Practical Unix & Internet Security
Practical Unix & Internet Security is divided up into six sections:
The first section covers the basics of computer security, tracing the history of Unix and security, as well as providing details of what should be in a good security policy.
The second section covers the building blocks of security, authentication, users and groups, filesystems, cryptography, physical security for servers, and personnel security.
Network and Internet security are focused on in the third section, with emphasis on modems and dialup security, TCP/IP networks, securing TCP and UDP services, Sun RPC, NIS, Kerberos, LDAP, NFS, and SAMBA, and finishing up with a chapter dedicated to secure programming techniques.
Day-to-day operations are the focus of the fourth section. Keeping up to date, making backups, defending accounts, using integrity checking tools, and auditing, logging, and forensics are all expanded upon in detail over five chapters.
The fifth section rounds off the main part of the book by describing how to handle security incidents. Special focus is given to discovering a break-in, protecting against programmed threats, Denial of Service Attacks (& DDoS), legal options, and a chapter on who you can trust.
The Appendixes make up the sixth and final section. Not a spot is wasted in the appendixes, which begin with a Unix security checklist, and then outline Unix processes, provide extensive links to both paper and electronic resources, and conclude with a sub-section on security organizations.
Among the topics I found most interesting were: Access Control Lists (ACL), Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM), the section about 128-bit keys and dictionary-based passwords, connection laundering, honeypots, the false syslog example, and the example detailing a call to Microsoft's anti-piracy help line. The real-life examples scattered throughout Practical Unix & Internet Security keep the security sections from seeming overwhelming. This is one of the few books that I've found ever chapter of the appendix useful, so don't overlook them as simple reference pages.
Normally one-liners are reserved for movie discussions but for those who've already delved into Practical Unix & Internet Security here are a few of my favorite one-liners:
- "...we do believe that making files readable and writable by everyone leads to many evil deeds." - talking about the octal mode 666.
- "Humidity is your computer's friend." - just before static discharge kills your entire system.
- "Beware of Key Employees." - warning against making one person so key that their departure could cause your company irreparable harm.
- "You mean, you don't really have a copy? [of Windows 98]" - the last part of a conversation with Microsoft's Anti-Piracy line. The company which called Microsoft's was tracing some intruders who had uploaded a copy of Windows 98 to the company's web site and was using the site to peddle warez. Microsoft was just about to launch Windows 98. The example shows just how clueless some help desks can be.
One of the great things about Practical Unix & Internet Security is that it is appropriate for a wide audience. There is relevant material for system administrators, security, company decision makers, even the guy sitting at the accounting terminal. Despite its massive size Practical Unix & Internet Security is entertaining enough to be read cover to cover. (It's good for the arm muscles too.) Though it is easy to read, beginners should probably reread their system manual before plunging headlong into this book. All in all Practical Unix & Internet Security continues to be one of those must-have books for any Linux user.
You can purchase Practical Unix & Internet Security from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
one thing unix doesnt really have to worry about is viruses..
except when the virus has a brain and the users choose weak passwords
No power requirements and need to connect to the Internet. Very handy feature.
"History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme." Mark Twain
what about social engineering? or do they trust management and sysadmins to be socially mobile, compatible, and perceptive? i think humans are one of the weaker links in the security chain.
I know that many computer users do not ever look at computer security, they just plug it in and go. At the best, some of my friends will block ports, but that is about it. They do not check logs, or anything. And how many people out there have a second PC attached by serial cable to log intrusion data? I think if more people secured their systems, then everyones security would increase because there would be less places to launch attacks from. What we need is someone at the major distros to write a program which, when executed, will secure a system. Something which is point and click "easy".
Rosco: "If brains were gunpowder, Enos couldn't blow his nose."
With Slammer and Blaster making their way into the news it seemed like a good time to brush up on security.
You don't need a 1000 page book on security to patch your systems against worms; you need a 1 page book on common sense.
-----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.12 GIT d? s: a-- C++++ UL++++ P++ L+++ E- W++ N o-- K- w--- O- M+ V PS+ P
While you make a good point about the power of google (see Thomas Friedman opinion on June 29). There is always falibility in the system to uncover results that are legitimate-- though always seemingly relevant. A book, and a longwinded one at that, is only good for putting everything in one place in this situation.
That having been said, Linux security is pretty well documented and easy to search on google. If only Windows had a bit of security, then M$ could have a book of its own as well. Sadly, Windows and security contradict one another.
The New Root Council, kickin' ass sinc
Because the uucp uid still owns all the serial port hardware. You need UUCP so that your modems will work, even though they are not running the UUCP protocol.
This is irrational. Presumably you could create any user/group you wanted and give it access to this hardware, so long as the users that the programs that need access to this hardware run as are also part of that group/that user. BUt why mess with perfection? If it works, there is no reason to change it. There is nothing magic about the name uucp. It just happens to be the name chosen by convention.