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Talk About A Security Hole, Go To Jail?
Nu11.org writes "According to a SecurityFocus article, 'Federal prosecutors in California went too far when they put a man in prison for disclosing a website security hole to the people at risk from it.'" According to the article, "...by explaining how the vulnerability worked, and why customer data was at risk, prosecutors asserted, the security specialist 'impaired the integrity' of the affected network", citing the case of Bret McDanel and his former employer, Tornado Development, Inc. We've discussed the disclosure of software exploits recently.
Makes you not want to even bother saying anything. Wait till the rest of the world decides that and you have security holes everywhere.
Of course, can you have holes within holes?
Gizmo
He reported it to management, like he should have. He should have left it alone there.
Well, if it's too dangerous to disclose security holes when they know who you are, do it anonymously on Slashdot. That'll sure get their attention...
Do not look into laser with remaining eye.
Isn't this going a little too far. I thought a suggestion box was always welcome, or even a public message board where people could leave suggestions was A Good Thing(TM).
I may have been wrong. But this isn't right. no sir, it is not.
Does anyone have any ideas as to what alternative third parties would be good for this kind of whistle blowing?
US Democracy:The best person for the job (among These pre-selected choices...)
One thing not mentioned in the article was where he got the list of email addresses of the Tornado clients. If he had taken this information when he left Tornado, there could be legalilty issues involved there as far as client privacy goes. Perhaps that weighed on the jury's decision...
"Sir, if you don't lock your car, someone could steal your stereo."
"Officer! Arrest this man! He has figured out a way to steal my stereo!"
Sign. Some people are just too stupid to live.
guy: "you're using Microsoft products, right?"
customer: "yes, that's correct"
guy: "well that's a huge security hole!"
customer: "no way! we have to keep this secret! come on Jeff, let's put this guy in jail before he tells anyone else!"
Federal prosecutors in California went too far when they put a man in prison for disclosing a website security hole
Guess whose hole will need tight security now ?
Ha ha, prison rape is funny! I'm so glad this country is civilized enough that we can not only condone it, but we can laugh at his humiliation!
Ha ha!
Man, I can't wait until society evolves to the point where we can laugh at normal rapes too, especially violent gang rape and child molestation. Ha ha, you got raped at gunpoint while walking to you car, maybe you have AIDS now! Ha ha, your uncle made you stick his little friend in your mouth when you were five, hopefully you are scared for life!
"Your superior intellect is no match for our puny weapons!"
b) They continued to advertise their webmail services as secure despite knowing that they were vulnerable.
He should get all of the users of the service together and class-action sue Tornado for knowingly lying to them about the security of their service.
Would you like to explain how someone manages to have Unencrypted WEP? That's kind of like saying that they have some dry water.
WEP is encryption. I think you meant to say they had unencrypted networks, or networks without WEP.
Why do I get the feeling that your 'security audits' involve looking for an open connection with which to connect to Kazaa?
You may disagree, but to be blunt, you're wrong. -tgd
The government argued that the message was incorrect, useful to would-be attackers, and was intentionally designed to give Tornado trouble.
Either the message was incorrect (which would render it useless to would be attackers), OR the message was CORRECT if indeed the message could be useful to would be attackers. I see a real contradiction in the government's arguement here (yes I know, big surprise eh?).
Does this mean that when Microsoft issues a report warning of a vulnerability in their software and exactly where it is and what the vulnerability can cause along with a security advisory that they are breaking the law?
This, IMHO sets a very dangerous precedent. It reminds me of another reuters article I read today concerning corporate whistle blowers having trouble continuing their careers in other companies after exposing illegal activity.
The Matrix is real... but I'm only visiting!
The Matrix is real... but I'm only visiting!
That would be a very interesting exercise. It would be facinating to see just how fast OSDN would roll over and cough up the "Anonymous" IP address to the feds.
Its interesting that other professions actually have a duty to inform others of their vulnarability - while in IT you can be punished for it.
As a physician, if I find that a patient presents a danger to another person (for example, a man has a psychotic break and intends to kill his wife), I have a legal and ethical obligation to inform that person (whom I have never met.) If I fail to do so, I can be thrown in jail.
Its not hard to envision a future scenario in information security where one could have legal obligations both to inform and _not_ inform -- thus finding a security hole would guarentee punishment no matter the road taken.
+--------------------- You idiot! I told you we were facing the wrong way!
I know that non-technical managers simply don't care how their systems work. They think in strategic and tactical terms. Buffer overflows are just an excuse why things can't get done. Managers hate those things. But there has to be a balance somewhere. Geeky technical issues cannot be ignored by managers. Granted, they don't need to personally learn the technical details. That's why they have tech guys working for them. But they need to invest the time, effort and resources into an ongoing technical systems maintenance program. This includes everything from cleaning dust out of computer chassis to maintaining security from the strategic level to the bits and bytes level. It is the technical department's duty to ensure that management understands the risks, like it or not. It is the management's responsibility to make sure the technical department is doing its job.
In nearly all businesses today, it is necessary to be on the Internet. Being on the Internet entails certain risks. In the course of its business, the company will need to address these risks on an ongoing basis. For these reasons, it is important that all but the smallest companies refrain from outsourcing their "IT" departments.
To make a long story short, corporate management unaware of the implications of their lack of attention to technical matters. This applies to computers as well as manufacturing processes. Since they fail to gain an understanding of the implications and since they fail to respect the technical field enough to invest the necessary time and effort into it, they should be subject to the consequences of their irresponsibility. Therefore, if you are aware of a security hole, you should do the following: Nothing. Let a black hat cracker break in, steal data and wreak havoc on their network. This is the only way they will learn.
Want to insist on doing "the right thing?" Send an anonymous letter to the company's IT department and to their management. State that if the vulnerability is not fixed within 48 hours, it will be posted on all the public disclosure sites. Do not include any identifying information.
The government's actions (in this case) provides electronic security professionals (and "crackers" if you prefer) with a "perverse incentive."
s /thu-1530-b-and erson.html
"Why Information Security is Hard - An Economic Perspective."
http://www.acsac.org/2001/abstract
"In a survey of fraud against autoteller machines [4], it was found that the patterns of fraud depended on who was liable for them. In the USA, if a customer disputed a transaction, the onus was on the bank to prove that the customer was mistaken or lying; this gave US banks a motive to protect their systems properly. But in Britain, Norway and the Netherlands, the burden of proof lay on the customer: the bank was right unless the customer could prove it wrong. Since this was almost impossible, the banks in these countries became careless. Eventually, epidemics of fraud demolish their complacency. US banks, meanwhile, suffered much less fraud; although they actually spent less money on security then their European counterparts, they spent it more effectively [4]."
If the government's goal is a more secure Internet, the government should encourage actions via incentive that result in more secure systems. It is clear that if Bret McDanel had not informed Tornado Development's customers of the security problem, Tornado would have done nothing to repair it.
If you subscribe to Ross Anderson's theories, the government's actions provide incentive for security technicians to take the following actions on the discovery of a security vulnerability:
1. Don't talk or write about it without obscuring the publishers identity.
2. Exploit the vulnerability for personal gain.
Heavy handed prosecution of people like Bret McDanel will lead to a less secure internet.
I think we can agree that all forms of rape are humorous, along with all forms of punishment, abuse, torture, etc. In fact people are simply funny, the way they run around their whole lives, slowly dying, pretending its not funny. But it really is.
- Intel caught him and told him to stop. He continued.
- He actually used some of the passwords to login, although he didn't change or grab any data.
- None of this was directy related to performance of his duties as a contractor.
I think Intel was merciful the first time, cause they could have nailed him then. The end result is awfully harsh and all out-of-proportion to the harm caused, however he was by his own admission doing something illegal that he'd been warned not to do.This case is similar. Yes, the prison sentence is crazy for the crime, however what this guy did was stupid. He was clearly going after the reputation of his former employer: if he'd been motivated only by the good of the customer, he would have sent the email while on the job. Also, he could have just warned folks without publishing exploit details.
This is a problem many geeks have -- getting nailed for doing something technically correct but socially unnacceptable. Most of the rules that run the world aren't written down and never will be. You can be technically correct and still wrong wrong wrong.
This isn't as much "normalization" as it is "don't take so many drugs when you're designing tables."
While I don't agree with what he did, I certainly don't think he did anything illegal. Why isn't the government going after Tornado for exposing their customers to a risk that could breach the confidentiality of their emails?
This is another example of "Security through obscurity". Someone makes a broken piece of code, doesn't want to bother to fix it, and then gets pissed off when someone forces their hand.
If the U.S. eventually passes a law that makes software publishers liable for these flaws, there will probably be a huge backlash from sloppy programmers because it interferes with their Consitutional rights for the "Pursuit of Happiness", since they are stuck at work fixing their unsecure code.
--
Luck is just skill you didn't know you had.
The following tidbits were turned up by a little search on the web.
3 .htm
s /200206 12-9999_1b12hacker.html
The FBI says that: "COMPUTER SPAMMER SENTENCED TO FEDERAL PRISON". Yes, they advertise the conviction of Bret McDanel as a spammer sent to jail:
http://www.fbi.gov/fieldnews/march/la03250
The San-Diego union tribune(?) writes that:
"Prosecutors allege that McDanel hacked into his former employer's server and sent thousands of e-mail messages at practically the same time, forcing the company to shut down its computer system in August and September 2000." Link:
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/busines
In the FBI note there was no mention of the security bug at all they said:
"Additionally, the emails he sent contained a link to a web site he had created where he revealed confidential information about Tornado technology that McDanel had learned while employed there."
Now that is such a selective disclosure of information that I am inclined to equate it with telling an untruth. (Just like printing that some John Doe killed several people in 1967 in he is still not behind bars, omitting that he was acting in war...)
What alarms me that he was found guilty on spamming charges which damaged the mail server while that seems not to be the basis of his ex-employers discontent. I guess the prosecutor was not interested in bringing out the truth but rather just have a conviction based on the "Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" on his resume.
Note that the company (Tornado) went out of business.
Jan 12, 2000 Customer support at Tornado gets an email from an exempoyee saying there is a HTTP REFERER problem in their product (along with 15 other webmail providers hotmail included).
Jan 13, 2000 Development has written a fix and tested the fix (cgi redirect and code to cause all urls in the email to go through this redirect, nothing big).
Feb 1, 2000 McDanel quit (gave 2 weeks notice) because of problems with managment dealing with another employee.
Aug 24, 2000 McDanel contacts customer support (he is friends with this person) and asks if the problem is ever going to get fixed (McDanel was allowed to keep his account free after quitting, which shows that he didnt leave on horrible terms, and maintained friendships with many people in the company, infact some people in the company tossed work to his fiancees company).
Aug 27, 2000 McDanel was told no they were not going to fix the problem (unknown at that time was that the QA person closed this bug report months ago without applying the fix).
Aug 30, 2000 email from one of the managers at Tornado to McDanel regarding his web page
Aug 31, 2000 McDanel sent emails to the customers at the rate of 6.67/sec (10 rcpt's per body (so the body is effectivly 10% the size) delay 1.5 seconds between each body). The system logs showed NO impairment during this time.
Later the system was shut down (sendmail, web server, etc) *then* the system load went up (resumably when they were deleting the emails, which in itself is a crime).
McDanel was on the phone with admins just prior to sending and continued talking to one admin for 20 minutes, then called others and helped this company fix their system when it broke (turns out it broke cause they were deleting the emails, but none the less McDanel did whatever he could to try to help them, including spending several hours on the phone with them the night the emails were being sent).
In every instance that he sent emails (6.67/sec to a 8 cpu UE 4500 with a gig of ram, that in no way is a DoS) there was no downtime, the xdelay in the mail headers was 1 second or less, it was not suffering at all. The queue stayed below 30 mails most of the time (once for less than 1 minute it went over 30 mails but it quickly processed that and the queue was below 30 again).
Sendmail (which they used) will automatically queue the emails if the load is too high. The mere fact that the queue was empty (or nearly so they do not log if there is less than 30 in the queue) indicates that the system was not overloaded.
The fact that the cpu load reports (HP Openview) indicated that the load did not go up until AFTER services were shut down (if you kill sendmail, sendmail cannot cause load - period!) also shows that it was not a DoS.
What is worse is that McDanel was charged under the 1998 version of 18 USC 1030. The new version (patriot act) makes it tons easier for them to convict you. If you attempt to impair the integrity and are unsuccessful, you can still be guilty (before you actually had to do something, now you just have to attempt/intend to do it, and presumption of intent is easy for them to prove, they just have to say it).
Bret was not prosecuted for revealing a security vulnerability. He was prosecuted for DOS'ing our server. He sent 14,000 emails to our system, and it overloaded and stopped accepting mail. He did this several times, and knew it overloaded the system when he did it, and knew the FBI had been called after the first time, so nobody needs to feel sorry for him. Holding him up as a martyr or hero is just asinine, but it speaks volumes about how our media works these days.
Of course, there's plenty of culpability to go around...the main server was a Sun Enterprise 4500 with 4x450 CPU and 4Gb RAM. A machine like that should swallow 14,000 emails without a trace. Of course, Tornado's brain-dead custom system implementation meant that every single incoming email spawned off an SQL script to take the message apart and inject it into the database, and a shell process to control the SQL script. The system load went over 100. I had to write a script to kill off all the processes. Since the load was so high, sendmail stopped accepting incoming mail and the rest of the spam piled up on the backup server, where it was rm'd. So, it was Bret's fault for spamming us, but it was Tornado's fault for such a painfully bad email processing method. This actually raises the most interesting question of all, is it a crime to knock down a system that was incompetently implemented?
Of course, the email system was not the only part of the system that was breakable...we had system outages several times a week from different causes, and really, the Bret thing was not that bad, being in that it was easily identifiable and fixable.
Another fun thing was that Tornado initially claimed $300,000 in losses from the incident. This is important because the FBI will not get involved with anything under $50,000. This figure was later reduced (much, much later) to $9,000. Oh yeah, what else...Tornado's great email implementation also meant that we had to run an open relay, which was frequently abused. We sent out hundreds of thousands of nigerian bank account emails. A manager who took a stand and turned off the relaying one weekend was demoted and ultimately fired. Basically Tornado was a bunch of Windows developers who couldn't use Windows to implement their custom email/fax/paging application because Windows wouldn't scale to the sizes they needed. So they had to use Unix, and they didn't know anything about Unix, and they made just about all of the predictable errors that the ignorant make.
In conclusion, it's scary that every time this story comes up, there's a different (wrong) angle on it.
Shutting down free speech with violence isn't fighting fascism. It IS fascism!