Fooled by Randomness
The main topic of the book is the fact that all humans are simply terrible at judging probabilities. Taleb is a securities trader, so a lot of the book revolves around financial probabilities, but his argument is mainstream and requires absolutely no knowledge of the markets. The book details examples of people wildly misjudging risks and probabilities in many contexts. Often that misestimation is understandable in advance of certain events, but harder to excuse after they've occurred; Taleb hits pretty hard on what he calls "data snoopers," his term for people who back-fit theories to existing data.
One of the most notorious examples is the Bible code (which has been thoroughly debunked), but Taleb argues that analysts who spend their time trying to find patterns in historical market data are no different: if you try long enough and hard enough, you will unavoidably find apparent regularities, which can be extremely compelling when seen in isolation. In context, though, they dissolve into nothing but meaningless statistical anomalies. Taleb rightfully compares these searches for meaning to the famous monkeys and typewriters parable.
Taleb's best example of poor probability intuition is probably the infamous survivor bias, which is our tendency to be disproportionately impressed by success. We almost always ignore the fact that, for one success story, there are many failures. But we seldom hear about the failures (just like we never hear about the many theories that didn't fit the data). So it's all a game of numbers: out of 10,000 traders, a few are statistically bound to be successful, even if they are nothing more than lucky idiots. The fact that they succeeded does not mean anything. It doesn't mean that they are bad traders, but it doesn't mean that they are good traders either, because on average somebody had to succeed.
One of Taleb's hot buttons is that people tend to be too confident in what they know. He argues convincingly that we should take everything, including science, with a grain of salt. Writing about Karl Popper, he points out that there are only two kinds of scientific theories: those that are demonstrably false, and those that are not yet demonstrably false. An irksome (but sadly true) observation, yet most people behave as if what they know is eternal truth. One could of course argue that Popper's observation is but another kind of truth, but I tend to put a lot more trust in people who question what they know than in people who don't.
Another of Taleb's peeves is the human tendency to over-attribute every random event (the old post hoc, ergo propter hoc). For instance, a commentator saying that "the Dow went down ten points today on concerns about Iraq" is talking nonsense: there is no way anyone can tie such a small market move to any particular reason. I found this specific point (which in retrospect is blindingly obvious) especially enlightening, as I am embarrassed to admit that, until now, I just accepted those market comments at face value.
Taleb also has some fun at the expense of economists and analysts, especially those whose predictions turned out wrong, but who claim that the theories were in fact right, and that the facts simply weren't supposed to be that way. This is what he calls denial of history, and is common among investors and gamblers (the two being of course close cousins).
The style of the book is informal and funny, and often meandering. We hop from one topic to the next, which occasionally may detract from the book's continuity, but overall the author's points come through loud and clear. Ironically for a man who advocates self-doubt, Taleb is starkly self-confident, though not in an irritating way.
Taleb is an intriguing, multi-cultural, iconoclastic character that has been around Wall Street for a while, and now runs his own small firm. Malcolm Gladwell (author of The Tipping Point, an absolute must-read for anyone who owns a brain) has written an excellent article that shows how Taleb's reasoning runs counter to just about every bit of conventional Wall Street wisdom. If you're interested in the markets, especially derivatives, and how Taleb trounces most of Wall Street's voodoo doctors, this moderately technical interview from 1996 is worth reading too.
Overall, a warmly recommended book.
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> (for instance, the fact that you're not dead: is that really because you're so darn good, or does dumb luck play a part?)
.. unfair things happen through dumb luck.
Thats called the Just World mentality. Its not a Just World
I've found this is the single biggest commenality in partiasian schools of thought:
Conservatives tend to think you are where you are because you deserved it. Dumb and lazy people are poor, smart and hard working people are rich. Dumb people get hit by trains, smart people comment on how dumb they are. Your situation is a result of your disposition.
Liberals go the other way. Luck, circumstance, and opportunity play huge roles in where you are. Poor people are poor because of luck and circumstance. People get hit by trains because they might have just plain been unlucky. Your situation is a result of your environment, including dumb luck.
Personally, this is the single biggest reason I can't stand conservatives. It bothers me to no end how capable they are of assuming that anybody in a bad situation is there because they deserve it.
"Old man yells at systemd"
Liberals tend to think that luck, circumstance, and opportunity play huge roles in where you are. Poor people are poor because of luck and circumstance. People get hit by trains while trying to get through the tracks before the train gets there, are just plain unlucky. Your situation is a result of your environment, including dumb luck.
Personally, this is the single biggest reason I can't stand liberals. It bothers me to no end how capable they are of assuming that anybody in a bad situation is there because of bad luck or circumstances beyond their control.
As provocative as the book's thesis seems to be -- and I must admit that my information on it comes entirely from this review -- it's not new. In the 1970s, Burton Malkiel's A Random Walk Down Wall Street posited that market fluctuations are mutually independent, though the market follows a general upwards trend, and thus it's impossible (ceteris paribus) to make any bets on short-term stock performance. The upshot is that the only way to beat benchmark indexes is to assume additional risk: trying to beat the market in most cases is nothing more than gambling on an upmarket roulette wheel.
"Freedom is kind of a hobby with me, and I have disposable income that I'll spend to find out how to get people more."
The stock market, day traders, etc are all dependant of this sort of thing. even though the possibily that their successes are often not distinguishable from random luck gives them all nightmares.
kinda difficult to pick out signals where they are buried in the noise floor to begin with.
"It is a greater offense to steal men's labor, than their clothes"
The main issue I have with what he says is comparing Time Series analysis (a topic that is near and dear to my heart), to the people that read the bible and then find prophetic phrases in there.
Aside from that being a bad analogy (but it sounds good if you don't know anything of time series analysis), it is also misleading in that time series analysis can be proven if it will work or not.
There is an equation (that is f'ing driving me nuts right now that I can't recall the name of it) that will tell you if your time series data is truly random or if it leads to predictability.
It has been shown over and over again that the stock market, were it a perfect market would in fact be random - but since there is human intervention that drives it, it is no longer truly random and there are non-linear patterns that are within the data.
The human brain is wired to pick up on linear patterns (to the point we see them where they are in fact not really there - it is advantageous to us to see a lion in the brush and run - when in fact there isn't a lion there, than the other way around and get mauled by a lion that we never saw).
That is more to what he speaks of, humans seeing what isn't there (there are a crapload of great books written about this - How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life by Thomas Gilovich immediately comes to mind) - but the way he speaks, he also includes computational analysis in there and is wrong in his generalization.
Now it is going to bug me all day as to what that frickin' algorithm is called - the one that shows the strength of your time series data... I know it doesn't start with an A, or a Z... and I don't think there is a C there... other than that, I'm pretty much at a total blank.
There are some odd things afoot now, in the Villa Straylight.
- mailed 1/2 the folks a prediction that stock X would rise, mailed the other 1/2 the opposite.
- threw away the 1/2 who ended up with the incorrect prediction
- repeated until there were a few folks left who had gotten 10 correct predictions (either 4 or 8 people, depending on n)
- asked the remaining folks for investments.
- split with the cash
Now imagine stock analysts all making predictions. Eventually there will be a star....something about seeing under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all?
I guess it just goes to show that there is nothing new under the sun.
"How to Do Nothing," kids activities, back in print!
Something else I've noticed people being bad at is estimating ratios. Example: back in high school an English teacher asked the class what the population ratio of blacks to whites in Michigan was. Some guessed as high as 50%, but I was the only one with the correct (lowest) answer of around 10%.
I have always wondered what affected this the most. It could be that we were a suburb of Detroit, or that the local television stations' news programs may have featured more black people (scaring white viewers makes for good ratings), or that these kids hadn't travelled very far from the Detroit area, or that they were just really lousy at estimation of distances and population and had no concept of the size of the state.
Certainly, some of the error may have come from cultural bias. I didn't notice any overt racism in the school, but the specter of the "dangerous negro" was/is probably still present.
Is this still on-topic? Anyway, it seems that we need to do better in our educational system of teaching people how to get their heads around the concepts of chance and estimation. Letting any bias influence these will cause errors.
Fantastic sounding book, I've ordered it.
:-)
:-)
I've long since been a believer in the "largely random" nature of the world and this puts me in mind of a wonderful piece of "research" I came across in New Scientist a few years ago.
It cut through a lot of bullshit to ask the question:
"can you predict the longevity of a system or state if you know almost nothing about it"?
i.e. life's pretty random and bothering to analyse the details will only get you so far
So how can we address, from a probabalistic standpoint, questions like:
"How long will the pyramids stand"?
"How long before my bank goes bust"?
"How long before we're hit by an asteroid"?
The reasoning went like this:
Take any "thing"/"system" etc. with a finite existance and ask the question:
"With a 95% certainty, how much time does it have left"?
For the sake of argument lets say you plant a tree, and you know nothing about trees.
Ten years later you come back and the tree is still alive and so you ask the above question about the tree.
Well, the tree is clearly alive but you don't know where "now" is in it's lifespan.
From a purely probabalistic point of view you've got a 50% chance that "now" is the middle half of it's life, i.e. you're not in the 25% of it's "youth" or the 25% of it's old age. So thats a 50% chance that it's had 75% of it's life already (middle age + youth).
Turning this into an equation, if:
x = current age
y = total age
p = probability
then: (it helps with a diagram)
x = py + (y-py)/2
or, rearranging to solve for y:
y = 2x/(p+1)
Going back to our tree then, if it's 10 years old
it's got:
95% chance of making it to 10.26 years
50% chance of making it to 13.33 years
The magic figure I keep in my head is that if you know NOTHING about something, you've got a 95% chance that it will last 1/39th as long again.
I find this little nugget invaluable when considering how much to spend on insurance or investments - cos I know/care NOTHING about them.
After all, why bother with the details, life is random
Check out these books by Robyn M. Dawes, another heavywieght in the emerging field of 'decision science.'
Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making
Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo-Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally
House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth
It's why people from "better" backgrounds can recover from poverty quickly - why good business-people can create new businesses from catastrophes repeatedly - and why very hard working people who don't know how to work tactically can still die poor. Knowledge and social networks are what keeps one out of poverty, not hard work.
As an aside, drug addiction exists in that gray area between choice- and not-choice, since it can be thought of practically as a "disease of the choice-making mechanisms of the mind." When drug addiction is responsible for poverty, there's little chance of escaping the poverty without addressing the addiction; likewise for mental illness.