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Maryland Plans Code Review for Voting Software
asmithmd1 writes "We already knew Diebold software is insecure, now the Baltimore Sun is reporting that the Governor of Maryland has asked SAIC to review the software in Diebold voting machines. Diebold has graciously allowed SAIC access to their proprietary code. Why isn't this code open source by law?" In a related story, a trade show for closed-source electronic voting systems is doing their best to keep critics out. Update: 08/07 15:23 GMT by M : Diebold's website security is less than outstanding.
even if the code is opensource, how can you be sure the voting machine executable has been compiled from the genuine source code ?
Voting via absentee ballot. At least there is a greater chance of my vote not being screwed up or changed.
Anyone who thinks these voting computers are going to be flawless and secure by Nov. 2004 is greatly mistaken.
But for the love of god and all that is holy, WHY are they fighting so hard against paper records? It makes no sense. (unless you are conspiracy-minded) Seriously. I just can't come up with any decent reason that Diebold et al would be so strongly against hooking a printer up to the system to produce a physical record. Much less why our elected officials would buy into such an idea.
Bush: He's Liberal in all the wrong ways.
you need to build it. They're not interested in building it open source apparently. Remember, Diebold makes ATM machines and other commercial products, and they have stiff competition. By the design of their business plan their software won't be open.
So, if you want to see an open source implementation of voting software, something that you can argue is perfect and be able to show the world such, you need to make it. Diebold and their competitors won't.
If you can build the software to make a secure voting system, someone else can design the hardware once the software is ready. That seems to be what people are missing here. Design the system right and the hardware will be built to work. Design the hardware first, and the system will be dependent on whatever wacky design is chosen.
Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
"Why isn't this code open source by law?"
This wouldn't fix the problem of faulty(by design) hardware, lack of audit trails, and no trust in the delivery method.
Sure with open source we can see the code, but that doesn't help if it is compiled by a compiler that you can't see the code for, run on microchips that you can't see the code for, and administered by people you can't trust.
The ``but it should be open source'' comment that gets thrown around in every single story about electronic voting does not take into account everything that happens to the code _AFTER_ we would be able to see it.
Anyway,
here is a link to a page on Electronic Voting:
Dr. Mercuri's Page on Electronic Voting
--xPhase
The following sentence is TRUE. The previous sentence is FALSE.
Security through Obscurity is not Inherently Evil.
In this case, it is.
With normal elections, the abilty to tamper with the results are minimal. The reason is that the votes do not end up in one place. In addition, you have several different parties counting at all times (typically Dems and Republicans). With this approach, it offers a single point of entry. It is possible for the votes to be rigged here either directly or indirectly. Somebody could offer 10 to 100 million dollars to the coder or even CEO within the company (keep in mind that some elections are spending a great deal more money to win them these days; apparently it pays off). Or since it may have a unknown opening, only the bad guys would know. Only the problem is that the bad guys would be a party member.
BTW, the orginal bribe may be to simply forget about an opening, rather than the introduction of one. Then the party would simply introduce something to manipulate it nationaly. At that point, they would manipulate close elections. Totally undectable.
I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.