Slashdot Mirror


XFree86 DRI on NetBSD

Dan writes "Erik Reid has been working on adding DRI support for NetBSD. Direct Rendering Infrastructure, also known as the DRI Project, is a framework for allowing direct access to graphics hardware in a safe and efficient manner. Some of Erik's work has been imported into XFree86 4.3.0 which is now in xsrc tree. He has subsequently put together a fairly large patch which compiles and works on his NetBSD/i386 1.6P system with a matrox g450. Try out the patch and give him some feedback!"

1 of 28 comments (clear)

  1. great news! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: -1, Offtopic
    Intelligence officials had long been frustrated in their attempts to track Saddam Hussein's erratic movements. Then, on Wednesday, according to senior U.S. government officials, Iraqi informants produced a lead.

    .

    The Iraqi leader, and possibly his two sons, were said to be in a private house built over an underground bunker in southern Baghdad.

    .

    What happened next, one senior administration official said Thursday, ''has created one of the great mysteries of the first day of the war -- did we hit anyone and if so, who did we get?''

    .

    On Thursday night, officials were still holding out hope that one of the American 2,000 pound bombs and nearly 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles, each carrying 1,000 pounds of explosives, may have struck Saddam or one of his sons, Qusay and Uday.

    .

    ''It may take days,'' the official said, ''to sift through it all.''

    .

    The mystery deepened as intelligence agencies monitoring Iraqi communications detected a significant drop in intercepted conversations among the top leaders of the country. Some officials speculated that Iraq's leadership had gone underground, others believed that, as one official put it, ''their phones melted.''

    .

    Either way, it was a surprise start to the war. It began close to 3 p.m. on Wednesday, when George Tenet, the director of Central Intelligence, got the tip that Saddam and his top leadership might be in the fortified bunker in Baghdad.

    .

    Tenet raced to the Pentagon to discuss the information with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, then spoke to General Richard Myers, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

    .

    ''There was no question about the legality of the target, but there was some discussion about how solid the information was and who might actually be there and when,'' said a senior official. ''The conclusion was that even though we didn't know for sure, it was an important target in any case.''

    .

    General Tommy Franks, the commander of allied forces in Iraq, had already begun planning a strike with Tomahawk cruise missiles against the bunker, the official said, and ordered the F-117A fighter jets aloft in preparation to strike -- even before Bush signed the attack order.

    .

    Franks, who was at his forward command post near Doha, Qatar, had the same intelligence information from CIA. officers in the field that Tenet was giving Rumsfeld, the official said.

    .

    Around 3:30 p.m., Tenet and Rumsfeld carried the information to a meeting with Bush and his top national security officials in the Oval Office. For three hours, the group discussed the source of the information, how likely it was to be true, and the risks of the operation. They spoke to Franks and came to the decision, the official said, that Tomahawk cruise missiles alone would not destroy a bunker that intelligence showed was buried under layers of dirt and concrete.

    .

    Assembled for the discussion about the attack was Bush's war council: were Vice President Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, national security adviser Condoleeza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card Jr., and General Richard Myers of the air force, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. The group concluded that it was imperative to send the F-117s, which can carry ''bunker buster'' bombs, a much heavier payload than a cruise missile.

    .

    According to senior government officials, Bush listened impassively as his top aides debated what might be done, weighing, as minutes ticked by whether to stick with the meticulously scheduled opening of the war with the extraordinary possibility that the United States could land a potentially lethal blow against the Iraqi regime.

    .

    ''This was the end of the 48-hour period for Saddam to get out of Iraq,'' said one official. ''So to have at that very moment when you're considering starting a conflict, to have a fairly good idea of knowing where senior most leaders are, is a pret