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Replacing WEP with IPsec on OpenBSD, Windows XP
BSD Forums writes "WEP has been proven insecure and is thus inadequate for protecting a wireless network from eavesdropping or abuse. IPsec can be used as a replacement to WEP in the following scenarios. Joshua Stein has implemented IPsec on OpenBSD with manual keying between a router and a client as a replacement. Also, Thomas Walpuski describes in detail the configuration of an IPsec Host-to-Host connection between OpenBSD and Windows XP Professional with Authentication via X.509v3 Certificates."
WPA, which stands for 'Wi-Fi Protected Access', is the replacement for WEP. It does a prima facia good job making up for WEP's flaws. Several companies have firmware updates and drivers to enable WPA. More are coming.
.1X client (if you can), and return a Session-Timeout of a few minutes. You'll effectively completely rekey (start from new material, in addition to the rekeying WPA provides.
If you want strong protection, use it in combination with 802.1x authentication with a TLS (and accept the infrastructure problem), PEAP (and choose between the incompatible v1 or v2 versions of it, and I personally can never remember which it is MS supports), or TTLS.
For even stronger protection, turn on 'session resumption' on your
Slashdot had a long discussion on WiFi security late last hear (Replacing WEP for Wireless Security). ComputerBits has a relatively short overview (Wireless Hot Spot Security) for those who prefer something more organized. Then there's the Unoffical 802.11 Security Page, the website of the WiFi Alliance (the industry group for 802.11) and a nifty google search on WiFi Security.
the clock on the wall says 4 til 7
And even with you scenerio of a nosy neighbor, I hope you're using an SSL/HTTPS website, so your credit card number is secured through that interface.
Encrypting the physical layer is just silly. If you want your packets to stay private, use the appropriate encryption on proper level.
Yes, it does matter.
Not only can it affect what someone can "hear" when they listen to your wireless, it's access control. If I'm a terrorist and I want to post something to the internet for my friends somewhere else to get, I'm going to find an open wireless access point, since that's easiest, but lacking one of those, I can just listen for any, and once I've found one using WEP only for security I can crack it and use it.
What's your point? The point is, if the "evildoers" use your wireless access point to transmit information guess who's hosue the Department of Homeland Security shows up at. Even if they don't haul you off to jail, having them show up at your house is not fun.
There is a misconception that because your not a large company or other visable target that your not going to be targeted. The problem is that people don't have to target you to abuse your network. They simply look for any network easy to abuse, and there's enough people looking to abuse networks that someone will stumble on to yours given enough time and a pringles can.
This is the same as companies I've been to who feel they aren't an "eBusiness company" and their access to the Internet is not public (there's no public website) so they aren't going to get hacked. They got hacked.
Darthtuttle
Thought Architect
This is a very good paper, assuming it works.
Also, it looks like W2K has all same functionality (besides security monitor, which i assume is just that - monitor). Can it be used for that?
Also, what about denying non-ipsec protocol over the server interface that is connected to access point?
Short but decent read without getting too technical.
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http://www.nwfusion.com/research/2003/0331wpa.htm
psxndc
The emacs religion: to be saved, control excess.
IPSec or WEP doesn't just keep your traffic secure. It also helps ensure who can connect to your access point. So, probably, because it will help keep people from stealing bandwidth from you or finding unencrypted stuff you didn't want them seeing. It's basically to encrypt all traffic to and from the WAP - clients.
PPTP is not very secure. For more information: http://www.counterpane.com/pptpv2-paper.html and http://www.counterpane.com/pptp-paper.html If you are taking the trouble to replace WEP, you might as well replace it with a good solution. That being said, the worst mistake would be to deploy a "fix" incorrectly... ie: an improperly configured IPSec box is far worse than a correctly configured PPTP.
There's only one way to be secure and that's to use strong, end-to-end encryption. Anything which encrypts only the wireless portion is borderline snake-oil - not only does it not protect your data but it actually makes the problem worse since people see all of the cryptogeekery and assume that it's secure - after all, they didn't understand any of what they had to do to use it! All of this hassle merely gets you an insecure network which is now hard to use, less reliable and slower.
I've taken the opposite approach - my access points are wide-open (=easy to use) because all that gets you is access behind a firewall which allows HTTP to a squid proxy, SSH, HTTPS/IMAPS/POP3S/SMTPS, IM and DNS. (When IPSec is more widely available I plan to replace this with something which blocks almost all non-IPSec traffic. I'd be less surprised to find everything running over SSL a decade or more before near universal IPSec deployment)
This approach encourages better practices because it makes people aware that they're doing something risky - many people have no idea that anyone along the way could capture their password during one of the 5,000 times their email client sends it in cleartext during a given week. One of these days I'd like to hack together a script with ettercap's password collector which would periodically send someone's password to them in a warning and set the expired password flag on their account.