OpenSSH Patch Extends Tunneling Under OpenBSD
Jonatan Wallmander writes "We've written a small howto as well as produced a simple patch for OpenSSH that improves tunneling functionality in the ssh client on the OpenBSD platform (this should be OK on other platforms with some tweaking). It's a simple hack but works very good for us. We can have different IPs on the same BSD machine tunnel different hosts ... Without the patch you can only have one tunnel per BSD machine since it listens on INADDR_ANY.. Now all my computers on the LAN can access remote servers securely as if they were in the same room provided by a single BSD server. :)"
I got educated on an earlier Slashdot story of how (a) how nice and easy it was to set up an encrypted tunnel using ssh instead of IPSec or a weird proprietary VPN product, (b) how TCP over TCP is a fundamentally bad idea and people were compensating by periodically restarting the tunnel service afresh to work around it.
How's the performance of this setup and does it address any of those problems?
"Provided by the management for your protection."
This is an excelent idea and better yet sounds like it will work to bridge the OS gap. But is this considered a VPN? And if so should I be concerned about "The Long Arm" if I attempt it with a node in a state that prohibates such.
Computer science is a grab bag of tenuously related areas thrown together by an accident of history, like Yugoslavia.
The OpenSSH sources list a "null" cipher, but I have had no success in establishing a connection using it. Is there a trick to it, or do I need to patch the sources to get a connection that sends in plaintext?
(Why? The traffic is already encrypted via IPSEC; I just want to use SSH's cool port-forwarding apparatus and its authentication, and don't want to pay for for encrypting twice.)
I don't wish to be pedantic, and it doesn't compromise the understandability of the article, but in the drawing under chapter 3 (The basic solution), the "brown" OpenBSD file server is available to the Windows PC as .200, and NOT .5 as suggested. :-) ) gets mapped to 127.0.0.1:139 (but on the OTHER end of the tunnel - thus the brown box).
The green OpenBSD box just does a simple port forwarding (from its own 139 to port 139 on 127.0.0.1 seen from the other endpoint's perspective) and makes it available non-loopback-only via the "-g" option (which btw won't work if you don't have "GatewayPorts yes" in your sshd_config file, and the last time I checked this was not exactly well documented). Therefore, 192.168.0.200:139 (actually 0.0.0.0:139, esp. without this patch
The next example is correct (and shows the use of the patch).
Just my 0.02
Vacuum cleaners suck. Kings rule.
TCP over TCP is a fundamentally bad idea
There may be some theoretical basis to this mantra, but in the real world it doesn't apply. I develop a product that uses TCP/TCP communications and it transfers hundreds of gigs a week from dozens of sites without any performance problems.
I think the way the real world works around the theoretical problems is that it's not really possible to maintain a TCP connection on the 'net for a long period of time unless you control the entire path. In my case, customer sites are always rebooting their routers, NAT boxes, etc. and connections rarely last longer than a day, often only several hours.
Fortunately, Unix has nice mechanisms for keeping things up, i.e. inittab.
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
Protocol overhead is obvious.. the real issue that people talk about is to do with how TCP deals with congestion... you end up with 2 layers of protocol trying to deal with a problem when only one needs to.. leading to some interesting issues... (things can theoretically get really slow)