Decrypting the Secret to Strong Security

farrellj writes "Cnet has an excellent article by Whitfield Diffie, who has probably has forgotten more about crypto than 99.9% of us will ever know, explains why secrecy does not equal security. The article also addresses the whole "open source vs proprietary software" security issue. A definite *must read* for anyone concerned about security...and that should be everyone!"

Comments

FP! ...anyway...

[MmmmAqua]

Whitfield Diffie, who has probably has forgotten more about crypto than 99.9% of us will ever know, explains why secrecy does not equal security.

For an excellent treatment of this important point, that secrecy != security, read Bruce Schneier's "Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World".
It's the best book on the topic available.

Re:Then again...

[R.Caley]

If you're going to use asymmetric crypto for legal purposes, to sign stuff, for instance, then the secret cannot be easily changed (unless there's some sort of central repository of keys that actually authenticates you properly when you ask to change your key, but even that is a bit dodgy).

I don't think it's quite that bad. Imagine you are maintaining a repository of signed documents (eg security patches for an OS). You sign these with a private key and make sur ethe public key is widely advertised, so people can check that your documents have not been compromised.

Now, assume your private key is compromised. This is bad but not the end of civilisation as we know it. You can make sure the world knows not to trust that key, at which point is as if your repository had never existed, and you are starting from scratch. You would need to get your documents back from a trusted archive (you did take backups didn't you:-)), and sign them with a new key pair. You are back in busines as soon as the new public key had been recieved and verified by enough trustworthy people.

So, loss of the secret is a big pain in the arse, but not disasterous. Just how painful it is depends on how well you have planned, eg having that trusted archive, having channels to quickly disavow your compromised key and the network of widely trusted people who know how to check that your new key really came from you.

in a legally signed document scenario, you might arange for an electronic notary to annotate your document with the date you signed it and then sign the annoted document. Then people could tell whether the document was signed before your key was compromised, and a fraudster needs to get at both your secret and that of the notary.