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UCB Researchers Critique DRM, Compulsory Licensing

An anonymous reader writes " In this paper, Berkeley researchers critique a host of cockamamie DRM schemes, and they also question the compulsory licensing approach recently being promoted by the EFF. They get into some of the practical details about compulsory licensing that no one else seems to be talking about like technical feasibility, incentives to cheat, monitoring for compliance, efficiency of collection and distribution of funds, privacy, fair use, feasibility of legal enforcement... Anyway, it's worth a read and is a useful contribution to the debate, whatever side you're on. "

2 of 158 comments (clear)

  1. Re:I haven't read the article by Dr.+Photo · · Score: 4, Informative

    This pdf was apparently generated by pdftex,
    which is GPL'd.

    So you probably won't go to GNU/Hell for reading it, in your friendly local xpdf or konqueror or whatnot.

  2. Text of the PDF paper by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative


    As someone who hates that disgusting Adobe PDF format (why people can't publish in HTML after all this is the web right ?) here is the text of the pdf..

    A Framework for Evaluating Digital Rights Management Proposals
    Rachna Dhamija
    UC Berkeley, SIMS
    rachna@ sims. berkeley. edu

    Fredrik Wallenberg
    UC Berkeley, SIMS
    fredrik@ sims. berkeley. edu

    Abstract
    In this paper, we analyze the strengths and weaknesses
    of the various solutions to compensate intellectual property
    rights holders. Specifically we look at digital rights manage-ment
    (DRM) based systems, extensions to DRM to support
    fair uses, monitor-and-charge schemes, compulsory licens-ing
    schemes and alternative business models.
    Our main contribution is to provide a framework from
    which current and future proposals may be evaluated. In
    order to realistically evaluate any compensation scheme, we
    suggest that the following questions are important to ask:

    Is the proposal technically feasible? What are the incentives to circumvent legal and techni-cal protections for all parties in the transaction?

    What is the burden of monitoring for compliance in the system, and on which parties does this burden fall?
    What is the efficiency of the collection and distribution of funds from consumers to rights holders?
    What are the impacts on user privacy and fair use? What is the feasibility of legal enforcement, both do-mestically and internationally?

    1. Introduction
    Over the last few years the debate over protection, or lack
    thereof, of copyrighted works has flourished. Proposals on
    how to reimburse the creators of these works range from
    strict proprietary encryption locks to new business mod-els
    that rely on revenue streams from ancillary products.
    Each new proposal points out the shortcomings of previ-ous
    schemes and highlights the benefits of its own solution.
    However, no consistent framework exists for analyzing the
    different solutions.
    In this paper, we analyze the strengths and weaknesses of
    the various solutions. Specifically, we look at DRM based
    systems, extensions to DRM to support fair uses, monitor-and-
    charge schemes, compulsory licensing schemes and al-ternative
    business models. From this comparison, we extract
    important dimensions such as technical feasibility, incen-tives
    to cheat, burden of monitoring, privacy, and the feasi-

    bility of legal enforcement. Our main contribution is to pro-vide
    a framework from which current and future proposal
    may be evaluated.

    Digital Information as a "Public Good" Economists
    sometimes refer to certain goods as public. This does not
    imply that they are in the public domain as defined by intel-lectual
    property law. Rather, a public good is a product or
    service that has two properties. First, it is non-rival, which
    simply means that consumption by one person doesn't limit
    consumption of the next. Second, it is non-excludable, im-plying
    that once the product exists, the benefit cannot be
    limited to those that have paid for it.
    Ideas and information captured in physical media tradi-tionally
    fall into some middle ground. While the informa-tion
    itself certainly has the characteristics of a public good,
    the physical media that it is tied to is rival and exclud-able.
    This gives rise to business models involving the sale
    of physical artifacts whose only value is the embedded in-formation
    such as books, CDs and DVDs. These business
    models have taken a serious blow with the introduction of
    information in digital form combined with communications
    media such as the Internet. The question at hand is whether
    or not it is possible to devise a scheme under which money
    can be transferred from those consuming information goods
    to the providers of the same.
    We use the characteristics of a public good to distinguish
    between the following classes of proposals to compensate
    intellectual property rights holders: