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Using Palladium to Secure P2P Networks
user555 writes "The RIAA and MPAA have seen Palladium as a way to prevent piracy. But this article argues that ironically Palladium may actually make P2P piracy more widespread (PDF). They argue that the security features of Palladium could be used to create P2P networks that are more resistant to attacks from content owners."
Trusted Computing, Peer-To-Peer Distribution,
and the Economics of Pirated Entertainment
Stuart E. Schechter, Rachel A. Greenstadt, and Michael D. Smith
Harvard University
fstuart,greenie,smithgXXeecs.harvardXe du
May 3, 2003
Abstract
The entertainment industry, facing a formidable threat from peer-topeer piracy networks, is exploring every possible means to attack these networks. The industry is also employing defensive strategies to protect media and media players from those who would extract and copy their content. These content protection systems depend on the computer industry's newly announced 'trusted computing' technologies. While 'trusted computing' technologies may better protect media and media players from content extraction by pirates, we assert that the very same technologies can be employed to better protect pirates and their peer-to-peer distribution networks from the entertainment industry.
1 Introduction
The viability of content piracy hinges on the resource costs of and risk from two required steps: extracting content from its protected form and then distributing copies of that content. History demonstrates that advances in technology often reduce these costs. The latest such advance comes in the form of extraction tools and peer-to-peer networks that automate both steps of the piracy process and put them in the hands of the average consumer. In response, the entertainment industry is looking to protect their content using 'trusted computing' technologies, which aims to place content extraction technology back outside the reach of the average consumer. We explore the implications of such technologies and argue that history, against the hopes of the entertainment industry, may continue to repeat itself.
1.1 A brief economic history of piracy
The cost of pirated goods is a function of the costs of extracting content and
distributing copies. We refer to the one-time extraction cost as e (sometimes 1 called the first-copy cost) and the per-copy distribution cost as d. The total percopy
cost of pirating n copies thus equals e
n +d, where the cost of extraction is
amortized over the number of copies. Using this simple formula as a guide, we briefly review the evolution of the economics of piracy and set a framework for understanding the reasoning behind the anti-piracy techniques used in the past and those being proposed today.
Before the days of consumer-writable media, the cost of piracy was dominated by the per-copy distribution cost d. No e®ort was expended to make it costly to extract content from media. This one-sided approach makes sense when one considers the components of the distribution cost d: the resource costs related to purchasing and writing media and the legal liability costs associated with the distribution of pirated content in countries that enforce intellectual property laws. The direct e®ect of high resource costs is to limit the number of pirates. Because the average consumer could not a®ord to produce pirated media, the entertainment industry could easily a®ord to pursue legal action against those few with the financial resources for engaging in piracy. Such legal actions had the e®ect of increasing liability, which ultimately resulted in further increases in per-copy distribution costs.
The advent of audiotape and videotape made recording technology and media available at a reasonable cost, and the widespread acceptance of consumer VCRs created a demand for pirated video content.1 These technology changes dramatically reduced d, and the entertainment industry reacted by endeavoring to increase e.
In particular, the industry introduced anti-piracy mechanisms into contentplayers and recorders in order to raise the cost of extraction high enough so that this cost could only be justified if amortized over a large number of copies. Consumer VCRs were built with technology that would refuse to record audio and video sign
You can burn a CSS-free DVD-R that will play on most DVD player on the readily available burners. The control of CSS keys does not prevent independent garage-made DVDs.
I don't see any move to stop the existence of unencrypted formats. The consumer electronics industry would not allow that. The __AA just try to make the encrypted ones as unbreakable as they can.
The "real threat" is there and is not going to stop anytime soon.