the protection.
Ultimately, the entertainment industry will only be able to control individuals who allow themselves to be controlled.
The rest of us will actively seek solutions that remove us from the evil claws of "Digital Rights Management", or rather "Consumer Ass Ramming" as it should really be called.
They can encrypt and protect all they want, but someone will come through. Someone will work constantly on giving us our rights back - even if it means doing so illegally.
If it becomes illegal to have control over one's own system and play off whatever one pleases, I will stand in line to break the law. Constantly. The more they try to control me, the more I will break laws.
I am not saying that people's concerns about violated rights to control one's own system is not justified. I am just saying that we will prevail in the end. With the incredible amount of brainpower available to those with a liberal mind, the entertainment industry may win over the sheep who do not realize what is happening, but they will not get the ones that don't want to be ass-rammed.
Sorry for the rant, but hopefully someone else agrees that the fight is far from over, and no matter what they tro to do, we will continue to fight...
Clever signature text goes here.
This technology is intended to support the TCPA 1.0 specification for "trusted computing". What "trusted computing" is supposed to mean is that if a file has a label on it saying "don't copy me", then it is in principle impossible for the user to copy the file (other than in the ways permitted by the digital "rights" management label).
Once you understand this, you'll see that the purpose is quite clear: of course boxes equipped with this BIOS will refuse to boot Linux. That's the whole point; they will be intended only to boot operating systems that strictly support DRM. Each machine will have unique "integrity tokens" which can be used as digital signatures, so that everything you do on the machine (create a document, contact a web site) can be traced. Since you'll have to pay for your downloads on a credit card, this can all be cross-correlated. The integrity tokens will be digitally signed by the manufacturer, so that any action taken on the net by the owner of one of these beauties can, at least, be traced to the original purchaser of the machine. Secret, DMCA-protected protocols will assure that only "trusted computers" can connect to their web sites.
Now, of course, initial implementations of this concept are likely to have flaws that can be exploited by crackers (example: find some way to write a program that replaces the "trusted" OS with a BSD or Linux kernel; reprogram the flash chip to disable checks), but I fear that they will get it right eventually.
At some point, then, the net will bifurcate: there will be a world of glorified DVD players calling themselves computers interacting with restricted network sites, and a world of general-purpose computers interacting with sites that follow standard protocols. Attempts to outlaw the "free world" will not succeed because it will do too much damage, but those who participate in the "free world" will be viewed with suspicion, called pirates, etc. ISPs might be pressured into refusing to connect with "untrusted" machines.
After five years or so, though, I expect the whole thing to fall apart, because countries that don't go along with this brain damage will acquire a technological lead, as the US enters an era where computer science is treated the way that the USSR treated science: dangerous state secrets not to be shared.
Okay, my take, based on working knowledge of 'trusted' computing and hardware design (I used to be a support enginner in Intel's server division,) is as follows:
'Trusted computing' relies on the fact that every component is known to be secure. Of course 'secure' is a cagey term, but in this case, it means that the end application knows that nothing is interfering with it. The uses vary, from DRM to financial transactions, to other uses we haven't thought of. But, there are three main pieces in a trusted system:
1. The hardware. The hardware needs to be 'trusted' in that we are certain that there is no hardware tampering or eavesdropping going on (of course, this applies only the the internals of the computer, a packet sniffer, or even a keyboard monitor, would be external, and ouside the scope of monitoring,) and to make sure that the machine is the machine it's supposed to be. This really started with Intel's Pentium III adding a processor serial number. The point of that (as with Palladium) was that each machine could be positively identified. If you had previously made that computer 'trusted', then set it so that only trusted machines could perform a said transaction, we could guarantee that the end user is who he says he is, from a hardware standpoint. This new BIOS is much the same way. Each board with this BIOS will be able to say "Yes, I am the motherboard that was here when this software was installed, so yes, I am the same computer." Obviously, this has implications for hardware failure, even moreso than Windows XP's activation problems.
2. The OS. The OS must have support for trusted computing. It must be able to partition off the 'trusted' applications from the untrusted ones. It must be able to encrypt the contents of the drive, and only allow trusted applications to access protected data, and only allow trusted applications to access the 'trusted' part of memory. (So as to disallow one program from sniffing the program files, memory, or data transport streams of a protected application.) This would probably see alot of use by multiplayer online games, as they could make certain that no third-party applications that reside on the game-running-PC could be used to cheat. (As with some of the 'god map' programs for Everquest.) Again, this does not protect the data stream once it leaves the computer, an encrypted network connection would be required. Obviously, for the OS parts to work, users must log in to the system with a username and password at least. Biometric security would be better, so as to more certainly guarantee that the user is who he says he is.
3. Applications. The entire purpose of 'trusted computing' is the applications. Applications that need to know that the user is who he says he is, and that is done by both the OS and the hardware. As with the game example above, other uses are financial transactions (for example, you could set it so that only your computer has access to your bank account records, so that even if someone stole your hard drive, and your username and password, they still wouldn't be able to get at your data,) and DRM. It makes a perfect DRM vehicle, as now the labels can enforce the one-computer rule. A downloaded file would refuse to play without the original application, OS, and hardware.
The question is if these systems can boot a non-trusted OS? Of course they can! You won't be able to use trusted features (for example, your bank's online account access wouldn't work,) but you could use it just fine for applications that don't use MS' Palladium. Just like the Pentium III's serial number could be disabled, and all you lost was access to the (very few) programs that required it.
Another non-functioning site was "uncertainty.microsoft.com."
The purpose of that site was not known.
Let's say the Microsoft Watch is a big success. Go ahead and laugh. They've got the bucks to seed these sorts of things into the marketplace for years. Eventually something will stick. If not the Watch then the MS Clock or the MS Hairdryer or the MS Refrigerator, or something.
Now, let's say you, as a geek, have reprogrammed the thing so that it runs FreeWatch, the oss embedded watch OS that does all the cool stuff you want it to.
The next version of the MS Watch is Trusted. It only runs approved software. It only runs approved services. And if it doesn't recognize the os and the software, it just doesn't run. Of course, approved means approved by Microsoft, or by the Watch Software Consortium. And they'll be happy to add FreeWatch, for $500 million and a 25% cut of the profits.
If you don't think that's the way it will work, think again, very carefully. It isn't Trusted to Microsoft until it's utterly predictable. It will only run MS-approved software. It will only display MS colors. Once it's utterly predictable, then support costs go down, service fees go up, and 3. Profit!
Now, extend that to the PC platform. Microsoft's stated goal is for computers to be as predictible as kitchen appliances. That means they run exactly the way it runs. Support costs go down, service fees go up. Paladium, TCPA, DMCA, DRM, it's all the same. It is to give you absolutely reliable computing. To end hacking, cracking, viruses, tinkering, end-user encryption, and everything else most geeks hold near and dear. And incidently, to put the hands of the electronics and entertainment industries into your wallet, forever.
If you think this is unlikely, as yourself, why is the membership list of the TCPA secret?
Maybe you still don't agree with me. Maybe I'm wrong. I really hope so. But perhaps it's worth keeping an eye on things.
> But isn't one of the "advantages" of Palladium that your friendly neighborhood viruses can no longer run and erase your
> MP3s/JPGs/etc, because they are not "trusted" code? I'm not sure how that will relate to unsigned VB scripts. It's designed
> to protect the consumer from themselves... and legislate what (Microsoft's, I assume) programmers could not implement
> properly.
No, Palladium won't help with that. Most viruses and trojans today are just memory resident processes like any other. There is no easy way to separate a "good" program from a "virus" program. (Seriously, how would it? And how would it be able to tell if a "good" program had an exploitable backdoor or buffer-overflow in it?) It's true that palladium might protect you against, say, boot sector viruses, but there are ways a properly implemented operating system can do this, too.
We already have all the hardware we need to provide computer security (namely, protected memory). Palladium's only purpose is removing the ability for users to inspect and modify their own computers (in an attempt to make DRM schemes fly), so don't listen to what they tell you!