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Killing Others' Malicious Processes

Roland Piquepaille writes "This opinion is not mine, but the one of Tim Mullen, from SecurityFocus Online. In this story, he expresses some strong ideas regarding systems infected by worms. "I believe you should have the right to neutralize a worm process running on someone else's infected system, if it's relentlessly attacking your network. I've even written code to demonstrate the process. Though the initial news coverage of the concept was grossly inaccurate in conveying my ideas, it has stirred up a constructive dialog. I knew my idea was controversial, but I was wrong about something -- I figured everyone in the security biz would "get it" and that the hard part would be convincing everyone else that if they can't or won't secure their machines, we as the defenders would have the right to terminate the process attacking us. It has turned out to be the opposite." The author then looks at the criticisms about this strikeback idea raised by some security experts -- to dismiss them of course. Check this column for a summary or read the original story for more details."

20 of 415 comments (clear)

  1. Re:Leave them alone !? by rmadmin · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I agree with this! I work for an ISP, and when we come across a user that we cannot contact to notify of problems, we simple disconnect them untill they can prove they have resolved the problem. Its worked wonders. We see so much less virus activity trying to hit our mail servers, and we've had alot less complains about people having a virus or worm.

  2. Re:More discussion at Counterpane by JPawloski · · Score: 5, Interesting

    "Since the owner of a system has no responsibility for the actions of a worm, or any malicious process, that runs without their knowledge, I submit that they also have no rights to the process. No responsibility means no rights.

    So, if they have no rights to the process, there is no infringement against them when we neutralize it. If someone wants to claim that their rights were violated by our taking out the attacking process, then they should be held accountable for the actions of the process from its inception. They can't have it both ways. "

    That, I think, is a good point. The solution, however, is not to make the counterattack legal, thus continuing to absolve people of responsibility, but to make the owners of the systems legally responsible for their failure to secure their systems. If your system is 0wn3d and used to launch a DDoS attack on AOL (or Slashdot, Kuro5hin, whoever), then AOL should have the right to sue you for damages. Your incompetence caused their loss.

    You say you can't afford to pay? Tough. Should have thought of that before you put your insecure system online. You say it's the fault of the manufacturer for selling the insecure system in the first place? Take them to court. Too expensive? Well, if their system is too expensive to use, then people won't use it.

  3. Re:Leave them alone !? by sfled · · Score: 3, Interesting


    That is bsolutely the correct way to go, rmadmin. I report the problem server to abuse@problemserver'sISP and they usually inform the server's sysadmin/dork and disconnect the server until the problem is fixed.

    --
    I'm not really a web designer, I just play one on the Internet.
  4. Re:The money quote by Whispers_in_the_dark · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Sounds like a great scam to me. Here's how the dance could go:

    1) Create a worm that will at some point perform a DDOS attack on my machine. Make sure it's nice and quiet so that it isn't detected until attack day.

    2) Wait until my site is attacked by the worm. Whine and moan about the lack of security on the other machines.

    3) Pick from among the richest "attackers" and sue their pants off...

    (Oh yeah, ... profit!)

    A friend of mine once said, "The only secure system is one that's not connected to the wall outlet." The hackers will always find something new to break into and everyone else will diligently (sometimes) try to stop them. The problem is that everyone's idea of diligence is different and someone with an itchy trigger finger killing off my processes at the drop of the hat isn't my idea of better security.

    Plus, whatever means the security patrol uses to shutdown the offending processes will likely be exploitable in itself. If ssh is getting hacked then certainly this little back-door will too.

  5. Re:The rights of the many and the few by LostCluster · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Strikeback's just slightly misplaced. It's clear attacking computers need to be stopped, but it's much easier to have DCMA-style takedown process where legal notice is served on an ISP to takedown the offender, and filing a false report opens the false reporter to legal liability.

  6. Incorrect and a solution already exists. by juuri · · Score: 3, Interesting

    This is just a guy out looking for kicks and fun. If someone is "probing/attacking" your network thanks to a worm and you can't contact them, the solution is simple:

    You simply block off their traffic.

    Close your blinds, your door, or whatever real world analogy you would like to try and apply. You have the right to send the same traffic back to them, monkeyseemonkeydo, but in no way is it possible to justify altering the running of their machine. Doing so, is no better than the malicious process already causing the damage.

    --
    --- I do not moderate.
  7. Happened to me by octalgirl · · Score: 3, Interesting

    I can't remember the name of the company, but last year I had just installed IIS, then ran to the store. By the time I got back, around 45min later, I had already been hit by CodeRed. There was a message on my screen saying 'You have been infected by CodeRed. We did not infect you. Your server is trying to infect us. Please look on your hard drive to prove how open your system is. You can click here for more help. Again, we did not infect you.' (something like that anyway.) They left a small folder in my WINNT/system folder that had a link to them. Once I clicked their link they had other links on how to remove it, you could download the script they wrote so you to could load it and detect other people infecting you. And they had stats on how many servers had tried to infect them already (around 2000), and they explained more how they were only trying inform those that were attempting to infect them to be more aware about codered. I have the link and script at home, not with me here. Sorry.

  8. some logic problems by Lovejoy · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Yes, and.. one point I haven't seen made yet: The government can't vaccinate your children without your permission. They can kick them out of school, isolate them and make your life pretty miserable, but they can't invade their bodies without due process of law, which is missing in this equation.

    And now DUCK, because here comes the straw man:
    I think the main reason for the knee-jerk criticism from the likes of Schultz is that they work largely in a theoretical rose-colored world of security, where all problems are solved after a cup of coffee and a bit of pontification

    While it's valid to argue that Shultz is responding knee-jerkedly (somebody have a better adverb?) It's not valid to attack him by virtue of the fact that he's an academic and to denigrate him with the cheap-shot coffee comment.

    Academics study things like unintended consequences, the big picture, etc.. These are things most geeks can't be bothered to consider. While stupid academics tend to rise to the top in the media, very few are actually addle-headed theoretical bloviators. These smart people can contribute a lot to our discussions.

    As for the actual argument about killing others' rogue processes, I don't have anything original to say, but in the "real world" it would be called vigilantism and trespassing.

  9. No Duty to Retreat... by Pii · · Score: 5, Interesting
    There is a concept in law called "No Duty to Retreat," and I see no reason why it cannot be applied in much the same way to cases like this.

    This concept relates to self-defense, and deadly force. Follow along with me...

    If a person is in public, and is threatened, that person must make every reasonable effort to avoid the use of deadly force as a means of self defense, prior to useing such force. He must attempt to leave the scene, etc. In short, there is a Duty to Retreat.

    If, however, that person is in his home, his own property, that person may use deadly force as a means of self defense without having to exhaust every means of escape or avoidance. On his own property, a person has No Duty to Retreat.

    How is the scenario for Cyber-attack any different? Unlike most of the people commenting on this article, I believe you do have the right to take active measures in protecting your property.

    Obviously, we're not talking about deadly force... We're simply talking about electronic countermeasures.

    If an unsecured system on the Internet has been infected by a malicious program, and is now launching it's own attack against your system, your property, denying you the use of bandwidth or resources that you are paying for, I think you're perfectly within your rights to put the attack down, and if necessary, the offending system.

    A person utilizing the Internet has a certain responsibility not to cause harm, either through action, or inaction. Most people on the Internet today seem tragically unaware of this. Without this, the Internet is ripe for a tragedy of the commons situation.

    Is it wrong to still believe that with Rights come Responsibilities, or that with Priviledge comes Obligation?

    Your rights to swing your arms around recklessly ends at the tip of your fingers, and at the beginning of my nose.

    I think Tim Mullen is 100% correct, and I'm surprised there aren't more people that agree with him.

    --
    For those that would die defending it, Freedom
    has a sweet taste that the protected will never know.
    1. Re:No Duty to Retreat... by TFloore · · Score: 4, Interesting

      "No Duty to Retreat" is also generally called the "Castle Doctrine" as in, Your home is your castle.

      It is very much a state-specific concept. For instance, Florida has Castle Doctine in it's law, you have no duty to retreat from your home if someone is attacking you. New York has no such law, and actually specifically states that you must retreat if you have any possible option to do so. If you get trapped in your basement by a home invader, and you have a 16"x16" window in your basement that you might possibly be able to squeeze through to get away, you *must* try to get out through that window before you may legally use deadly force to defend yourself.

      Also note that, for businesses and private individuals, there is nothing resembing Castle Doctrine for a place of business, only for a personal residence. Physical security forces are a special case, as they are nearly quasi-governmental.

      But this proposal raises several other interesting problems. One of the neat statistics that 2nd Amendment supporters love is the accidental shooting statistics comparison between police and people that legally carry a concealed weapon. Police are much more likely to shoot an "innocent bystander" or similar than someone with a CCW permit. The reason for this, if you look into things, is that a CWW permit holder is usually involved in the assualt/crime from the beginning and knows exactly who the bad guys are. The CCW holder is usually the one *being* assualted, and can see the assaulter right in front of them. The cops come in in the middle of things, and have to figure out who the bad guys are in mid-stream, sometimes under extreme time pressures.

      This relates to the Strikeback proposal rather directly. How many DDOS attacks use IP spoofing? Will you know who is attacking your system with certainty? How many systems are you allowed to incorrectly strike back at before you are legally liable?

      Which incompetent admins that can't secure their own systems are you going to let decide who to strike back at???

      Think of this in terms of the sniper attacks in the DC area last year. How much worse would it have been if 10 people nearby had pulled out guns and started randomly shooting at nearby vehicles that looked like they might be able to hide someone with a rifle? Thankfully, most people that carry a concealed weapon have more sense than to shoot at targets they are unsure of. I don't believe that of BOFHs on the internet.

      --
      This is my sig. There are many like it but this one is... Oops. Frank, I've got your sig again! Where's mine?
    2. Re:No Duty to Retreat... by evenprime · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Pii said:
      There is a concept in law called "No Duty to Retreat," and I see no reason why it cannot be applied in much the same way to cases like this. This concept relates to self-defense, and deadly force. [....] If, however, that person is in his home, his own property, that person may use deadly force as a means of self defense without having to exhaust every means of escape or avoidance.

      On his own property, a person has No Duty to Retreat.


      What you say is correct in many, but not all jurisdictions in the USA. For example, in Florida, your statement would be correct, since they allow the use of deadly force to protect any of your property. In contrast, Massachusetts residents may not use deadly force to protect their property, although they can use it in self defense. Specifically:
      If you are in your own home, there is no duty to retreat, but you may use deadly force only to repel an intruder's deadly force attack against you or your family
      According to what I just googled, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming don't even allow the use of deadly force to protect a dwelling. Surprisingly, it looks as though Maryland actually allows more latitude in the use of deadly force to protect your business than it does to protect your home. (If someone in one of those jurisdictions has better info, feel free to correct me.)

      Anyway, the short version here is that jurisdictions differ widely in a) what you are allowed to defend, and b) what means you are allowed to use in defense.

      How is the scenario for Cyber-attack any different?

      First off, this idea is a defense of property. It is not a matter of defending you or your family against death or bodily injury. All states allow the use of deadly force in to protect you and your family, but they differ widely in what *else* they let you protect with deadly force; i.e. you may not be allowed to use deadly force to protect your property.

      Obviously, we're not talking about deadly force... We're simply talking about electronic countermeasures

      You correctly noted that computer strikeback is not the same as the use of deadly force, but you failed to note that the states have similar disparities in computer laws. For example, the Oklahoma Computer Crimes Act of 1984 makes it a felony to
      "willfully and without authorization disrupt or cause the disruption of computer services or deny or cause the denial of access or other computer services to an authorized user of a computer, computer system, or computer network."
      Why strikeback is a bad idea.

      What is legal in your jurisdiction may not be legal in your targets jurisdiction, or in the jurisdictions of the computers, switches and routers that your attack travels through enroute to the the target

      It may not be effective in eliminating the problems your network is having from the target site - if you strike back against a machine and accidently harm it, you could find yourself in a protracted feud with the owner of that system (a la "hatfields vs. mccoys") which ends up being more of a bother to you

      If you cause collateral damage, you could be liable for it - e.g. someone is flooding you with easily spoofable ICMP and UDP packets and you foolishly DoS the machine whose IP address appears in the header, thus shutting down a small business owner's website. There's a good chance you'll get sued if they know what happened.

      it may not be cost effective to accurately trace and identify the machine that is attacking you.

      --

      "Weapons should be hardy rather than decorative" - Miyamoto Musashi
      I think that goes for OS's too
    3. Re:No Duty to Retreat... by Pii · · Score: 3, Interesting
      This relates to the Strikeback proposal rather directly. How many DDOS attacks use IP spoofing? Will you know who is attacking your system with certainty? How many systems are you allowed to incorrectly strike back at before you are legally liable?

      Which incompetent admins that can't secure their own systems are you going to let decide who to strike back at???

      Think of this in terms of the sniper attacks in the DC area last year. How much worse would it have been if 10 people nearby had pulled out guns and started randomly shooting at nearby vehicles that looked like they might be able to hide someone with a rifle? Thankfully, most people that carry a concealed weapon have more sense than to shoot at targets they are unsure of. I don't believe that of BOFHs on the internet.

      You raise valid questions, and so have some others. Most of them, however, seem to think I'm out to shoot someone that sends an ICMP Echo Request in my general direction. :) As tempting as that may be, from time to time, we're not actually talking about killing anyone in this discussion.

      How many DDOS attacks use IP spoofing? Probably a great many of them, but for most worms, IP spoofing is impossible, because the initiator in most cases needs to get responses back from the victim host. Using a spoofed IP address would make that nearly impossible.

      Obviously, electronic countermeasures would have to be very specific. A set of counter responses would have to be tailored to counter a specific worm.

      As an example, when NIMDA was running rampant, fully 5 months after appropriate patches had been offerred my Microsoft, and it was clear that there were a number of system administrators that had no interest in updating their systems, I put the NIMDA countermeasure on my system (I'd seen it posted here, as a matter of fact. That one had a problem, but I modified it to simply shut down the remote system, rather than disabling IIS first, and then attempting to shut down the system (That wouldn't have worked.)).

      My logfiles were filled with invalid queries from infected systems... Hundreds of log lines per system. After employing the countermeasure, I'd get 5 or 6 lines in my log, and then silence from the infected host. My script left a message in the offender's log files stating that they were infected, and containing the URLs to all of the appropriate Microsoft documents, and the patches that needed to be installed.

      Was I wrong to do so?

      I'm sure there are plenty of people that think I was. I fully understand their perspective.

      On the other hand, I think I was within my rights. It's pretty clear that 5 months after the outbreak, the people operating those systems were either unaware of the problem, or unconcerned about it's impact on others.

      Let's say your auto manufacturer issues a recall about an unsafe braking system in your vehicle, directing you to take the vehicle into an authorized service center for corrective measures at no cost, and you choose not to do it. Months later, you experience a brake failure, and slam into another car. In my book, you're guilty of negligence.

      I view the people that failed to patch their systems, 5 months after the NIMDA outbreak, when patches existed even prior to the NIMDA outbreak, in the same manner. Negligent. You've allowed your property to become a public hazard through inaction.

      It isn't as if I built a scanner, to go out and sweep the Internet for people with infected systems, and attempted to shut hosts down at random. My script sat in wait. It retaliated only against systems that had brought the malicious code to bear on my system, and my bandwidth.

      (As a result of NIMDA, to this day I am still unable to receive inbound connections on Port 80, because my ISP has set up filtering.)

      --
      For those that would die defending it, Freedom
      has a sweet taste that the protected will never know.
    4. Re:No Duty to Retreat... by 0xA · · Score: 3, Interesting
      Most of them, however, seem to think I'm out to shoot someone that sends an ICMP Echo Request in my general direction. :)

      I don't think you would do that but I have met some people that would.

      About a year ago I got an email from some guy telling me I had I virus on one of my company's computers and it was trying to hack into his system. He was rather upset. When I investigated I found that it was actually just an SQL replication agent that I had put the wrong IP address into. I guess he had one of those personal firewall programs that pops up a dialog any time somebody tries to connect to your computer so it looks like it is actually doing something. I sent him a message saying I was sorry for the mistake, it won't happen again etc. He wrote back that saying I was obviously an idiot, I tried to hack him and if it happened again he would call the cops.

      A week later I am starting a replication manually and I enter the IP wrong again, same one, it was very similar. Buddy flies off the handle, emails me 6 times, emails abuse@myisp 10 times, calls my office etc. I spent a week explaining this to people.

      Now you know, and I know that a couple connection attempts to your machine on a port that is not open is no big deal. It is almost always a mistake. Your average user does not know this. I don't even want to think about what would have gone on if this guy had access to "Evil Hacker EZ Revenge Kit" or something like it.

      I agree with this idea in a theoretical sense but I think it is too dangerous to become a common practice.

  10. Re:The money quote by Xugumad · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I maintain a small number of servers, for a research project. All of these run the minimum of services for our purposes, have their own firewalls (in addition to the main organisational firewall), and once I apply the new packages for RHSA-2003:001, they will be up to date with all available patches.

    This does not mean that they are unhackable. While it may be unlikely that someone will write a worm that uses a previously unknown bug, it could happen. By what you're saying, I'd still be liable. Should I have checked every single line of code my box runs?

    As much as it may frustrate people when they get DDOS by wormed systems, this is not the solution. Better arrangements for having ISPs disconnect wormed systems, in my opinion, is the solution.

  11. My letter to Tim Mullen by Digital_Quartz · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The idea of writing "strikeback" scripts, as you describe, has been tossed around before. I recall reading a quick-and-dirty script for Apache posted on slashdot some time ago that would detect attacks from machines infected with Code Red, and would then exploit the security holes Code Red had opened on those machines to clean them. I used to support this idea, but I'm afraid after some thought, I've changed my mind.

    I'd agree that if a worm is running on someone's machine without their knowledge, then the owner of that machine has no rights to that process (the obvious exception being the person who is spreading the worm, who runs it intentionally on his or her own machine, but we'll ignore him or her for now). In order for you to terminate that process, however, you have to break into their machine, and run your own process. You are, in effect, creating your own worm. Your worm may only run for a short while, and may be "for the greater good", but that doesn't change the fact that you are running code on other poeple's machines without their consent.

    Even if we opt to ignore the ethics and look at this from a more practical angle, can you guarantee that your strikeback process is not going to adversely affect the machines it cleanses? What if your strikeback process causes a machine gathering scientific data to reboot, or kills the wrong task? This has the potential to set someone back by several days in their work. What if it reboots a machine monitoring medical equipment? You could end up killing more than just a process, if you catch my meaning, however unlikely that may be.

    Since you are intentionally running a process on someone else's machine, you are accountable for it's results. If you cause damage to a machine, or cause data to be lost, even if it is inadvertant, you open yourself up to litigation from the owners of those machines.

  12. Sloppy rights talk - this is about property rights by djembe2k · · Score: 4, Interesting
    All this talk about rights and self-defense and vigilantes and vaccinations and putting down dogs is taking this conversation wildly off course. Computers are property, and this is about property rights.

    Computers don't have rights or responsibilities. Processes don't have rights or responsibilities. If computer A attacks computer B (via a worm or whatever else.) and computer B "strikes back", self-defense is a fair metaphor, but it isn't a relevant legal or ethical argument, because the computer don't have rights.

    Computers are property. More specifically, my computer is my property. I have a right to keep my property, and you have a responsibility to keep your hands off my property, and if you don't keep your end of that agreement, you've broken the law and I can bring the government into it.

    Yes, your property rights are violated if my computer has a worm that attacks yours. Maybe the government will acknowledge that and step in, and maybe it won't. If you don't like the way the government handles this, elect somebody who will change it, write a letter to your legislators. But the government's refusal to step in doesn't mean, as Mullen asserts, that the owner of the attacking computer has no responsibility. It just means that the government has opted not to hold him responsible. The only way to fix that is democratically.

    But suppose Mullen is right about that, and this person has no responsibility. He says "no responsibility means no rights". Wrong. The constitution says that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In practice, that limits the action of government, not offended sysadmins. But the principle here is that my rights are my rights, and nothing I do, however, bad, foreits them automatically. Maybe, after a fair legal process, society (i.e. government) may decide to take away some of my rights (i.e. lock me up, fine me, whatever). But not before. That's a fundamental part of the social contract which makes us civilized.

    Then Mullen makes a different argument: the rights of the many outweight the rights of the few. (Thank you, Spock.) Maybe. But the same principle applies. My rights are my rights. Maybe you can get a court order to require me to donate blood, if it will save 100 lives. But if you take my blood without getting the court order, you have still violated my rights and broken the law.

    Now, if the guy who took my blood is a real hero, and believes what he did was right and necessary, then he'll say that going to jail is a small price to pay for saving 100 lives. Good for him. If Mullen really believes this is a case where the law runs contrary to ethics and morality, he can wear a grey hat and illegally hack systems for the greater good. But unless he's willing to wear a black hat, he'd better admit what he's doing it illegal, and a violation of rights, and be prepared to take the punishment when he does it.

    IANAL, yadda.

  13. Re:Leave them alone !? by crazyphilman · · Score: 4, Interesting

    DancingSword said: "Dropping the packets isn't going to save me from paying for the bandwidth, or unclog my connection ( this IS assault, we're talking about ), and no matter how I makebelieve that they aren't touching my machine, therefore I have no right to touch theirs, it isn't that clear/simple ( they are obliterating my resources, for starters ):"

    Yes, but the correct approach is to complain to your ISP and have them firewall the offending packets off upstream, without making you pay for them. If you're a business customer this shouldn't be a problem for the ISP.

    Then he said: "If A PROCESS among their machine is attacking me & costing me, then have I the right to kill that process's action..?"

    No; you're not killing an action by firewalling their traffic. You are blocking it, just as you have the right to put a lock on your front door to block a thief from entering your house. You're not tying the thief to a telephone pole; he still has his liberty -- you're just keeping him out of YOUR house, which is YOUR right. See? Your rights end where the thief's rights begin, and vice versa.

    Then he said: "If not, then assaulting/damaging others' ( by losing them their ISP/connection, or costing them thousands of dollars in bandwidth, or obliterating their livelihood's function ) is a right, and neither one's-own-resources, nor defensive-action is *equal* a right."

    Now, you're using a non sequitur. You cannot proceed from the other proposition to this conclusion; it just doesn't work. Here is what I think the "rights" situation is (just to be clear):

    I have the right to take action on MY OWN MACHINE, to prevent your machine from interfering with me. Thus, I can firewall your machine off from me, and I can ask my ISP to put in an upstream firewall to protect my business. This only affects MY machine, so it doesn't impact any legitimate rights of the attacker.

    Even if an attacker is DOS'ing your server, you do not have the right to attempt to counter-hack him. Your rights end where his begin, you see: he has the right to expect privacy and noninterference on his system just as YOU do on yours.

    The only appropriate action is to involve your ISP and the authorities. They can then take LEGAL action against the source of the attacks.

    --
    Farewell! It's been a fine buncha years!
  14. Re:Computers are not Cars, but even so . . . by MalleusEBHC · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I don't think it is a matter of holding everyone responsible for any attack that may come from their machine. It is about holding negligent users responsible for their negligent actions.

    For exameple, if someone owns a gun but keeps it locked in a safe in their house and stores the ammo somewhere else, yet some master thief manages to steal their gun and use it in a crime, I doubt anyone would say that is the fault of the gun owner. However, if the same gun owner left the gun loaded and laying around on their front lawn and someone came by, picked it up, and shot somebody, they would be sued and/or arrested for their negligence.

    The problem is determining at what point is a computer user negligent. Is your average consumer negligent for connecting their Windows box to a high-speed connection and not using any firewall software? Or is it someone who turns on various services like file sharing without knowing full well what they are getting into? Or is it anyone who takes reasonable precautions, but when they get cracked they don't realize it until their box has had a chance to eat up tons of somebody else's bandwidth?

  15. Re:More discussion at Counterpane by Cyclometh · · Score: 3, Interesting

    While I may agree with some of this, I think it should be pointed out that securing your systems is not a binary operation; you can be a competent sysadmin and still get owned by the latest exploit if you didn't find out about it quickly enough. You can also get nailed by some obscure exploit that a duly diligent admin might not have known about.

    You might also get nailed if you run an insecure application or allow users to run code on your system. My concern is that if you have a precedent like this, no one who can't afford an army of lawyers could afford to take the risk of being online, because the risk of getting sued into penury is too great.

    Do we want to foster a system where only the very wealthy or highly-connected can afford to run a server on the Internet?

  16. The main problem I see... by Jester99 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    with Mr. Mullen's proposal, is this.

    He sees the world this way: 1. People are negligent, and allow machines to become compromised, which allows harm to come your way. 2. Therefore, if people will not defend their own machines, you should be able to defend yours by disabling theirs.

    This is a little like the following: 1. People are negligent, and allow their cars to get stolen, which allows hit-and-run drivers to take you out with them. 2. Therefore, if people will not defend their own cars, you should be able to defend yours by being given a rocket launcher to disable theirs.

    The second example sounds kinda weird, doesn't it?

    I've watched "World's Scariest Police Chases" and suchwhat. If a driver's acting like a maniac, the police bust out these cars with large ramming devices on them, and beat the crap out of the offending vehicle. If someone is driving recklessly on the highway, I can't just take my SUV and ram them off the road myself.

    While I may have justification for doing so -- after all, that driver is endangering me and those around me -- I do not have authority. There is a reason that only police are given the power of arrest and other various things they have. (Just try walking around with a pistol in broad daylight in Philadelphia, for example.)

    Mullen would have us all issued shotguns, to defend ourselves from any would-be vandals and thieves who enter our homes. While it is justifiable for us to use these weapons against those who would cause us harm, is it really wise to give everyone a shotgun? There are most certainly those who would use them improperly. The obvious solution, of course, is to give everyone some sort of shield, that prevents them from being hit by a shotgun shell, to protect us from bad users of shotguns. But, uhm, then shotguns don't work against the vandals, because they have shields too. So a perpetual arms race against ourselves would develop.

    There's a reason weapons aren't issued to us for our own defense -- collectively, we are not responsible enough to operate that way. Only special agencies are given the Authority to administer Justice; justice itself does not belong to the rest of us. Unfortunately, we don't have an "internet police force", nor would one even be desirable.

    But ISPs can still pull the plug on users who aren't operating "correctly," and University and other networks can block down a MAC address if it's causing trouble. And that's about as close as we really should want.