Next Generation Space Shuttles

zymano writes "Popular Science has an article about the next generation space shuttles. If you're wondering about what happened to all those cool ideas for a new shuttle and what happened to them then this story will explain it. Mentions the politics, design, costs and time for a new shuttle." There's some neat images of mockups as well.

Comments

HOTOL - the unrealised 1980s alternative

[WIAKywbfatw]

A viable alternative to the shuttle was on the drawing board as far back as the late 1980s. HOTOL (Horizontal Take-Off and Landing), similar in appearance to current generation supersonic aircraft was designed by British rocket veteran Alan Bond.

Unfortunately, as soon as Bond had designed the revolutionary air-breathing engine that the project was based on, it was classified by the British government. Score one for stupid politics. So, perhaps the best rocketry engine designed never got built.

Later, HOTOL variants and derivatives were proposed, including an Anglo-Russian project called Interim HOTOL.

Here are a few related links to check out, most of which contain illustrations of what the orbiter would have looked like:

HOTOL
HOTOL and Interim HOTOL
Wikipedia entry for HOTOL

Google search for "HOTOL"

Of course, HOTOL and HOTOL-derived orbiters are still a viable alternative today. Air-breathing engines seem to be the logical next step.

Hmm

[B3ryllium]

I wouldn't exactly call the existing space shuttles "disaster prone".

They've flown for 22 years. Imagine what the mileage is? Somewhere in the millions, maybe even billions.

Only two out of five have failed.

I would only concede the disaster-prone point when considering that the astronauts lives were lost; that's certainly a little more impactful than a bunch of drunken teenagers totalling a car, right? But even then, the shuttles themselves are not disaster-prone; it's just that any slight mishap is instantly promoted to National Disaster and Mourning Period status.

The person's point above, that the shuttle's computers are outdated, is partially true - but they are entirely adequate for running the onboard software. When you're developing a system like the shuttle, you simply cannot use the latest technology. It has to be military-certified for mission critical systems, and it has to go through about two years of testing to acheive that status. That point was made in the article, that once you "freeze" development, that's what you're stuck with.

The shuttles work as they were designed.

The problem is that NASA made them too high-maintenance.

I fully agree with the article's point, that an automated human escape mechanism is required in reusable space flight vehicles. Heck, even Star Trek has escape pods.

Japanese and technology

[John Bayko]

Actually, large scale Japanese aerospace and military projects tend to go badly, as far a cost and schedule in particular. As an example, look at the H-2 rocket, which is both more expensive and less capable than similar U.S, European, Russian, or even Chinese rockets. Plus a longer development time.

Also check out their current indiginous fighter project - even given the basic F-16 design to copy, it's still not finished (it's not an exact copy, but it's taken longer than some of from-scratch designs).

Japanese companies are very good at using mature technology, and at making technology mature. They are fairly bad at using immature technology for end products. Rocket technology is still a long way from being mature.

Although a lot can be done with the technology that is mature. An example was the McDonnel Douglass Delta Clipper X, which was almost all off-the-shelf technology on a small budget. The rocket engines weren't reusable, but they were just driven at a much lower thrust, eliminating most of the wear allowing them to be reused anyway.

Sadly, after being sold to NASA, the DC-X fell victim to its budget - it was so cheap to operate, it was run mostly in a seat-of-the-pants fashion. During its last flight, a technician forgot to plug in the hydrolic hose to extend one landing gear (it had four), so when it landed, it simply toppled over.

Still, when NASA was looking for its last "replace the shuttle" program, it (or the larger Delta Clipper Y version) was one of three proposals - the other two were the Lockheed VentuStar, and a re-worked Space Shuttle. Although the two that lost were based on working technology, the main goal at NASA was for new technology development, not product development, so the riskiest project was funded (Lockheed's).

It didn't fail, in NASA's view - the innovative engines were developed, and aerodynamic studies performed. They just ran out of money and decided to stop it (the composite fuel tank technology was not completed). An end product wasn't really the goal for them - in the end of the program, Lockheed would have been responsible for building the actual vehicle, operating it, and marketing launch services - NASA would just be another customer. It was Lockheed's choice not to without the NASA funded prototype complete to show investors.

In my opinion, the DC-Y was the best choice - no new technology, just build the prototype and go. But it the program had succeeded, I would have been wrong, so blame doesn't work unless you know the future ahead of time.