Columbia Accident Investigation Board: Final Report

ssclift writes "After nearly 7 months the Columbia Accident Investigation Board has released its final report into the February 1st loss of the Shuttle Columbia and all 7 crew members. This is more than a technical assessment of the immediate causes of the accident. Once again, sadly, the world's flagship space agency gets a thorough and grim review. Press briefings will begin at 11:00 EDT along with a webcast."

Comments

Failure is not an Option?

[tinrobot]

Funny how the History Channel special on the early space program came out this week. After watching it, I realized how much different NASA is today. They have no fire in their belly, seems like they're more interested in keeping their jobs than anything. If we want to continue sending men into space, we had better start doing it right once again.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[Frymaster]

Sound familiar anyone?

of course. now how would you or anyone build a system that was more open? even the japanese "tan" system has failed...

the suits will always be there and they will always want "yes men".

Time to shrink NASA

[chroma]

I used to be a big believer in the NASA Myth: that they were the only ones capable of doing big space launches and that space access for humans was inherently expensive.

Then I heard Jerry Pournelle speak a couple years ago at a convention. He said something that shook me: NASA has many good people and does many good things but needs to get out of the business of launching people and robots into space. It surprised me because here is a guy who is in favor of space exploration but against NASA.

NASA as an organization doesn't really care about cheap, reliable space launches, because that would mean that their budget would be cut! The shuttle accidents are a symptom of bureaucratic mentality. Think on this: the Russian space agency will charge you about $15M for a trip to the space station. It costs between $500M and $1 billion just to do a shuttle launch.

NASA does a great job building Mars rovers and such, let's keep them doing that. But we should turn everything else over to private industry.

change of mindset

[mks180]

It seems to me that somewhere along the way NASA has changed from an operation mode where you had to prove that something was safe to proving that something is not safe.

Re:Lessons learned

[sphealey]

Hopefully there can be some valuable lessons learned from this tragedy. Hopefully something like this will never happen again.

While no one is in favor of needlessly throwing away life, do consider that the bones of a good percentage of the settlers who tried the Oregon Trail can still be seen along the sides of that trail today. For the ones who made it, Oregon was a good life. But quite a few did not make it, and that is the nature of exploring/pioneering.

Also consider that that same week 90 people were roasted/squashed to death while attempting the life-altering experience of seeing "Great White" live on stage. Seems to me that space exploration is worth a bit more risk than that event.

sPh

Re:Feynman said exactly this 16 years ago

[ChuckDivine]

Sadly, you could be right about NASA not changing.

There are, however, some hopeful differences. Let me list a few:

• There have been a lot more obvious blunders committed in the public eye. Consider Hubble's focusing problems, the crash on Mars of probes because one group was using metric and the other English units, space station woes, the X-33 failure.
• Compared to 1986 there are more people with real knowledge about the agency who are willing to speak up about the agency's problems. In 1986 extremely interested people were far more willing to cut NASA a break. That's not true anymore.
• Significant politicians (e.g., Mikulski) are more aware of the problems and are willing to take action.
• The CAIB's citing of a "culture" problem marks an important step. People are no longer looking just at technology, but at the organization that creates and uses the technology.

This event is being viewed as NASA's Vietnam. That's a real wake up call.

Yes, things could still go wrong. There are plenty of well entrenched people who have turf to protect. But that's going to be much harder now.

And, I suspect, a lot of the good people who still manage to work in aerospace are also going to work to change things.

Oh so familiar...

[RetiredMidn]

NASA's problem is a reflection of the institutional behavior I have seen at my last 4-1/2 employers (the least recent morphed into a pathological organization while I was there); it has become more important to appear to have a product or strategy (or quality) than to actually have it. Nothing Scott Adams hasn't been saying for years.

BTW, the mindset did not start within NASA. In the 60's, the mandate was to spend what was necessary to build the best solution that could be conceived; starting in the 70's, it was all about compromises.

It Would Be Nice if NASA could be given a mandate and execute on it in such a way to once again set an example on How It Should Be Done, but I think we ultimately need to fix our broader culture about the standards of how we conduct business.

Using a BETA product for Production

[Uncle Op]

The second speaker, who was charged with reviewing the history of how the accident could have come about, observes that it's dangerous to use beta tools for a long time as if they are production ready.

The shuttle is and was an experiment. It's effectively a very functional prototype, but the completion - or at least the ongoing refinement - of the shuttle program has been in stasis for too long. We're not driving Model-T's anymore for a reason.

Re:The "Culture of NASA"????

[cybercuzco]

There is a culture of NASA. I had a professor tell me a story about how they came up with the toilet on the shuttle. Aparently they already had a perfectly good toilet design from skylab, and it actually worked nearly as well as a conventional toilet, you didnt have to strap yourself down or anything. Just hold on and a centrifugical pump in the bowl takes care of everything. At any rate, it was designed at Marshall Spaceflight center. Of course the shuttle was beign designed at Johnson Spaceflight center (or maybe it was the other way around, dont quite remember) At any rate, Johnson couldnt use ANYTHING that had been designed by Marshall (and vise verse) So Johnson deisgned a completely new toliet, at very great expense to the program (~$10mil) When they could have used an existing design for much cheaper(probably still ~$1mil, but hey thats 10 times less). Similar thing happened with the flooring of the ISS. Again same two center, but reversed in stupidity. Skylab had an "isogrid" flooring system which basically was a bunch of aluminum triangles. You put a rubber triange on somebodys boot and voila, you canstand wherever you want and work without floating away by jamming your boot into the floor. Well that wasnt designed where the ISS was being designed so that was out the window. I think they use some sort of seat restraint system and velcro on the ISS now. Velcro is fine but it wears out over time, and of course seat restraints are more expensive than the floor you have to put in anyways. NASA needs to get rid of the Not Invented HERE (tm) syndrome and use the best ideas available and not whatever will boost a certain centers prestige.

Is shuttle fligh safe?

[kurtkilgor]

People are commenting that if 100 flights took place in a year instead of 4, we wouldn't worry about safety so much. But I think what's frustrating about the Columbia and the Challenger accidents is that they were caused by seemingly simple problems which were known before the accident occurred. Not a single astronaut has been killed by any of the things that make space dangerous: asteroids, radiation, etc. They have been killed by essentially terrestrial things that we expect to happen on a passenger car (leaky seals, cracked body panels) but not a multi billion dollar spacecraft. It's like sailing out of a storm alive and then drowning as you step off the boat.

What's *right* with NASA.

[Unknown Kadath]

For my senior thesis, I helped design a proposed Mars mission. I was working at Johnson when Columbia broke up, but I've since graduated and am no longer associated with NASA, and can speak freely.

I'm not sure to start on what's wrong with NASA. Many other posters have covered that in detail, and I think many of them are spot on.

But there is one thing very, very right--the people. From janitors and groundskeepers, all the way to the directors of the various centers, NASA employees are passionately devoted to the job they do. Losing Columbia hurt like losing members of their families, hurt their professional pride, hurt that part of their souls where they keep their their dedication and hope. They will continue because there is still work to be done, because the journey is still unfinished, because that's what their fallen comrades wanted. This spark is fundamental to NASA--the institutional culture cannot extinguish it, but I fear that it may become impotent.

Space travel is costly and risky. It will be centuries before we can consider it routine. The people of NASA have the expertise and the will to carry on, but will they be permitted to do so? I say, Stand aside and let your scientists and engineers work. Let your astronauts fly. They may greatly fail, but it will be because they have greatly dared.

We've forgotten courage, I think.

-Carolyn