OpenSSH Patch Extends Tunneling Under OpenBSD
Jonatan Wallmander writes "We've written a small howto as well as produced a simple patch for OpenSSH that improves tunneling functionality in the ssh client on the OpenBSD platform (this should be OK on other platforms with some tweaking). It's a simple hack but works very good for us. We can have different IPs on the same BSD machine tunnel different hosts ... Without the patch you can only have one tunnel per BSD machine since it listens on INADDR_ANY.. Now all my computers on the LAN can access remote servers securely as if they were in the same room provided by a single BSD server. :)"
I got educated on an earlier Slashdot story of how (a) how nice and easy it was to set up an encrypted tunnel using ssh instead of IPSec or a weird proprietary VPN product, (b) how TCP over TCP is a fundamentally bad idea and people were compensating by periodically restarting the tunnel service afresh to work around it.
How's the performance of this setup and does it address any of those problems?
"Provided by the management for your protection."
TCP over TCP is a fundamentally bad idea
There may be some theoretical basis to this mantra, but in the real world it doesn't apply. I develop a product that uses TCP/TCP communications and it transfers hundreds of gigs a week from dozens of sites without any performance problems.
I think the way the real world works around the theoretical problems is that it's not really possible to maintain a TCP connection on the 'net for a long period of time unless you control the entire path. In my case, customer sites are always rebooting their routers, NAT boxes, etc. and connections rarely last longer than a day, often only several hours.
Fortunately, Unix has nice mechanisms for keeping things up, i.e. inittab.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
Thanks for the tip. You learn something every day on this board!
Method of processing duck feet
Thanks, I guess I should have googled for it myself.