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Planning for Survivable Networks
Priscilla Oppenheimer writes "Annlee A. Hines' book Planning for Survivable Networks, is quite a page-turner. Yes, that's surprising for a technical book, but I found it to be true. I was fascinated by the stories of real companies (Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street Journal, and others) that survived the 9/11 attack and resumed business quickly. There are also stories from other disasters, both man-made and natural, and information on companies that were not able to quickly resume business. The author summarizes the stories with explanations of what went right and what went wrong, with advice on developing your own disaster recovery plan." Read on for the rest of her review.
Planning for Survivable Networks
author
Annlee A. Hines
pages
320
publisher
Wiley Publishing, Inc.
rating
10
reviewer
Priscilla Oppenheimer
ISBN
047123284X
summary
Designing networks that can recover from natural and unnatural disasters
As Hines explains, Lehman Brothers had headquarters in Tower 1, as well as in 1,2,3 World Financial Center (across the street from the WTC towers). Lehman moved to a backup recovery location and performed cash-management functions the same day as the attack. The company was online trading fixed-income securities by the next day. They had 400 traders online when the NYSE reopened Monday, 9/17.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published the story of its own recovery and Hines used that as source material for her book. WSJ had an extensive disaster recovery plan, based on lessons learned in the 1990 power blackouts in New York. After the blackouts and a subsequent fire in the emergency generator room, WSJ decided that it would never again depend on just one location being operational. WSJ opened other offices that could perform some of the necessary tasks to bring out a paper. Geographical diversity of resources seems to be a key to success.
When the 9/11 terrorists attacked the buildings across the street from WSJ's main offices, senior managers called for an evacuation, knowing that they could still produce the paper. The Wall Street Journal managed to publish a full newspaper with eyewitness accounts of the tragedy the next day.
Hines' writing is easy to follow. Although she delves into some technical details, with the requisite IP and TCP header depictions that you will find in so many networking books, the book can easily be read by managers and business people. Planning for Survivable Networks has many factual tidbits about disasters of all sorts, and although these are interesting, the primary benefit of reading the book is to gain an understanding of the characteristics of companies that sustained business after a disaster compared to companies that did not.
As Hines says, the companies that survived disasters all had disaster recovery plans in place. The plans were activated by decisive managers, who also promptly got their people out of harm's way. (If people don't survive, it won't matter much if systems survive.) Another point she makes is that the managers had to be adaptable. Not everything went according to plan, and it shouldn't be expected that it will.
The book opens with the author being rocked by a terrorist-caused explosion herself. She wasn't present for the 9/11 attackers. Rather, the bombing she survived occurred at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, 20 years before. A retired Air Force officer, she has dealt with threats all over the world for many years. Her direct command and control experience has taught her many lesson, which she shares with the reader in Planning for Survivable Networks.
Probably one of the most useful chapters, Chapter 11, "The Business Case," offers advice on presenting to management a case for a network continuity plan. According to the back cover, Hines has taught economics at a community college, and I would say that experience helped her explain the many costs involved in having a disaster recovery plan, including fixed, variable, direct, and indirect costs. She also explains the expected value of having a plan and how to sell that to management.
I recommend this book as an informative discussion of how companies can ensure business and technology continuity in a world with hackers, terrorists, natural disasters, and human error. It's a practical book, but also a surprisingly uplifting book, considering its technical content. I truly enjoyed reading about the adaptable human spirit that enabled managers and workers to keep their businesses going after the 9/11 attacks.
As Hines explains, Lehman Brothers had headquarters in Tower 1, as well as in 1,2,3 World Financial Center (across the street from the WTC towers). Lehman moved to a backup recovery location and performed cash-management functions the same day as the attack. The company was online trading fixed-income securities by the next day. They had 400 traders online when the NYSE reopened Monday, 9/17.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published the story of its own recovery and Hines used that as source material for her book. WSJ had an extensive disaster recovery plan, based on lessons learned in the 1990 power blackouts in New York. After the blackouts and a subsequent fire in the emergency generator room, WSJ decided that it would never again depend on just one location being operational. WSJ opened other offices that could perform some of the necessary tasks to bring out a paper. Geographical diversity of resources seems to be a key to success.
When the 9/11 terrorists attacked the buildings across the street from WSJ's main offices, senior managers called for an evacuation, knowing that they could still produce the paper. The Wall Street Journal managed to publish a full newspaper with eyewitness accounts of the tragedy the next day.
Hines' writing is easy to follow. Although she delves into some technical details, with the requisite IP and TCP header depictions that you will find in so many networking books, the book can easily be read by managers and business people. Planning for Survivable Networks has many factual tidbits about disasters of all sorts, and although these are interesting, the primary benefit of reading the book is to gain an understanding of the characteristics of companies that sustained business after a disaster compared to companies that did not.
As Hines says, the companies that survived disasters all had disaster recovery plans in place. The plans were activated by decisive managers, who also promptly got their people out of harm's way. (If people don't survive, it won't matter much if systems survive.) Another point she makes is that the managers had to be adaptable. Not everything went according to plan, and it shouldn't be expected that it will.
The book opens with the author being rocked by a terrorist-caused explosion herself. She wasn't present for the 9/11 attackers. Rather, the bombing she survived occurred at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, 20 years before. A retired Air Force officer, she has dealt with threats all over the world for many years. Her direct command and control experience has taught her many lesson, which she shares with the reader in Planning for Survivable Networks.
Probably one of the most useful chapters, Chapter 11, "The Business Case," offers advice on presenting to management a case for a network continuity plan. According to the back cover, Hines has taught economics at a community college, and I would say that experience helped her explain the many costs involved in having a disaster recovery plan, including fixed, variable, direct, and indirect costs. She also explains the expected value of having a plan and how to sell that to management.
I recommend this book as an informative discussion of how companies can ensure business and technology continuity in a world with hackers, terrorists, natural disasters, and human error. It's a practical book, but also a surprisingly uplifting book, considering its technical content. I truly enjoyed reading about the adaptable human spirit that enabled managers and workers to keep their businesses going after the 9/11 attacks.
You can purchase the Planning for Survivable Networks from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
"Disaster recovery" is the biggest load of shit. If I had been a 9/11 survivor, the LAST thing on my mind would have been getting my projects back on track!
People need to get their damned priorities straight. If you lose your job because you'd rather spend time with family or just enjoy life, so be it. Jobs can be replaced. Time cannot.
I can't wait for the comments on this one. Someone will try to be all cool and enlightened, in order to achieve a +5, Insightful. That will be the highlight of their day. And then someone will spend ten minutes thinking of some wisecrack or pun to get them a Funny. They'll then show it to everyone else and wonder aloud if they could take Leno's job. Someone else will Google around for a minute, grab the first semi-relevant link, and post it hoping to get an Informative. Then someone will spin a fake yarn about their disaster, and get pegged for Interesting.
I post pretty often here on Slashdot, usually not as an AC. But sometimes you just see the futility in it all.
"Planning for Survivable Networks has many factual tidbits about disasters of all sorts..."
I wonder if that's included.
When SARS hit earlier this year our disaster recovery planning team was faced with a situation they hadnâ(TM)t anticipated: potential quarantining of large numbers of staff with critical business-continuity functions.
The building and computer systems would be physically secure, but staff would not allowed into the workplace.
So there was a scramble to survey everyoneâ(TM)s job function and set up broadband and VPN access from home if needed.
Esteem isn't a zero sum game
Ha! I love the political incorrectness. Seriously, isn't the whole idea planning and an second location? Really, when disaster hits, whether external (terrorism) or internal (hard disk failure), is the person responsible for these systems in a frame of mind to create a plan?
I've watched my 24/7 server choke and die. I had a fever and still got things up and running in less than 8 hours. Why? A plan. I knew where it was and where all my manuals and documentation were.
Just because a server is small and easy to set up doesn't mean it should be treated any less than a mainframe should. Let me say that again, because this is why this is a topic of discussion: treat your servers like mainframes were treated 20 years ago.
--- "1.21 Jigawatts!" -Doc
Run down on what I learned from 9-11.
Were constantly under attack on some front, hey I knew this in my Marine corps days, some attacks are just worse than others.
What YOU should have learned from 9-11.
Dont take life for granted, your a freaking SysAdmin, A programmer, a Techie or god forbid some kind of manager that can be replaced. Work when your at work, back shit up and when you leave work, leave work, dont take it with you if your gone tomorrow, someone will notice, in a week there will be a new face in the crowd to replace you.
You never really know when your gonna be part of some F-ed up shit that is going to happen. Go surfing, get a Girlfriend, get a life outside of work.
The most important disaster you should be planning for is your own, is this mentioned in the book?
What if it's cheaper to move your functions to a new network than maintain the old one after a disaster? Ie, if the new network appears exactly the same to the user as the old network did, then the network has "survived" whether or not it is the same network as before.