Slashdot Mirror
The Search for Secret Shuttle Parts
Slashdot readers have been submitting this story about the search
for secret shuttle parts with all sorts of insane conspiracy theories attached to their cut & paste of the URL. It's apparently just the box that handled encryption for messages, so of course Uncle Sam wants it back. Quite the needle in a haystack tho.
If its for encryption, it probably uses the same technology/techniques that the DOD uses and probably also has military secrets which shoudln't "fall into the wrong hands".
Spy novelists are salivating right now with such story line.
I imagine that what the government is worried about is someone using this device to impersonate shuttle control from the ground. A terrorist's dream...if the shuttle ever flies again, that is.
If the government doens't know of any flaws in AES, Blowfish, RSA, etc., then why would they bother using a "top secret" crypto box instead of just the publicly available algorithms?
It's hard to be religious when certain people are never incinerated by bolts of lightning.
What we need is one of the large media outlets to interview someone about security issues, and with any luck, that individual would say insightful things like
:-)
*there's no reason why a security device should be sent up in a rocket which could very well blow up over earth and then could be refound and it's security implements "un-engineered." if the device is that sensitive to unengineering, then either it is defective, and serves no role to play, or its role should not be on the shuttle. The idea of the shuttle exploding over land was always under consideration.
I will likely never know what is in this security device and how it works exactly, but I usually have greater faith that the government has some understanding of security issues, and that they wouldn't design single source of failure systems.
On the other hand, if this device is part of the original shuttle design, then perhaps I'm just being too hard on them, since no one including their grandmother truly understood security issues at that time. Whereas today...we all do...now don't we?
people would have learned by now that putting "Secret Government Property" on a box is not a good idea. Write "Spectrographic Differential Analyzer" on it and everybody will just think that it's a really boring and useless piece of scientific equipment and leave it alone.
The Shuttle has crypto boxes on board to support DOD missions that require secure air-to-ground voice communications links. This isn't as much of an issue as it used to be since the military has lost interest in using the Shuttle to launch military satellites.
Mea navis aericumbens anguillis abundat
That is pure dogma. The biggest enemy of security is dogma in place of thought.
The Germans had good reason to use security through obscurity. At the time there were NO ciphers available that were not vulnerable to analysis. It would not have taken an insane amount of additional computing power to break the allied codes. They were only slightly better by modern standards.
The enigma codes were broken in part because the Allies captured several enigma machines and code books. But the Germans knew that it was likely that this would happen. The Enigma system had been designed to be resistant to such attacks. It failed because it had one non obvious flwa - a letter never encrybecpted to itself and the operators were indisciplined.
The reason that security through obscurity is bad is it leads to complacency. But it is not the only way people can become complacent. As recently as 1992 I was arguing with UNIX sysadmins on comp.sys.computing that shaddow passowrds were necessary for UNIX since crack etc. were a real threat. Oh no came the reply you are ignorant, you don't understand, you are promoting security through obscurity.
Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
No "escape pods" are attached to ISS. One Soyuz craft, capable of ferrying down 3 people, is docked at the station. Russia is obligated to swap out that Souz every 6 months.
Russia also uses their unmanned Progress craft to send up small amounts of supplies on a regular basis, and to remove some of the station's waste. The craft then burns up on re-entry.
Using the Russian craft effectively limits the station's capabilities. Since the Soyuz is the only way to get the crew off the station in an emergency, that means no more than 3 people can be onboard, which is about one-half the intended crew complement, I believe. Fewer people means fewer results.
The cargo-capacity of Progress, only a small fraction of the Shuttle's, is simply insufficient to resupply the station in the long term.
And, of course, remember that tthe station is not yet complete. Only the Shuttle can do that job.
Don't forget that the Shuttle's intended design was crippled by the Nixon Administration's budget crew and that, ever since, the U.S. has been operating a human space flight program that manages to combine lack of direction (no President since Kennedy has provided even an ounce of space leadership) with rigidity and feigned purpose.
-- Slashdot: When Public Access TV Says "No"
NASA (the government) is more likely concerned with the technology loss (in other crypto areas) than the possibility this one 'box' could actually be used.
>>Then again, the Nazis using Enigma used keys
>>like 'Hitler'
Not exactly possible. Enigma used a 3 letter indicator sequence that were sent twice for double encodement.
Some operators did use the same inital indicator sequence every day. Others would not shift the rotors from the previous days setting thus allowing another 'day' of decodes if found.
Another way decodes occured dealt with the German style of not abbreviating long words/titles and beginning messages with the exact same salutation each day.
Captures of long range weather boats and some U-boats (carrying months of daily keys) were another successful ploy to assist Bletchley Park; especially since the Naval Enigma was much more complex (extra rotors, key rotation, etc.) than Army and standard police/government.
Check "Battle of Wits: The Complete Story of Codebreaking in World War II," by Stephen Budiansky, "Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes 1939-1943," by David Kahn, and http://www.xat.nl/enigma/ for some working software simulations.
10 MD
One, it's only an assumption that this "secret" thing is an encryption device. If we knew what it is, it wouldn't be secret anymore, eh?
Two, military aircraft fly every day chocked full of classified hardware and software. And, sometimes they crash. The argument that the possibility of a crash should preclude the use of classified devices is wrong and inane.
-- Slashdot: When Public Access TV Says "No"
Lets see the space shuttle was designed in part to ferry secret military sats to space. Of course it has an secret equimpment on board.
What is really funny is that people were surprised that the government reacted so harshly to items appearing on E-bay. And people were suprised when the Men in Black(R) show up demanding the items back.
Slashdot, home of supporters of free software, free music, and free speech.Except for Moderators that disagree with you.
Oh really? I guess my next question is, who's ass did you pull that little "factoid" out of? Your own?
For one thing, they were still in radio communication with the shuttle as it was breaking apart, albeit not receiving a signal..nor were they actually aware of what was happening to the shuttle when they lost contact. I find it hard to believe that anyone in NASA would look at the loss of communication and think "well, they seem to be having trouble..better blow the shit out of them before they get too close to the ground."
I guess if you're a troll logic doesn't matter much, though, so by all means..continue on, oh wise one, with your vast knowledge of those evil conspirators at NASA. Do me one favour though, brush your teeth. I can smell the bullshit from here.
While it is a crash investigation and it is illegal to withhold what you know, if this top secret piece of decryption hardware fell on your lawn, you legal own it as it is on your property and you have salvaged it.
Like it or not this is the case and the media and the police saying otherwise is starting to bother me.
One little note, just because it is your property doesn't mean you are able to withhold access to it to the crash investigation, after all, that's exactly what it is. It is illegal for you to impede the investigation, but at the end of it they are required to return your property to you.
Help Brendan pay off his student loans
The ciphers fall into three types. Type 1 are the most classified, details not known. Has ciphers such as BATON, JUNIPER, MAYFLY, CRAYON. Type 2 falls in between, contains stuff like KEA and SKIPJACK, some details known (for instance SKIPJACK is now declassified). Type 3 contains all the rest, roughly Why some of the ciphers are secret is because their design will indirectly reveal ways to attack the ciphers (naturally the ciphers have been designed to resist such attacks). Such ways to attack are known by the designers of the classified ciphers (that means the NSA) but possibly not by the academia. For example, DES was resistant to a form of attack not known previously outside NSA (possibly other intelligence agencies too who use the Echelon walk-around to go around legal restrictions when spying on their own citizens (this means you are country A, you spy inside country B and give the results to the spooks of country A). So having secret ciphers is a matter of protecting the "intellectual property" of the spooks.
There could also be other technical innovations, as the module is likely made tamperproof. If somebody has more information (or pointers) about the aforementioned classified ciphers, please post it here.
As for why the shuttle communications are encrypted, could it be because there's some things going on in there you don't want people to know (not ETs but like designing chemical weapons reagents and watching certain countries).
I suppose it's a good thing for the US government that the crash happened on home territory. When landing, the shuttle passes first over a great deal of sea (Pacific Ocean) and then lots of US soil.
Imagine a scenario where the geographical circumstances would not be so favourable and the parts of the shuttle would have fallen and crashed into another (perhaps less friendly) country. Would the US kidly ask for the debris to be returned, or would they engage into a secret undercover recovery operation in order to retrieve these top secret components?
What if this operation would have to be so extensive, that it could not be held secret? To what lengths do you think the US government would go in order to re-acquire the parts?
The launch failure of Intelsat 708 in China a few years back raised some concerns about crypto material falling into the 'wrong hands'. Seriously, you don't need any sinister motives for hunting down classified material... the paperwork alone from its loss would probably be more trouble than a massive ground search. =]
Here's an excerpt from the Intelsat 708 investigation that might shed some light on the subject.
The Intelsat 708 Encryption Boards Were Never Recovered
The Intelsat 708 satellite carried two FAC-3R encryption boards, one in each of its command processor units. These boards are considered Controlled Cryptographic Items by the Department of Defense, and the algorithm is classified "Secret."
Encryption boards are used to protect the command and control links between the ground station and satellite. They are required even on satellites that carry unclassified U.S. Government communications traffic. These devices do not encrypt the communications traffic that is otherwise processed by the satellite payload.373
Shortly after the Intelsat 708 launch failure, Loral's Communications Security custodian reported to the Department of Defense that the status of the encryption boards was being changed to "destroyed."
This was not seen as unusual by Department of Defense, however, because its prescribed policy requires that encryption boards be reported as "destroyed" when they are launched into orbit.
The Department of Defense did not require Loral to produce any evidence that the FAC-3R boards were in fact destroyed.374
After recovering debris from the crash site, Loral engineers grossly estimated the percentages of various subsystems and components that had been recovered.375 In that estimate, Loral engineer Muhammad Wahdy estimated that 30% of the command processors were recovered.376 Loral personnel then packaged the debris and shipped it to Palo Alto, where engineers examined the debris to specifically determine if the encryption boards were recovered.377
That examination determined that the FAC-3R boards were not, in fact, recovered from the crash site.378
The two FAC-3R encryption boards used on the Intelsat 708 satellite were mounted near the hydrazine propellant tanks and most likely were destroyed in the explosion. Additionally, the two FAC-3R boards had no distinguishing markings other than a serial number, making it extremely difficult to locate them amongst the crash debris.379
It is not known, however, whether the FAC-3R boards were recovered by the PRC. If they were, it would be difficult for the PRC to determine the cryptographic algorithm that was imprinted on them.
Reverse-engineering of a damaged board would be even more difficult. Any successful reverse-engineering would be resource intensive for the PRC.
If the PRC were able to determine the cryptographic algorithm contained on the FAC-3R board, it would gain insight into the state of the U.S. military in the 1960s, although such algorithms remain in use today.380
When the National Security Agency designs and recommends algorithms for use in equipment, it assumes that the equipment will be lost or compromised sometime during its operational lifetime. The National Security Agency relies on unique cryptographic keys for each separate satellite to keep command and control links secure. Because the FAC-3R boards on Intelsat 708 were uniquely keyed, the National Security Agency remains convinced that there is no risk to other satellite systems, now or in the future, resulting from having not recovering the FAC-3R boards from the PRC.381
I don't see how most of that is a problem... it's covered pretty clearly in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. But then, I haven't read the book. (Yeah, practical concerns like getting out without a ladder are certainly an issue, though!)
h tm - the relevant part is Article V:
You can read the text of the treaty at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outersptxt.
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
I was watching the incident which lead directly to the withdrawal of publicly accessible 24 live (non encrypted or artificially delayed) audio visual broadcasts from space - I used to have a constant feed streaming where I worked and at home (as I also had a permanent connection at home too).
If you'd actually seen the broadcast you'd know it had nothing to do with UFO's or 'Space debris being pushed around by thrusters' as you put it (this is related to an entirely different reported incident and has nothing to do with why they cancelled some of the live a/v feeds, it didn't even happen at the same time). Additionally, the concern astronauts expressed about the space debris was not that it might be a UFO, but rather it might be part of the ISS or the shuttle which was, to them, of much more immediate concern.
I remember the actual incident quite vividly and it had everything to do with dust and small particles, some of which were suspected to be metallic by the crew, being pushed around by the air filters on board the ISS - as it was this which lead to complaints from the crew.
Needless to say, the crew were not happy about this situation - particularly as a complaint regarding this issue had already been made, yet it had been seen to be ignored by mission control. NASA ground control attempted to disregard the importance of the complaint, they even seemed to doubt it's credibility (I hypothesise that in such an incident some ground staff may have downgraded the severity of the complaint in the own minds and put down to the perception of an understandable crankiness of a crew living in close, cramped quarters for months at a time).
It was the appearance of disharmony and complaints from the crew which lead to the decision not to have 24 hour 'live' streaming as it was decided that this was not in the best interests of NASA, or the ISS, from a public relations perspective.
In their defence, the crew on board the ISS had been wound up even further as the communications to the ground kept breaking up and cutting out due to interference, which forced them to have to keep repeating their report. They also had other on going issues which give them cause for complaint, but I don't remember what they were.
Personally I do not think they were being particularly cranky - certainly I'd expect to see much more negative retoric in an office environment over issues considerably less trivial than small flakes of metal in the air conditioning, but I can only assume that NASA feels the significance of the project demands a greater sense of sensitivity that most work environments. Overall, I think the withdrawal of the video on these grounds was a mistake, as it has hurt NASA and ISS public relations rather than helped (due the relative triviality of the incident).
Of course there may be other reasons which lead to the cutting of the a/v feed, but this was the incident and reason cited by NASA at the time...
* IIRC this happend in the first half of 2000, but I could be wrong about that as I often find I get time periods mixed up.
Here is some many people don't talk about but any rocket that does up into space has a remote selfdistruct system.
No they don't, from an engineering and risk assessment perspective that simply makes no sense to me.
Rockets are either designed to be:
1) Re-usable.
Take the SRB's (Solid Rocket Boosters) or the Baikal (the reusable part of the new Russian Angara rocket) - they are reusable, that is: specifically designed to be reused. They are supposed to return to earth once they are spent, ready to be reused, bolted on to new second stage apparatus and fired back into space time after time.
Putting self-destruct systems in case they fall back to earth (which is something it's designed to do deliberately) would be silly. Particularly as the SRB's are (a) fitted with parachutes for a nice soft landing and (b) only launched so that they fall back to earth over the sea (where there aren't any cities).
2) Disintegrate.
Though they are not really rockets, ET's (External Tank's - i.e. the big orange thing an Orbiter is attached to) are designed to self distruct in earths atmosphere when their role is complete. I use this as an example to demonstrate that if don't want your 'Rocket' to self-destruct then it's fairly simple to have it disintegrate (burn-up) on re-entry.
In fact, as we've just seen, getting things to NOT burn up on re-entry is the problem.
Moving on...
I'd also like to point out that not only is the Orbiter not a 'rocket', but that if you really have as much knowledge as you want us to believe then I'm surprised that you didn't call the Orbiter an Orbiter and instead only ever referred to it in your posts as a 'shuttle' (which seems an odd, though not entirely unprecedented, thing for someone in the field - bearing in mind it was on it's return trip).
If as you suggest, self-destruct systems exist on rockets and Orbiters, why not on satellites? After all, satellites like Skylab clearly lack such systems (as was demonstrated by Skylabs ungracious 'landing' over Australia) - this odd proclivity towards putting self-destruct systems on space craft, while simultaneously discriminating against satellites makes little sense.
Additionally I'd point out, that it is extremely difficult to hit any precise target with an Orbiter, even with the aid of OMS/RCS (Orbital Manoeuvring System/Reaction Control System) and the avionics system, hence the unusual landing pattern that all Orbiter's follow - it's a difficult enough task just getting to the runway. In fact only one human has ever landed an Orbiter without the aid of the avionics system (and this individual had hundreds of flights logged).
This is relevant because hitting a target as big as a city with a returning Orbiter _ON_PURPOSE_ would be a difficult task for any pilot. Hitting a built up area, let alone any people, purely through random chance would take a miracle.
Besides which - did you not see the chunks of the Orbiter that came down? They were massive - some of the pieces that fell (which were numbered in the thousands) were easily the size of an engine block.
Explain to be how this is better - and in any way safer - than letting the Orbiter come down in once big piece?*
*= Especially when there is an inflight crew escape system (which was fitted after the Challenger incident in 86) - which would mean even if the Orbiter was heading off course the crew would still have the chance to slide along the escape rail and parachute out when they reach a low enough altitude (assuming the Orbiter was not spining or rolling).