98% of DNS Queries at the Root Level are Unnecessary
LEPP writes "Scientists at the San Diego Supercomputer Centerfound that 98% of the DNS queries at the root level are unnecessary. This doesn't even take into account the 99.9% of web pages suck or are unnecessary anyways. This means that the remaining 2% of necessary DNS queries are probably not necessary either."
On a similar note, I noticed that AOL causes a lot of DNS lookups. From what I can see from my firewall logs, each TCP connection from an AOL user is handled by a separate proxy. Each proxy then does its own lookup on the host. So, for a normal sized webpage with some images or whatever, you get like 10 TCP connections for the content and 10 UDP connections for the DNS lookup. Seems kind of excessive to me.
From the article:
"Researchers believe that many bad requests occur because organizations have misconfigured packet filters and firewalls, security mechanisms intended to restrict certain types of network traffic. When packet filters and firewalls allow outgoing DNS queries, but block the resulting incoming responses..."
It's nice to see a story with info I can take and use. This is actually "stuff that matters".
Kudos to the researchers, and now I am off to check my firewall.
There are 01 kinds of cars in the world. The General Lee, and everything else.
Is it just me, or is this a description of a reverse lookup? How does that qualify as unnecessary? This is a pretty common step in troubleshooting, and some software does a reverse lookup following a forward lookup to verify that the hostname it gets back is the same one it started with.
Chuckles
Why don't DNS servers have a list of correct top-level domains, in order to answer directly, without going to a root server? The list is short, compared to the information the DNS server caches already, and the content of the list doesn't change so often. This list could be downloaded once in a day or so, from the DNS root servers.
When packet filters and firewalls allow outgoing DNS queries, but block the resulting incoming responses, software on the inside of the firewall can make the same DNS queries over and over, waiting for responses that can't get through
Why the hell does a firewall accept outgoing queries to black-listed domain names, if they are configured to block the response to these queries? This seems like a serious misconception to me.
JB.
And that's a problem? My understanding was dealing with this sort of thing was exactly the purpose of the root DNS servers. If every ISP's DNS server was pre-configured to recognize valid and invalid top-level domains, you could just set them up to go straight to the specific DNS servers handling those domains (.com, .net, .org, etc.) There would be no need for a root-level system.
The argument for allowing this kind of cracked query through to the root server is that it makes it easy to add new domains (.elvis, .corp, what have you) without forcing everyone to reconfigure their DNS boxes for each new top-level domain.