To Allow or Not Allow E-Mail Attachments?
t0pper311 asks: "I work for a pretty large utility company in the midwest and of course, security is a big concern. We use Trend Micro as a mail gateway to basically scan for virii and strip off most attachments like executables or VB script. Now with the Sobig.E virus on the loose, we need to ask ourselves if we should be blocking ZIP files. We got lucky this time and were not effected, but what about next time? What are other companies doing? If you do block ZIP files, how do you give the people who need to sends files the ability to do so? Do you allow any attachments at all?"
I forget the exact stats, but it decompresses out about 7 levels deep, 16 files per level, and 4gig files at the last level. So, that's a lot of unzipping your virusscanner would be doing.
Granted, you could probably give it a checksum for this file in particular, but there are always variations on the theme.
Exactly! Files that are executed should always be executed in a sandbox, except if the reside in "/usr/bin" or other system directories. If the common file managers/ email client did that, there would be no problem sending exes per mail.
Someone should implement the following: A program "nobody" that executes a command line and traps all system calls. When the child process does a system call, it asks the user e.g. "The program wants to open a connection to c32x.com. Allow?". If the user answers "No", the system call just returns -1. You could invoke it just like "nice" or "nohup". That should solve the email-attachment problem. Programs like "strace" already trap system calls, so this must be possible.
-- 1.e4 c6 2.d4 d5 3.Sc3 de4: 4.Se4: Sd7 5.Sg5 Sgf6 6.Ld3 e6 7.S1f3 h6 8.Se6:
Why do you make so many accommodations for the failures of the OS? Isn't the OS supposed to work for you, instead of you working for it? How many features do you have to shut off before it's not worth the considerable cash you paid for it?
.sh file, then the problem would also exist on Linux.
Clearly you lack an understanding of the issue. This is nothing to do with OS. The issue is one of users running executables they are sent via email. If (insert your favourite Linux email package here) allowed a user to double-click an attached
Outlook was designed to be scripted so you could use it to build your own workflow . If you don't need this feature, switch it off! Complaining about exposed but unused functionality being abused is that same as complaining that it's Linux's fault of all the daemons are started at boot and someone roots you though BIND.
That is true. At one company I worked (with several thousand employees) there was an virus outbreak every one or two weeks on the corporate network.
This reduced to once or twice per year after they blocked off hotmail, yahoo mail, lycos mail, ICQ, AIM, etc. And really, if you are smary enough to get around this an use a small webmail provider then you're smart enough to not download a virus as well.
...that no one uploaded a zip bomb. For the uninitiated, that's where you make a huge file or series of files containing nothing but a single character (e.g. a null character) repeated millions/billions of times over and then compressed. Since such perfectly repetitive data compresses so well, it's easy to upload the resulting small file (on the order of a few dozen kilobytes) and wait for the server to get thrown off unzipping it.
Note to M1-ers: a curt but otherwise insightful message is not "Flamebait" or "Troll".